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Summary 
 
This thesis investigates the sector wide approach (SWAp) partnership in the education 
sector in Malawi. In my study, I utilized interviews with key actors and a questionnaire 
for selected development partners (DPs), government officials and members of civil 
society. In so doing, my aim was to gain an insight into the origins of the SWAp as a 
critical partnership strategy for funding sectors in developing countries based on the 
conceptual understanding that it would prove to be a more effective aid modality than 
the project approach. Being a typical basis for partnership collaboration in the wake of 
the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Malawian education SWAp, which 
was initiated as a response to the demands of changes in international aid during the 
1990s, provided the focus of the study. 
 
The findings of the study show evidence of how partnership interactions affected the 
SWAp process. This thesis demonstrates that the SWAp process has experienced 
challenges around power relations, as DPs seem to be either unwilling or unable to 
comply with the principles and partnership model prescribed in the Paris Declaration.  
 
Funding constituted the main source of power relations in this SWAp process. DPs that 
donated more money to the government created an imbalance of power and influenced 
the interactions of other actors, which adversely influenced the decision-making 
process, including policy design and implementation. This in turn affected the 
participation of government officials, civil society and those DPs that donated less 
money. The thesis argues that as long as those who loan or donate the most fail to use 
their influence positively and facilitate adherence to the principles of the Paris 
Declaration, the SWAp process is bound to continue to be adversely affected. It also 
shows that although the SWAp differs fundamentally and conceptually from the project 
approach, in reality, nothing much has changed. The thesis further argues that the initial 
assertion that a SWAp is a more effective aid modality than the project approach is 
optimistic, and is made without due consideration for the practice on the ground.  
 
In addition, the thesis demonstrates that the role of civil society as a watchdog in this 
SWAp was constrained and, although expected to constitute one of the main actors in 
the process, it was rarely viewed as part of the main partnership. It also found that even 
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though DPs seemed to embrace the innovations that a SWAp necessitated, their internal 
systems were too slow to change and adapt to the requirements of the modality. It 
argues that, moreover, DPs‟ own government mandates and internal systems restricted 
their operations in the SWAp process; which, in a sense, created conflict not only with 
their role as DPs, but also around the setting of national priorities.  
 
Finally, a key finding of the study is that minimum capacity – a “capacity base” – is 
required if the government is to engage meaningfully in a SWAp, even though such a 
modality intrinsically includes state capacity building. Indeed, capacity was an area of 
great concern, particularly in terms of the ability of government officials to engage in 
the SWAp process according to the principles of ownership and leadership – as a certain 
amount of capacity is required to lead the SWAp process by bringing together DPs and 
civil society, and clearly advancing government priorities. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the nature and structure of collaboration between various 
development partners (DPs), government officials, and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the development of 
Malawi‟s education Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) to the initiation of its 
National Education Sector Plan (NESP). Specifically, the aim of the study is to analyse 
critically the nature and dynamics of the Malawian education sector wide approach 
(SWAp) partnership and determine how this alliance influences the modality‟s process. 
This topic is particularly important, as the SWAp has become a critical partnership 
strategy in international development aid for funding sectors in developing countries 
(King 1999). In this context, a sector is determined as a division of a government‟s 
organizational structure such as education, agriculture and health. In Malawi, Health, 
Education, Water, Agriculture and Transport government sectors have adopted the 
SWAp as a means of enhancing development.  
 
Malawi embraced the new modality from 2000, initiating policy reform that would 
facilitate a SWAp development process for achieving aid effectiveness (Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development, 2005). This has been implemented as a means of 
adjusting to the demands of development agencies that are supporting a shift from 
international aid in the context of a project-based approach to the SWAp for funding 
sectors in developing countries. Such a strategy was adopted in anticipation that a 
SWAp would prove to be a more effective modality for aid delivery than the project 
approach, which has largely failed to meet expectations (Foster, 2007). 
  
My inspiration for this study stems from many years working for the United Nations 
Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) – an agency with a vision to be the driving force that helps 
to ensure that children‟s rights are realized – with which I participated in various aid 
forums, including the Malawian education SWAp, with many development partners. 
During this time, I also observed with great concern that there were still a number of 
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factors that hindered access to high quality education, particularly in rural areas; and 
yet, there were 250 projects distributed across several sectors in Malawi (Foster, 2007) 
that had made no real impact on improving access, equity or quality in education. My 
decision to undertake this study was eventually confirmed by my participation in the 
Malawian education SWAp partnership during the development of the NESP – which 
experienced a number of relationship challenges – with the hope that my research 
findings would provide some solutions to the problems. 
 
The thesis has ten chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the context of the public education 
system in Malawi with particular emphasis on sector reform. It highlights the many 
challenges in terms of funding, access, quality, equity, and internal efficiency that 
confront the education sector. It shows how with Malawi‟s high dependence on 
international development aid, the SWAp process was associated with increasing 
funding to the education sector, an intervention that would ultimately assist the 
government to achieve the international targets of Education for All (EFA) and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This led to high expectations among 
government officials who anticipated that a SWAp partnership would address these 
challenges. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the historical circumstances that led to the shift from the project-
based approach, characterized as totalitarian whereby donors had full control over funds 
and implementation, to the SWAp as a more egalitarian and democratic modality for 
funding developing countries. It acknowledges the necessity of the SWAp, but also 
highlights the challenges that many other countries have experienced due to deviation 
from the conceptual understanding of the approach mainly during implementation on 
the ground. The chapter also portrays a modality conceived in the rarefied atmosphere 
of the Paris Declaration purely from a theoretical perspective that has not always borne 
much resemblance to the reality on the ground. Finally, this literature review is used to 
frame my research question with regard to the SWAp partnership which is:  
 
How do stakeholders‟ perspectives on partnership influence the education SWAp 
process in Malawi – from the Policy and Investment Framework to the National 
Education Sector Plan? 
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Chapter 4 provides details of the methodology used for the investigation. Owing to the 
nature of a study that focuses on understanding the structure of an education 
partnership, exploring the perspectives and opinions of its actors was a prerequisite to 
determining the effect that such an alliance had on the SWAp process. Consequently, 
the study utilizes a social constructivist philosophical framework to explore the views of 
DPs, government officials, and CSOs and NGOs as actors in the education SWAp 
process. 
 
The thesis addresses the perceptions of actors on the emergence of the Malawian 
education SWAp partnership, relationships and roles of partners, power relations, and 
funding to the sector. A mixed methods approach is adopted based on the aims of the 
study. 
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 present the data from the study. Chapter 5 investigates the 
perspectives of various actors on the emergence of the education SWAp, beginning by 
providing their varying perceptions on the rationale for the emergence of the 
partnership. Chapter 6 examines the various actors‟ perspectives on their relationships 
and roles in the SWAp partnership. Chapter 8 investigates the various viewpoints on 
power relations in the partnership. Finally, Chapter 7 explores how the partnership 
influenced education funding.  
 
Chapter 9 discusses the way power was conceptualized in this SWAp partnership, and 
examines the manner in which it was exercised in view of the challenges to the 
realization of a SWAp model, as defined by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005).  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and presents a summary of the main findings of 
the study, the contribution of the thesis, and the implications of the findings for SWAps 
in Malawi and beyond. It also enumerates areas for further research based on the 
findings of the study.  
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Chapter 2 
Education Reform in Malawi  
 
2.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides the context of the reform of the Malawian public education 
system; and links changes in international development aid with internal reform of the 
sector. The chapter also highlights key events in the history of education in Malawi; the 
many challenges in terms of funding, access, quality, equity, and efficiency that 
confronted the education sector; and how the new modality was adopted in the 
anticipation that a SWAp would address these challenges.  
    
2.1 Overview of Malawi and its Education System 
 
Malawi is a former British colony, which was known as Nyasaland from 1907 until 
independence in 1964, when Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda became prime minister and 
changed the name. The country became a republic two years‟ later in 1966, with Dr 
Banda as the first President of the Republic of Malawi (Ng‟ambi, 2010). He ruled the 
country for 30 years, maintaining tight control over administration of the land and its 
resources (Chimombo, 2009); thus, effectively, turning Malawi into an autocratic state 
(Rose, 2002). 
 
As one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, Malawi relies heavily 
on donor funds to finance its national budget. The poverty rate is estimated to be 65.3 
percent of the total population; it has a GNP per capita of approximately U$160; about 
52 percent of the population lives below the poverty benchmark of US$1 per day; and it 
has a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) prevalence of 12 percent amongst the 15–49 years age group – albeit a slight 
improvement from a peak of 14 percent (Ministry of Education Science and 
Technology, 2006; Malawi Education Country Status Report, 2009). Furthermore, such 
destitution is characterized by unsatisfactory social conditions, which include high 
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infant and maternal mortality rates, low literacy levels, and poor health (Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development, 2005). Therefore, education is essential to build 
the knowledge and skills necessary for increased agricultural productivity, improved 
health, and enhanced socio-economic well-being. The Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS) acknowledges the role of education in its key planning 
document: „[Education] is a catalyst for socio-economic development, industrial growth 
and an instrument for empowering the poor, the weak and the voiceless‟ (MGDS, 
2006). The centrality of the role of education is underscored in this statement hence the 
need to address the aforementioned challenges through enhanced funding to the sector. 
 
Malawi continues to rely heavily on donor financing of the education sector, which is 
supported by several DPs in a combined effort to improve the prevailing situation. 
Active agencies include the Department for International Development (DFID) – a 
traditional donor from the time of independence; the African Development Bank 
(ADB); the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); the German 
Development Bank (KFW); the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ); the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA); the United Nations Children‟s Fund 
(UNICEF); the World Food Programme (WFP); the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID); the United Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA); and the World Bank (WB). Donor funds are coordinated by the Ministry of 
Finance in accordance with the Paris Declaration framework and the Accra Agenda for 
Action (Ng‟ambi, 2010).  
 
Donor support to the sector primarily takes the form of improvement to quality, equity 
and access to free primary education (FPE). Indeed, the primary school grade repetition 
rate had increased to 20 percent by 2006, and is currently one of the highest in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Malawi Education Country Status 
Report, 2009; Ng‟ambi, 2010). This is largely due to the poor quality of education on 
offer, whereby the number of children who reached a minimum level in English 
reading, for example, decreased by 50 percent from 1998 to 2004, by which time it had 
dropped to barely 9 percent (Malawi Education Country Status Report, 2009).  
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This suggests that donor support to the education sector is still very much needed to 
address challenges in the system that are largely due to inadequate funding. For 
example, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) budget was 
reduced from 27 percent of the national budget in 1994/95 to approximately 14.1 
percent in 2007/08, which had a negative effect on the implementation of sector 
programmes (Ng‟ambi 2010).  
 
Malawi underwent a major political change in 1994, from a one-party state under the 
autocratic rule of Dr Banda to a multi-party state. Such an innovation was brought about 
because the people of Malawi believed that the Banda government had failed them in 
several ways; particularly in respect of human rights and freedom, which had been 
violated under the previous regime. The education system of the Banda government also 
remained highly elitist, effectively perpetuating the colonial era practice of limiting 
access to the privileged few owing to the fact that the majority of parents could not 
afford to send their children to school (Chimombo, 2009; Rose, 2002).  
 
Therefore, upon winning the democratic elections of 1994, the first multi-party 
government of Bakili Muluzi made a deliberate policy decision to improve the national 
situation. Accordingly, it adopted a development strategy that promoted smallholder 
agriculture (as opposed to the large-scale farms that prevailed during the Banda era), 
expansion of the private sector, and improved delivery of basic social services 
(Chimombo, 2009; Rose, 2000).  
 
Thus, the first democratic government landmark achievement was the introduction of 
free primary education (FPE) in 1994. This policy was implemented in order to meet the 
demand for greater access to education by the Malawian people and the international 
agenda for education as set at the 1990 Jomtien World Conference on Education for All 
(EFA). It was also designed as a means of executing the World Bank-supported poverty 
alleviation programme (PAP), which was drawn up following the first multi-party 
elections and associated low enrolment with the inability of many Malawians to pay 
school fees, among other issues (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
1995).  
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Therefore, 1994 not only signalled the beginning of a new era in the country‟s political 
domain, but also in its education system. Consequently, the Malawian education system 
can be categorized according to three main phases: the colonial era, post-independence: 
the Banda era, and post-independence: the democratization era.    
 
2.2 A Brief History of Education in Malawi 
 
2.2.1 The Colonial Era (1891–1963) 
 
Malawi‟s education system was fashioned after that of its colonial masters, initially 
taking the form of a “4-3-3” system, that is, four years of primary, three years of junior 
secondary and three years of senior secondary education. This was later changed to a 
“5-3-4-2” system that comprised five years of junior primary, three years of senior 
primary, four years of basic secondary education and two years of study for external 
examinations, at the end of which students took the British General Certificate of 
Education Ordinary Level (GCE O level) (Ng‟ambi, 2010). The financing of education 
was initially only made possible through donations and the payment of school fees by 
overseas missions (Ng‟ambi, 2010; Rose, 2002), but this was later changed, as 
explained below.  
 
During the colonial era, education was provided mainly by missionaries who charged 
fees, and „the focus of the missionaries on education was to enable Christians to read 
the Holy Bible‟ (Ng‟ambi, 2010, p.21). Accordingly, the missionaries adopted the view 
that if Africans learned to read and write, their evangelical mission would be easier to 
accomplish (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002). However, the broad aim changed over time 
and education was extended to cover other subjects such as general reading, writing, 
arithmetic, carpentry, bricklaying and needlecraft. However, there was no state 
coordination in terms of either policy or standards until 1907, when the colonial 
government began to provide funding that was initially directed towards the unification 
of the education system (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002; Malawi EFA Assessment Report, 
2000); although such support was maintained at the comparatively low level of only ten 
percent of the required total budget until 1920 (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002).  
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However, later, the government became significantly more involved in education 
administration, a development that was facilitated by the Phelps Stokes Commission of 
1924, which recommended the establishment of an agency that would be responsible for 
coordinating and supervising schooling provided by the missionaries, and evaluate the 
curriculum (such as it was) that they were offering (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002) 
Subsequently, the colonial government established the Department of Education in 
1926; hence, by 1940, the government had assumed more control over education and 
had begun to set curriculum standards (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, the financing of education was initially only made possible through 
donations and the payment of school fees by overseas missions (Ng‟ambi, 2010; Rose, 
2002). Amongst other strategies, the Phelps-Stokes Commission report of 1924 
recommended the setting up of a grant-in-aid system that also emphasized the education 
of girls and led to the establishment of such a provision by the government in 1927, 
which continued to the post-independence period (Rose, 2002; Ng‟ambi, 2010). From 
personal experience working in the education sector in Malawi, I observed that this 
policy had been maintained during the post-independence era to support mission 
schools – also known as grant-aided schools; a finding corroborated by Ng‟ambi (2010) 
and the Malawi EFA Assessment Report (2000). However, limited support to education 
by the colonial government suggests that very few people were able to gain access to it 
during this era, thereby denying them the opportunity to develop and become productive 
citizens.  
 
Secondary education was accorded even less attention during the colonial era and there 
were then very few secondary schools in the country (Ng‟ambi, 2010; Malawi EFA 
Assessment Report, 2000). This further indicates the extent to which education 
expansion was constrained during the colonial era, thereby leaving a big gap in the 
system for the post-independence government to fill. 
 
From the onset of colonization, the Malawian education system was constrained in 
terms of expansion due to inadequate funding, donations from missionaries and income 
through school fees proving inadequate to meet the requirements of the system. As 
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observed earlier, even after the colonial government began to support public education, 
this assistance still fell short of the total requirements of the sector at that time, thereby 
creating both access and funding gaps that would later require redressing. The focus on 
urban areas in the provision of education and reliance on self-help for rural areas during 
the colonial era (Rose, 2002) entailed obvious inequality in the system, regardless of 
well-intentioned policies that ostensibly ensured that the inadequate education budget 
was augmented and communities involved in the education of their children. In essence, 
such attempts seemed to defer the resolution of a problem that meanwhile only grew 
bigger.  
 
2.2.2 Post-independence: the Banda Era (1964–1992) 
 
During the period immediately following independence, although most schools were 
nominally controlled by the government, they were owned by missionaries (Ng‟ambi, 
2010). However, the government gradually assumed responsibility for funding the 
sector, including policy direction (Kadzamira and Kunje, 2000). Although efforts to 
expand education were made, the government largely maintained the colonial strategy 
of non-expansion with regard to the primary level, a policy expressed in the 
establishment of a few additional government primary schools, but concentration on 
secondary and higher education.  
 
The aim of education during this era was to develop a competent workforce with 
relevant expertise to fill jobs in government offices to a certain extent, but mainly in the 
agricultural and technical sectors; a strategy that was later reflected in the 1974–76 
Education Policy Paper (Chimombo, 2009; Rose, 2002). Although this move favoured 
the development of higher education, the policy of slow localization adopted in respect 
of the civil service suggests that the foundations of schooling at the primary level were 
being undermined, which had repercussions that would later affect both secondary and 
higher levels. This further entailed less investment in primary education than was 
anticipated. 
 
In order to fulfil the new strategy for the education sector, the Banda administration 
focused on the expansion of secondary education, which was viewed as critical to the 
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economy and the development of the modern sector (Rose and Dyer, 2006), by building 
one so-called government day secondary school in each district, institutes that were less 
expensive to run than the colonial boarding schools (Malawi Government Economic 
Report, 1966).  
 
From my personal experience working in the education sector in Malawi, I observed 
that the Banda government also established distance learning opportunities for 
secondary school students via Malawi College of Distance Education (MCDE) centres 
throughout the country. The expansion programme increased access to 8,000 students in 
1967, an enrolment that in 1972 rose to 12,800 places that were offered in excess of 60 
schools (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, due to a perceived need to address human resource requirements in filling 
posts in the new government, the administration also focused on higher education 
(Malawi Government Economic Report, 1966), founding the University of Malawi in 
1964, which having begun operations the following year, by 1990 had an enrolment of 
approximately 4,829 students, 26 percent of whom were female (Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology, 2011).  
   
Other countries such as Tanzania that had recently gained independence followed the 
socialist practice of introducing mass education (Rose, 2002). However, the first 
Malawian Education Development Plan (1973–80) drawn up in 1973 placed the 
emphasis firmly on secondary and tertiary education, which also meant that more 
funding was directed towards these levels. Yet, it was too broad, its strategies were 
unclear, and it thus failed to make an effective impact on education (Chimombo, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the second Education Development Plan (1985–95) was regarded as being 
more focused, clearly specifying key areas and targets that not only included access, 
quality and efficiency, but also highlighted universal primary education (UPE) as a goal 
for the first time (Kadzamira and Rose, 2003; Chimombo, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, the success of both the first and second education development plans was 
short-lived due to the government‟s lack of financial resources to implement the 
policies (Chimombo, 2009). Unfortunately, such common financial constraints in the 
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Malawian context could be misinterpreted as meaning that the policies themselves were 
flawed, hence the perceived need for new ones perpetuating the proliferation of policy 
documents that were never really implemented beyond an initial short period due to lack 
of funding, as observed by Booth et al. (2006). This further indicates how a lack of 
financial resources can negatively affect not only education programmes, but also the 
implementation of well-intentioned sector policies. An example of inadequate funding 
during the Banda era is demonstrated in the expenditure on education as a percentage of 
total recurrent government expenditure, which was 16.5 percent in 1967/68 and dropped 
to 11.8 percent in 1979/80 (Rose, 2002). 
 
2.2.3 Democratization: the Muluzi Era (1994–2004)  
 
This era is characterized by the introduction of FPE, which, although celebrated by most 
of the country owing to its initial spectacular impact on access to primary education, 
failed to sustain such optimism in the long term. Enrolment increased from 1.9 million 
in the 1993–94 academic year to almost three million in 1994–95 (Chimombo, 1999; 
Rose and Dyer, 2006; World Bank, 2004). However, these unforeseen dramatic 
consequences only created more problems in the form of unmanageably large class sizes 
resulting in congested classrooms; insufficient teaching and learning materials; 
inadequate infrastructure that witnessed classes being taught in the open air; and the 
recruitment of 18,000 untrained teachers in an attempt to meet the demand (Ministry of 
Education, 1994:Rose and Dyer, 2006).  
 
The impact of FPE not only put pressure on the primary sector, which had been 
neglected for a long time, but also on secondary and tertiary education. These problems 
arose from the lack of a well-designed plan that took into consideration all key policy 
issues and translated them into goals at the implementation stage (World Bank 2004; 
Chimombo, 2009). Although Chimombo (2009) argues that the country should have 
prepared for this innovation more thoroughly and anticipated the consequences of such 
a huge increase in enrolment in order to prepare the system adequately – which is true to 
a great extent – the fact remains that even with such a level of preparation, there was 
still a major challenge in funding the implementation of the initiative. Therefore, this 
created even greater need for donor funding to address the situation. 
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Consequently, due to the huge strain on the education system created by FPE, the 
Ministry of Education responded by producing a paper called the Policy and Investment 
Framework (PIF) in 1995. This document was designed to guide the development of the 
education sector, identifying policy and prioritizing sector programmes (Chimombo, 
2009). The document also provided a guide to the donor community in order to ensure 
efficiency and the flow of funds in the education system (Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology, 2001). The government also sought financial support from 
both local and international donors and development partners to assist in the 
implementation of FPE. The FPE policy coincided with World Bank education funding 
reform of 1995. As a result, Malawi benefitted from the newly revised loans, and, in 
accordance with the conditions attached to them, the influence of human capital was 
confirmed and reflected in the PIF (Chimombo, 2009).  
 
Initially developed as a direct response to problems created by the FPE, the PIF was not 
very successful, since in attempting to repair the damage caused by the unplanned 
adoption of the former, policy was prioritized at the expense of policy implementation 
(Chimombo, 2009). The objectives of FPE might have been laudable in terms of 
increasing access, eliminating inequality between groups, and sensitizing communities 
to the importance of education (Kadzamira, 2003) – and, moreover, seem to have been 
achieved, albeit briefly. Yet, the impact of the dramatic increase in enrolment on the 
education system took a toll on sector resources that resulted in compromising the 
quality of education (Kadzamira and Chibwana, 2000; Kadzamira, 2003), which tended 
to have a counter effect on access, perpetuating the very inequality FPE was intended to 
eliminate, as children were inadvertently rejected from the system due to adverse 
conditions.  
 
Following these events, the Ministry of Education and its development partners felt the 
need to revise the PIF in 1999. The development of the PIF was an attempt to formulate 
a long-term development strategy for the education sector that would establish a clear 
set of policy priorities, which, in turn, would guide donor interventions and ensure a 
systematic approach to investment in the sector (Policy and Investment Framework, 
1999). As Chimombo (2009) observes, the intention was to explicitly outline the 
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problems on the ground and suggest policies and strategies to be adopted in order to 
solve them (Chimombo, 2009).  
 
The revised PIF‟s key areas of focus are access, equity and quality across the different 
levels of education. It also recognizes the importance of technical and vocational 
training in accordance with human capital theory. The mission statements for all levels 
of education express the common goals of building human capital, imparting knowledge 
and skills, an agenda of sustainable economic growth, and poverty alleviation (Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology, 2001).  
 
Although human capital theory is not concerned solely with education, the empirical 
measures of growth and returns on investment have mostly been applied to this sector, 
hence its continued influence on education policy and planning. The fundamentals of 
human capital theory are rooted in the notion that economic growth is derived from 
investment in people (Blundell, et al., 1999). Although Sweetland (1996) perceives 
education as having many benefits, including improved health, reduced fertility rate, 
enlightenment, and the realization of one‟s rights, these qualities are rather difficult to 
measure; therefore, this explains the extensive focus on economic growth, which can be 
measured empirically. Therefore, education takes precedence over other sectors in 
prioritizing policy at macro level, as was the case in the Malawian context when 
developing the MGDS.  
 
The democratic era of Bakili Muluzi thus marked the dominance of the influence of 
human capital theory in the provision of education in Malawi, an approach that was 
characterized by even greater expansion of the secondary education sector, with the 
World Bank playing a major role in supporting the policy (Rose and Dyer, 2006). 
However, with few public resources, secondary and tertiary education remained elitist 
(Chimombo; 2009), these education levels actually are becoming less accessible due to 
high costs and limited space.  
 
University enrolment increased from 3,526 in 2002 to 7,400 in 2005, a figure that 
includes the 1,302 students enrolled in parallel programmes (Government of Malawi, 
2005), that is, courses in which students who qualify for university entrance are given 
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the opportunity to attend classes alongside those enrolled on conventional programmes 
but who live off campus due to limited accommodation.    
 
Although it is being addressed, the implication of a trend whereby there is limited 
access to higher levels of education due to the lack of government finances to undertake 
further expansion is that a significant proportion of the population will be left powerless 
to contribute to the fundamental changes in economic growth and development that are 
envisaged in the MGDS. The situation characterizing the education system in Malawi 
suggests that there must be additional funding to the sector to support the 
implementation of new education policies and strategies if successful progress across all 
levels of education is to be ensured in order to realise the aspirations expressed in the 
MGDS and the PIF.  
 
2.3 The Current State of the Education System and its Challenges 
 
The education system continues to follow one of the broad aims of the government, 
which is to alleviate poverty. The Government of Malawi also recognizes the 
importance of education as a critical element in the development and nurturing of an 
educated leadership and effective governance (Policy and Investment Framework, 
2001).  
 
Basic education is provided mainly by public institutions, which enrol 99 percent of 
pupils at the primary level and 77 percent of those at the secondary level (Malawi 
Education Country Status Report, 2009). The total school education cycle amounts to 
16 years, which is divided into three main phases, comprising 8 years of primary, 4 
years of secondary, and 4 years of university education (Ng‟ambi, 2010; World Bank, 
2004). At the end of the primary cycle, students take the Primary School Leaving 
Certificate Examination, which determines their eligibility for entrance to the secondary 
level. However, not all students who pass the examination are enrolled in secondary 
school due limited space (Ng‟ambi, 2010; Malawi Education Country Status Report, 
2009). Those who do complete their secondary education also take an examination 
known as the Malawi School Certificate Examination, which determines eligibility for 
university. Again, university places are extremely limited, meaning that an even smaller 
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number of secondary school students who pass the examination are able to proceed to 
tertiary education (Malawi Country Status Report, 2009).  
 
Thus, the Malawian education system continues to face many challenges, particularly at 
the primary level, including access, quality, equity, and internal efficiency (Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology, 2001a). Indeed, the sector has not yet fully 
recovered from the effects of the main policy reform of FPE, some of which are 
indicated above. A specific problem confronting the education system at primary level 
comprises high repetition and dropout rates. More than ten percent of eligible children 
remain out of school (mainly the hard to reach, orphans, vulnerable, girls and those with 
special learning needs). Additionally, although almost all children in Malawi enter 
Standard 1, only 40 percent reach Standard 4; 30 percent Standard 6; and only 26 
percent complete Standard 8 – and of those who do finish their primary education, only 
16 percent are girls (Kadzamira, 2005). 
 
As Chimombo (2009) also observes, one of the biggest challenges facing the Malawian 
education system is quality, which, over the years, has deteriorated across all levels, 
necessitating urgent action to reverse the situation. Indeed, there is still a large 
proportion of unqualified teachers, poor teacher to pupil ratios, and a lack of resources, 
all of which affect the quality of education implemented under such a system. Yet, 
quality is an important consideration if the government is to benefit from its investment 
in education. Although the formulation and implementation of plausible strategies is 
required if such investment is to provide returns, this also necessitates greater funding to 
a sector that is already under-resourced in comparison to other sub-Saharan African 
countries (Malawi Local Education Donor Group, 2009). 
 
Evidence from the recent Malawian Education Country Status Report (2009) confirms 
that there are many challenges confronting the education system, principally: 
 
 Poor teaching quality, test scores and national examination pass rates, according 
to the Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 
(SACMEQ)  
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 A severe shortage of teachers at the primary level, with a student to teacher ratio 
of 80:1 in 2007 ( a drop from 63:1 in 2000) and a student to qualified teacher 
ratio of 88:1 
 Access to each subsequent level of education suffers from greater location and 
income disparities, with a difference in the primary completion rate of 14 
percent between boys and girls; 34 percent between urban and rural students; 
and 44 percent between the richest 20 percent of the population and the poorest 
20 percent 
 Technical education, vocational and entrepreneurial training (TEVET) is 
fragmented with very low enrolment rates 
 Higher education enrolment is one of the lowest in the world  
 Primary education enjoys the largest share of recurrent education expenditure, at 
44 percent of the total (but which is largely due to the highest recruitment of 
teachers being at this level); higher education is allocated 27 percent; and 
secondary education is assigned 22 percent; while the total share for pre-school, 
literacy, TEVET and teacher training does not amount to more than 7 percent 
 Low priority is given to early childhood development (ECD) and literacy   
 
The following quotation summarizes and emphasizes the extent of the problem, and not 
only the context in which the Malawian education system must operate and develop, but 
also the anticipated amount of financial resources needed to address the challenge: 
 
The Malawian education system has to develop within a heavier 
demographic context than that of its neighbouring countries [original 
emphasis]. Malawi‟s population, estimated at 13 million inhabitants in 2008, is 
increasing at the rate of 2.4 percent per year. The 5–16-year-old age group 
represents 37 percent of the total population. This is the highest proportion of 
that age group in the entire Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region. It is estimated that the population growth rate will slowly decrease, but 
that the primary school age group (6–13 years old) will increase by 20 percent 
between now and 2018 (Malawi Country Status Report, 2009, p.4).    
 
Based not only on the various definitions and principles of the SWAp (Buchert, 2002), 
but also on a comparison with the project approach – which has failed to yield the 
desired results, and is consequently blamed for the fragmentation of the sector and 
alienation of the government in removing it from the centre of control in handling aid 
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(Hamblin, 2006) – most stakeholders remain focused on the potential of the new 
modality, and proceed on this basis as  the best chance of overcoming challenges. The 
optimism for the Malawian education SWAp is reflected in the section of the NESP 
entitled A Sector Wide Approach to Development of the Sector, as revealed in the 
following quotation: 
 
MoEST, together with its partners, has explored the potential of adopting a 
sector-wide approach to the planning and development of the sector.  It 
recognizes that a sector-wide approach (SWAp) is an approach to service 
delivery that brings Government and partners together in a manner, which 
promotes national ownership, alignment of sector objectives, and coherence of 
financing and harmonization of procedures.  MoEST perceives a SWAp as 
providing a solution to problematic issues arising from a traditional project 
approach.  These issues may include: a compromised holistic impact on the 
sector; a relatively narrow focus; the emergence of parallel management and 
support systems; and skewed national resource allocation.  MoEST also believes 
that benefits arising from a SWAp include linking macro-level policies and 
plans to sector-level strategies, and the closer alignment of major programmes 
with the budgetary structures and processes set out in the Medium Term 
Economic Framework (MTEF).  
 
The NESP provides a strong basis for a SWAp, mapping, as it does, issues 
across the whole sector and presenting a complete picture of issues, needs, major 
strategies and priorities. The NESP also now forms the basis of all investment 
in (by Government of Malawi and all Development Partners) and 
development of the sector for the ten-year planning period.  Future 
decisions about funding will be based upon this plan [original emphasis] 
(Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, August 2006, p.6). 
 
Such blind optimism expressed at the time of the development of the NESP cannot go 
unchallenged, especially in the wake of the questions and criticisms raised by Buchert 
and Epskamp (2000), which reveal that there were difficulties in complying with the 
principles of a SWAp at the implementation stage. However, the education reform 
proceeded on the basis that, among other things, it would enhance funding to address 
sector challenges. 
 
Thus the Bingu wa Mutharika era which followed the Muluzi reign in 2004 is mainly 
identified with reforms such as the NESP and the MGDS. President Bingu implemented 
reform processes at a time when the country enjoyed good aid relations owing to his 
initial tough stand against corruption, and the exercise of good fiscal discipline and 
governance, which witnessed the resumption of the flow of aid that had been withheld 
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during Muluzi‟s last years in power. To begin with, Bingu‟s term of office showed 
significant steady progress in terms of macroeconomic conditions and indicators that 
was considered worthy of recognition by the international community. Unfortunately, 
such promise was short-lived, just as the introduction of FPE during Muluzi‟s era had 
been, as the government seemed to drift away from its original commitment to good 
governance (Wroe, 2012). Not long after the expulsion of the British High 
Commissioner all the other donors withdrew assistance to Malawi. This had a negative 
effect on aid, since China does not support the country in all sectors as the international 
donor community had done; and, as a result, Malawians began to experience the 
negative effects of aid withdrawal.  
 
Malawi, which until four years ago had diplomatic ties with the Republic of Taiwan, 
made a sudden shift in its international relations policy to establish diplomatic links 
with the People‟s Republic of China, based on my knowledge as a citizen living in the 
country at that time. This change was made almost immediately after Malawian 
President Bingu wa Mutharika spoke at the UN General Assembly, making a strong 
appeal to all to support the Taiwanese government in its bid for recognition. There was 
speculation that perhaps this dramatic attempt to persuade the entire world community 
of Taiwan‟s political legitimacy was in some way made as a calculated bid to gain the 
direct attention of the powerful People‟s Republic of China, and prompt it to turn its 
attention to Malawi just as it had with neighbouring Zambia.  
 
Accordingly, the incident marked the exit of the Taiwanese government from the 
Malawian aid arena and the entrance of China as a powerful donor that seemed to be 
flexible enough to accommodate some major development and construction projects. 
Subsequently, China has maintained an influential presence in the country, not only in 
political terms, but also with regard to the commercial sector. In addition both critics 
and proponents of Bingu‟s stance seem to link the influence of China to the bold step 
taken by the former president to expel the British High Commissioner ostensibly on 
account of criticism of deteriorating governance (Collins, 2010). 
 
However, there have been many policy reverses in Malawi with the inauguration in 
April 2012 of President Joyce Banda, who has already demonstrated strong positive 
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steps towards the recovery of an economic situation, which had hitherto been suffering 
from mismanagement and the withdrawal of aid. Based on her recent press releases 
President Banda hopes to make further headway on developing the mining, tourism and 
agricultural industries to enhance the economy. 
 
2.4 Education Reform and the Involvement of DPs 
 
The Malawian education sector has undergone significant policy reform over the past 
two decades in an attempt to respond to external pressure emanating from the demands 
of international development aid, which is linked to international targets (Colclough, 
2005; King and Rose, 2005). Such assistance has also been associated with the 
macroeconomic policies of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, 
which, it is argued, have tended to undermine the role of the state and promoted neo-
liberal economic policy prescriptions (Malhotra, n.d.; George, 1999; King, 1992).  
 
As has been indicated earlier, the Government of Malawi‟s major education reform 
process can be traced back to 1994 when the country first became a democracy after 
ushering in a new government that had promised free primary education (FPE) in its 
election manifesto, which it indeed introduced in its first year in office (Rose and 
Kadzamira, 2003). This policy was largely aligned to the WB Poverty Alleviation 
Programme, which was an initiative launched in the same year that emphasized the role 
of education in reducing destitution (Smith, 2005).  
 
As part of this reform, the process of switching to a SWAp was initiated in 1999 when, 
in response to the requirements of international aid trends, the Ministry of Education, 
Sports and Culture developed the Policy and Investment Framework (PIF), which was 
viewed as a step towards developing a long-term development strategy for the education 
sector (Policy and Investment Framework, 1999). The PIF provided a timely 
opportunity for the ministry to review its 1995–2005 education strategy in order to 
establish a clear direction for policy priorities and reforms in the sector (Ministry of 
Education, Sports and culture, 1999).  
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During the development process of the PIF, DPs, and CSOs and NGOs started working 
closely together in thematic groups to develop the policy document and ensure that it 
was well balanced. These thematic groupings evolved into one education sector group 
that conducted regular meetings with the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (as it had by then become), thus marking the beginning of a SWAp 
partnership that embraced civil society in the development agenda (Joint Sector Review 
Report, 2006). This period also witnessed a change from the commonly used 
terminology of “donors” to “development partners”, or “cooperating partners”, some 
government officials using the two new names interchangeably.  Education joint sector 
reviews were introduced after the development of the PIF, which were intended to 
assess progress in the sector based on indicators and targets identified in the PIF 
document. The joint sector reviews were introduced as an annual exercise, a process 
that continues to the present. Thus, the purpose of involving DPs was to support the 
government with funding and technical expertise in the SWAp process. 
 
Vision 2020: National Long-Term Development Perspective for Malawi was also 
developed in 1999 and this policy document has continued to guide subsequent 
development efforts. It steers the implementation of medium-term policies such as the 
MGDS, which incorporate the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) that was 
developed in 2002, the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy, and various other sector 
strategies and policies (OECD, 2007; Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
2005). Formulated in 2006, the MGDS represents an overarching framework for 
addressing poverty and economic growth. Additionally, during the development of the 
MPRS in 2002, the thematic groups continued working together in partnership, as was 
the case with the PIF (Joint Sector Review Report, 2006). The coherence provided by 
Vision 2020 is crucial to the effectiveness of policies and strategies, although there has 
been a tendency to depart from such a format owing to the political aspirations of 
individual leaders, a ploy that only derails progress and affects donor funding; as was 
the case when Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) withdrew its 
much-needed aid to Malawi (Van der Meer et al., 2007). 
 
As part of ongoing government reorganization, in 2001, the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology embarked on a further programme of significant restructuring 
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known as PCAR. This initiative started as a project, the principal goal of which was to 
ensure the development, implementation and monitoring of a basic national primary 
curriculum that addressed both the academic and non-academic needs of students, 
including strategies for preventing and coping with HIV and AIDS (Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology, 2001b). The PCAR intervention secured two DPs 
in DFID and GTZ, which cooperated to support the project. However, the partnership 
around the implementation of the PCAR incorporated further DPs including CIDA, 
UNICEF and USAID (PCAR Risk Assessment for the Supply Chain of Standards 2 and 
6, 2007). However, government funding for the implementation of PCAR remained 
insufficient (Ng‟ambi, 2010).  
 
Subsequently, from 2004, operating in a SWAp partnership, the Government of Malawi, 
DPs and civil society embarked on the development of the NESP, which became a 
widely recognized landmark reform. Consequently, the NESP was distinguished as the 
main SWAp document that operationalized education policy aims.  
 
However, the process of developing the NESP was a protracted one and major 
amendments had to be made in order to align it with the requirements of the Fast Track 
Initiative (FTI), as the functioning of an effective SWAp partnership was also regarded 
as being one of the conditionalities of the FTI (Malawi Education Country Status 
Report, 2009). Consequently, the government utilized the education SWAp opportunity 
to develop an NESP that could be adapted to facilitate its application for FTI funds. As 
a result, Malawi struggled for a long time to qualify for the initiative‟s funds – the aid 
package that was expected to contribute towards improving the education sector in order 
to register progress on EFA targets and the MDGs (Malawi Education Country Status 
Report, 2009). This raises the question of the appropriateness of the criteria that the WB 
applies when assessing countries for FTI funds – now known as Global Partnership for 
Education – (Rose, 2005). Introducing stringent conditionalities could mean that crucial 
international development aid is denied to those countries that cannot easily meet the 
macroeconomic conditions for accessing the support they need. This further suggests 
that such requirements may well defeat the very essence of the aim of aid provision in 
the interests of meeting international targets on time. 
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Samoff (1999) voices a similar concern in terms of the multifaceted role that 
international development aid has assumed. Addressing domestic education sector 
challenges whilst at the same time striving to achieve international targets has further 
complicated aid provision and rendered developing countries vulnerable to the 
conditionalities of aid agencies, as was the case in the Malawian context whereby the 
education sector became a casualty of such conditionality when Denmark decided to 
discontinue its aid programme in 2002. The Danish government acted on the basis that 
the Government of Malawi had failed to live up to the conditions of strengthening its 
administration, improving governance and reducing corruption (Van der Meer et al., 
2007).  Following this abrupt withdrawal of assistance, the Malawian education sector 
experienced many setbacks because „the volume of Danish support to Malawi‟s 
educational [sic] sector was substantial‟ (Van der Meer et al., 2007, p.9); thus, 
emphasizing the effects of the country‟s heavy dependence on donor funding.    
  
In spite of internal policy reform that has responded to the demands of changing trends 
in international development assistance and the main reform policy of FPE (which has 
yielded increases in enrolment of over 60 percent) (Rose and Dyer, 2006), the Malawian 
education system is still facing many challenges that require enhanced funding to the 
sector. Even with additional FTI funds amounting to US$90 million that Malawi 
obtained in 2010, combined with supplementary assistance from all the DPs operating 
in the sector, there is still an estimated shortfall of US$130 million in the execution of 
the Education Sector Implementation Plan (ESIP), a medium-term initiative for the 
operationalization of the NESP (Malawi Local Donor Group, 2009). All this serves to 
underscore the magnitude of a financing requirement in the education sector that has 
remained persistently substantial from the colonial era right up to the present. Thus, the 
expectation that a SWAp would transform this situation, enhance funding to the 
education sector, and consequently address the various challenges in the system is high.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed the context of Malawian education reform. It has highlighted 
changes in international development assistance and their link to the initiation of 
internal education reform in the country. The chapter has also identified challenges in 
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the Malawian public education system in terms of funding, access, quality, equity, and 
internal efficiency. It has discussed the reasons for adopting the new modality in the 
expectation that a SWAp partnership would address these challenges.  
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Chapter 3 
The Sector Wide Approach – A Product of Trends in 
International Development Aid 
 
3.0 Introduction      
 
The SWAp emerged at a time of innovation in international development that 
increasingly linked aid to international targets for poverty reduction, EFA and the 
MDGs (King and Buchert, 1999; Buchert, 2002; Walt et al., 1999; Colclough, 2005; 
Virtue, 2005; Smith, 2000; King and Rose, 2005). In terms of primary education, the 
pledges made by developed countries at the World Conference on Education for All 
(WCEFA) in 2000 resulted in increased international aid to developing countries (King, 
1992) that required a new modality – the SWAp – for the effective delivery of 
assistance.  
 
3.1 Trends in International Aid and the Influence of Development 
Theories 
 
This section focuses on the historical events that led to changes in international 
development aid; the effects of neo-liberalism on education aid, and the 
operationalization of the former during the Washington Consensus and Post-
Washington Consensus periods; and how the notion of human capital drove WB 
investment in education based on analysis of the rate of return. Subsections also reveal 
how competing development theories influenced trends in the international aid arena, as 
the North, or Western countries, attempted to support the development of the South.   
 
3.1.1 Historical Perspective 
 
International assistance to education formed an aspect of global development 
cooperation (Forster, 1999). Accordingly, this was firmly established on new 
foundations of international relations during the decolonization period following the end 
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of the Second World War up to the 1960s. Thus, the concept of the North and the South 
was established, whereby the former represented developed or rich countries and the 
latter underdeveloped or poor countries.  During this period, the North assumed 
internationally accepted responsibility for the development of the South, thereby 
heralding the beginning of international development cooperation (Forster, 1999). This 
model was shaped by the development theories that are discussed throughout this 
section. 
 
Escobar (1995) and Foster (2001) also independently argue that the concept of 
“development”, which groups countries into “developed” and “developing” nations, 
evolved as a result of changes in international cooperation that emerged during the 
decolonization period. At this time, some Northern countries began to perceive 
conditions in Asia, Africa and Latin America as poor and therefore in need of new 
strategies to address their problems (Escobar, 1995). During the same period, many of 
these countries reflected on their conditions themselves and realized that they were 
underdeveloped. Therefore, they began to identify ways of developing; an advancement 
that they soon realized would mean subjecting themselves to certain interventions. Such 
thinking seems to have been largely influenced by modernization theory, a hypothesis 
that explains how society progresses according to the process of social development, 
which focuses on national growth and the belief that less-developed countries can 
eventually advance to a more developed status (Engerman (2004), and  Przeworski and 
Papaterra (1997).  
 
Thus, modernization theory addresses a country‟s social progress and its outcomes, as 
observed by Engerman (2004), and Przeworski and Papaterra (1997). Since the theory 
asserts that a “traditional” society must progress to the level at which technological and 
economic advancement can begin to take place, subsequently, these qualities will 
further influence change in culture and societal values until such a society grows into a 
modernized state. Social change is produced as the country attempts to adapt itself to its 
environment and interacts with other nations. Thus, globalization has driven the spread 
of modernization over the decades (Engerman, 2004). Consequently, it is also argued 
that this theory mapped the path decolonized countries were to take in order to catch up 
with the West/North (Przeworski and Papaterra, 1997).  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
This is how the West/North began to assume the role of developing the South, and why 
international aid has continued to play a critical role in supporting development 
activities – including education reform (Forster, 1999). Moreover, following 
decolonization, international aid was provided to developing countries mainly through 
the project approach, a modality by which donors – who in most cases were erstwhile 
colonial masters – donated aid to a former colony in which they had economic interests 
or potential markets (Minch, 2010).  
 
The link between changes in international cooperation in education and general changes 
in development cooperation after the Second World War are rooted in neo-liberalism 
and the development we see today came about largely as a construct of post-colonialism 
(Malhotra, n.d.). This commentator argues that in the last two decades, the role of the 
state as the primary development actor has been increasingly challenged and 
undermined by neo-liberalism, with the introduction of other major societal factors such 
as the market and civil society. He goes on to observe that during the same period, the 
government share of power and privilege – which is closely aligned to gross domestic 
product (GDP) – began to decline due to the effects of neo-liberal economic policy 
prescriptions and the external debt crises that many developing countries were subject to 
in the early 1980s.     
 
It was during this period that dependency theory was developed in reaction to the 
economic stagnation and growing dependency of poor Southern countries on rich 
Northern or Western ones. The principal argument of this theory is that underlying 
relations between the North and the South (centre–periphery dynamics), and the 
resultant economic problems for the latter determine the inability of developing 
countries to gain total independence (Easterly, 2009). Thus, modernization theory – 
according to which attempts were made by the North to support the development of the 
South – was criticized by dependency theorists who believed that the “poor” state of 
Southern countries was not because they were yet to be modernized, as asserted by 
modernization theory, but because “rich” countries had exploited and caught them in a 
dependency trap. Accordingly, their fragility was exacerbated, and they were 
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consequently susceptible to further manipulation by the North (Przeworski and 
Papaterra, 1997). 
 
Dependency theory has two main strands: the Marxist perspective and the structuralist 
perspective. The major difference between the two is that Marxists believe that North–
South relations – and thus the prosperity gap – are a consequence of technological 
disparities and the Western advancement that led to early industrialization. The resource 
wealth of the South is ruthlessly exploited in exchange for indebtedness created through 
the importation of finished products. Accordingly, Marxists believe that the 
development of poor countries is not possible as long as the prevailing status quo is 
maintained (Easterly, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the structuralists are of the view that centre–periphery relations 
comprise more than just economics, and that the power of the North over the South is 
social and political. This view also places much emphasis on so-called “satellites” – the 
elite of the peripheral countries, and their interests and ability to make decisions. The 
question is do they really represent and control the decisions they make (Easterly, 
2009), an issue that becomes more pertinent later in the thesis, when the nature of the 
SWAp partnership in the education sector is examined. 
 
For now, suffice it to say that dependency theory encapsulates two main viewpoints: 
industrialization, as argued by Marxists; and economic–political relations between the 
North and the South that originate from colonial ties yet to be completely broken, as 
contended by structuralists – both of which seem to continue to influence the way in 
which international aid is delivered and managed. 
 
King‟s (1999) observation of changes in international development cooperation in 
virtually all sectors emphasizes the fact that the new aid modalities that ultimately 
paved the way for the SWAp assumed common currency in aid provision to the 
education sector, contending that in the 1990s, changes in international cooperation in 
the education sector were closely linked to innovations in development assistance. 
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Further to King (1999), Easterly (2009) highlights a recent shift in the development 
literature that indicates a change of focus from a transformational conception of aid to a 
lighter approach; research indicating that rather than attempt massive experimental 
programmes, the step-by-step small-scale intervention is more likely to achieve positive 
results. Although this new strategy has not yet been fully embraced by aid practitioners 
in policy discussions, Easterly (2009) contends that if the desired outcome is not 
initially achieved, there is room to learn and improve through such a marginal approach.  
 
The transformational approach, on the other hand, has proved to bring about the 
opposite outcome – a lack of learning – with its tendency for DPs to recycle old ideas 
and policies; if they are not successful the first time around, the programme is 
discontinued until some years later when it is reintroduced as a new initiative. 
Paradoxically, such an approach also tends towards the problem of escalation, whereby 
if policies do not prove to be effective, they are traded in wholesale for a completely 
new set of more experimental strategies (Easterly, 2009).   
 
The big question in the literature is whether to attribute failure to institutional weakness 
in the recipient country or failed DP strategies. The West/North has responded to this 
conundrum by fully blaming the South for its failure to develop, claiming that lack of 
effective reform is due to its inability to meet certain conditions such as setting up good 
institutions. Therefore, the cycle repeats itself, and aid agencies once again formulate an 
entirely new policy and set of conditions to accompany it (Easterly, 2009). This was the 
case with the 1981 Berg report on sub-Saharan Africa, wherein recipient countries were 
blamed for poor economic growth due to their inappropriate policies; an accusation that 
was used as a basis to justify WB structural adjustment programmes (Rose, 2002). 
 
3.1.2 Neo-liberalism 
 
As observed earlier, to a certain extent, Malhotra (n.d.) applies neo-liberalism as a 
concept to describe a market-oriented approach to development (economic and social). 
Neo-liberal policies are associated with the transfer of control over the economy from 
public to private hands in the belief that this will increase government efficiency and 
contribute to the improved economic health of the nation. Thus, from the 1980s, greater 
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attention was paid to the role of macro-economic stability; market-oriented policy 
reform; the role of the private sector; interactions between the public and private sector; 
and the potential contribution of civil society (Sagasti et al., 2005).  
 
A scrutiny of the effects of neo-liberalism as expounded by Malhotra (n.d.), Sagasti et 
al. (2005), and Rose (2003) reveals that the world has continued to witness a macro-
economic policy strategy as the dominant feature of development theory and practice 
for the past five decades. Such a policy initially emphasized the moderately socially 
oriented Keynesian economic indicators of full employment and social security. 
However, the dominant approach in the 1980s shifted to economic growth and the 
concurrent preoccupation with per capita GDP – which even included financial 
indicators covering the health of stock markets – that dominated economic neo-
liberalism discourse during this period.  
 
The principles of neo-liberalism can be traced to John Williamson‟s ten-point policy 
proposal, which gained consensus approval from the two Washington-based 
international economic organizations the World Bank and the IMF. In 1990, Williamson 
coined the term “Washington Consensus”, the rationale of which was: 
 
…to define the set of policy instruments associated with World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes and IMF stabilization programmes in the early 1980s, 
the main objective of which was to stabilize economies in severe disequilibrium 
and promote economic growth (Rose, 2003, p.70).    
  
Rose (2003) affirms that these policy instruments symbolised the programme 
conditionalities to which countries that accessed IMF and World Bank loans in the 
1980s were subject. Neo-liberal market-oriented principles and policies influenced IMF 
stabilization and WB structural adjustment programmes. The latter was a product of 
neo-liberal thinking that emerged in the early 1980s. It was an economic policy that was 
designed to assist or indeed rescue developing countries by offering loans and small 
interest subsidies on condition that their governments would adopt certain policies 
designed to help adjust the economic structure (Rose, 2003). One example of this was a 
policy that advocated a common market economy.  
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There were certain prescribed measures imposed on countries participating in structural 
adjustment, which included currency devaluation; government deficit reduction; tax 
reduction; privatization of state-owned industries; tightening of monetary policies; 
reduction of tariffs on imports; wage freezes; and social spending cuts. Consequently, 
structural adjustment programmes were heavily criticized due to the way they affected 
social expenditure in terms of service delivery. For example, when the government cut 
back on spending and wages were frozen there was a lot of pressure on the system to 
meet the demands of such a policy (Reimers, 1997). The result of this retrenchment was 
slow growth and, in the worst case, regressive development with all the potential 
negative social consequences that this entailed; a situation experienced by many 
developing countries that accessed WB loans – including Malawi during the Banda era 
– which adversely affected education indicators due to the commensurate increase in 
school fees (Rose, 2003). 
  
3.1.3 The Washington Consensus – Operationalizing Neo-liberalism  
 
As pointed out in the preceding section, the Washington Consensus was associated with 
the WB structural adjustment and IMF stabilisation programmes of the 1980s that were 
imposed on developing countries with the aim of stabilizing their economies (Rose, 
2003).   
 
Sagasti et al. (2005) and Rose‟s (2003) independent observations on development 
financing and neo-liberalism show that the pre-Washington Consensus period was 
characterized by a major transformation in development that broadened its 
conceptualization to include finance and investment; the quality of the labour force; the 
technological capability of the private sector; and government policy. Such 
amplification stemmed in the main from lessons learned from the development 
experience of the 1960s and 1970s when economic growth did not necessarily lead to 
improvements in social conditions.  
 
Consequently, under the presidency of Robert McNamara, who was keen to eradicate 
GNP as a measure of development, the WB incorporated other concepts that focused on 
broader growth and poverty alleviation, in the recognition that markets were imperfect 
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and therefore required state intervention to correct distortions. The adoption of these 
strategies thus ultimately led to approaches that emphasized the realization of basic 
human needs (Sagasti et al., 2005; Rose, 2003). This expansion of the role of the WB 
included its involvement in development issues related to education, nutrition and 
population growth, which, in the 1970s, paved the way for the Bank to assume a dual 
identity as a development agency as well as a financial institute, emerging as a self-
styled “knowledge bank” in the 1990s (Rose, 2003). 
 
3.1.4 Post-Washington Consensus 
 
Rose (2003, p.75) describes the post-Washington Consensus as „neo-liberalism with a 
human face,‟ observing that the shift in focus came about because of the failure of 
structural adjustment programmes to produce positive social change; as well as 
recognition of the factors that were responsible for the success of the newly 
industrialized East Asian countries. She also acknowledges that the transition to the 
post-Washington Consensus was partly due to a need to address the political realities of 
recipient countries. However, she argues that the post-Washington Consensus was not 
founded on a critical analysis of the Washington Consensus and, in many ways, it 
continued with the same old principles. She thus cautions against the oversimplification 
of obviously complex political, social, cultural, and economic issues through the 
application of neo-liberal economic principles that regard the state from an economic 
efficiency viewpoint (Rose, 2003). 
 
In a similar vein, Easterly (2009) challenges current aid efforts by posing the question 
of how outsiders can best fix internal problems that are deeply rooted in the historical 
and political contexts of recipient countries. This view indicates that there is some 
substance in dependency theory, at least from the perspective of its argument around the 
causes of problems and how they have escalated. However, the theory has been widely 
criticized due in the main to its overestimation of Western power and influence through 
the historical colonization of the South. Accordingly, commentators argue that these 
poor countries have been wholly absolved of the blame for economic stagnation and 
gross underdevelopment when, realistically, perhaps they need to take some 
responsibility for their failure to catch up with the West/North: 
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Local political elites in these areas have almost invariably structured their 
domestic rule on a coalition of internal interests favourable to the international 
connection. Thus, it is not the sheer economic might of the outside that dictates 
the dependent status of the south but the sociological consequences of this 
power. The result…is that the basic needs of the international order must be 
respected by the south if this system is to continue to provide the services that 
the local elites need in order to perpetuate their rule in their turn (Smith, 1979, 
p.251).  
 
Nevertheless, the notion of human capital continues to drive WB investment in 
education based on the analysis of rates of return. The focus of the WB on human 
capital can be observed in, for example, studies by Psacharapoulos (1994), and 
Psacharapoulos and Patrinos (2002) that generated mass data from various countries 
whose evidence revealed similar results on the rate of return for different levels of 
education; private versus social returns; and country groups. Of all the levels of 
education, the primary sector was found to provide the highest rate of return, in both 
private and social terms. The private rate of return was higher than its social aspect 
across all sectors of education, but the gap was much wider at the higher level 
(Psacharapoulos, 1994; Psacharapoulos and Patrinos, 2002). The same study also 
discovered that countries with different economic standings did not experience the same 
rate of return, evidence from various studies and estimates in differing countries 
revealing that those with low and medium incomes received the greatest returns.  
 
Thus, as Rose (2003) observes, based on the highest rate of return for primary 
education, the human capital influence is evident during the post-Washington 
Consensus period in terms of WB focus on primary education and its role in poverty 
reduction. One feature of such a priority has been the Bank‟s increased lending to 
education, with the most funding going to the primary sector (Rose, 2003). This focus 
was seen to reinforce international agency and several governments‟ acceptance of 
primary education at two EFA world conferences in Jomtien in 1990 and Dakar in 2000 
respectively, at which international donors promised to increase aid to the subsector 
(King, 1992, 2007; Rose, 2003). 
 
Rose (2003) argues that rhetorically, the post-Washington Consensus embraces more 
instruments and broader objectives than are captured by human capital theory, 
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emphasizing the relation between the state and the market – as opposed to a state versus 
market approach. She underscores her point thus: „[The] emphasis of the post-
Washington Consensus on more instruments and [a] broader objective provides an even 
greater opportunity for the prioritisation of education, seeing it as both a means to, and 
end of development‟ (Rose, 2003, p.76).  
 
The concept of human capital was first articulated by Adam Smith as early as the 18
th 
century, but the theory really emerged in the 1960s and is now one of the most 
dominant hypotheses in development (Marshall, 1998). The theory has been 
championed by the two renowned economists Shultz and Becker. They expand on the 
notion that individuals acquire knowledge and skills in the process of production that 
are regarded as capital, and that a substantial part of this acquisition is a deliberate 
investment; the term “human capital” deriving from the fact that it becomes embedded 
in the individual, from whom it cannot be separated (Schultz, 1960; Becker, 1993).  
 
Moreover, Shultz (1960) and Becker (1993) argue that similar to machinery in the 
production process, human skills, knowledge and ability may also be conceptualized as 
capital because they provide productive services; they can be regarded as inputs in the 
creation of a product that may be viewed as beneficial to the economy in the same way 
as any non-human device. Thus, the concept recognizes that it is through investment in 
education that people become more productive: knowledge and skills gained assist them 
to create or adapt to new ideas in order to capitalize fully on production (Blundell et al., 
1999). Accordingly, human capital theory argues that such investment is highly 
beneficial in terms of increased productivity (Marshall, 1998). Indeed, it has been 
shown through several studies that investment in human capital is beneficial to both the 
individual and society (Psacharapoulos, 1994; Psacharapoulos and Patrinos, 2002). 
 
Proponents of human capital theory also argue that it provides the reasons for wage 
inequality in the labour market. They suggest that people are rewarded based on their 
productivity, which, in turn, is affected by the level of their education and training. 
Therefore, they argue that a more highly educated and trained individual will be 
rewarded with higher earnings over time because he or she is perceived to be more 
productive (Blundell et al., 1999). Nevertheless, the concept of human capital is broad, 
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encompassing other stock such as health and social standing, and further aspects such as 
on-the-job training (Psacharapoulos, 1994; Psacharapoulos and Patrinos, 2002). 
 
However, human capital theory has been criticized based on estimates pertaining to the 
rate of return of education. For example, Bennell (1996) questions the selectivity of the 
data gathered in sub-Saharan Africa in particular that is used by Psacharapoulos (1994), 
arguing that the sample from which they originate is not representative of country 
populations, and that methodology used in calculating the rate of return to education is 
suspect. Disparagement of such study methodology and of the entire human capital 
theory notwithstanding, based on a cost–benefit analysis, the WB officially 
acknowledged the value of human capital concurrent with the Washington Consensus 
neo-liberal agenda, declaring human capital development to be a critical element of 
poverty alleviation (Mundy, 2002; Rose, 2003). Subsequently, the Bank‟s influence and 
its loans to various countries‟ education sectors grew (Rose, 2003).  
 
3.1.5 Linking Aid to International Targets 
 
Colclough (2005) asserts that education MDGs can be traced back to the United Nations 
(UN) Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, which prompted several subsequent 
conferences, some of which produced declarations reaffirming the right to education 
that have since been signed by the majority of countries. The general understanding in 
1948 was that education should be free and compulsory, with higher education equally 
accessible to all based on merit. Since then, there has been a constant attempt to link aid 
to education. Colclough (2005) also points out that the tying of education aid to a 
poverty reduction strategy, EFA and the MDGs came about during this revolution.  
 
However, it was not until the international World Conference on Education in Thailand 
that the global community saw the launch of the EFA movement and its espousal of a 
number of systemic reforms that basic education gained a prominent position on the 
development agenda – as noted above in the discussion on the Post-Washington 
Consensus – with the WB playing a key role in promoting human capital through 
funding to primary education in particular. Alongside this, came widespread political 
commitment to basic education on the parts of both developed and developing 
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countries, which led to increased international aid and, ultimately, the introduction of 
the new aid modality of the SWAp (King, 2005).  
 
The 2000 Dakar World Education Forum adopted the Dakar Framework for Action, 
which aimed to achieve high quality education for all and a 50 percent increase in adult 
literacy by 2015. This marked an acceleration of the implementation of SWAPs, as 164 
nations renewed their commitment to EFA, with developed countries pledging to give 
more aid to developing countries in an endeavour to meet EFA targets (Colclough, 
2005;). All these events led to the linking of aid to the international targets of the MDGs 
and EFA, with the emphasis on adopting the SWAp as an effective modality for the 
delivery of development aid (King and Rose, 2005).  
 
The FTI was launched in 2002 in the interests of supporting developing countries with 
funds in order to enhance their efforts towards achieving EFA goals (EFA-FTI 
Secretariat, 2011). Moreover, the functioning of an effective SWAp partnership that 
facilitated the development of a sound national education plan was an integral 
conditionality of the FTI – which is now known as the Global Partnership for Education 
(EFA-FTI Secretariat, 2011). 
 
Turning more to the focus of the present study, Easterly (2009) indicates that the West‟s 
call for a „big push‟ to save Africa is a recent phenomenon. He acknowledges that 
international and regional attempts have been made by the West towards this goal, but 
he points out that the West has been preoccupied with what it can do to redeem Africa 
rather than assessing the potential of the continent to develop on its own. And in view of 
the approaches alluded to earlier, Easterly (2009) argues that this sort of assessment 
implies that the West‟s ideas are right, it knows what is best for Africa, and the 
continent‟s current predicament is all its own fault for failing to embrace change. 
Moreover, “The idea that a society must have already attained good policy, good law 
and order, etc. in order to develop is like saying „you need to be developed in order to 
develop‟ (Easterly, 2009, p.425).  
 
A typical example of such a catch-22 is the set of conditionalities for accessing FTI 
funds whereby a country should already have a SWAp partnership; a comprehensive 
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national education sector plan; a fully costed implementation strategy; a financial 
management system; and a Ministry of Education with the capacity to implement the 
whole initiative (Malawi Education Country Status Report, 2009; Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology, 2009; Malawi Local Education Donor Group, 
2009). This epitomises the issues of capacity that international aid partnerships must 
deal with. Therefore, it is important that whatever kind of intervention is implemented, 
it must account for shortfalls in local systems and work at strengthening them (Easterly, 
2009). 
 
Colenso‟s (2010) review of international targets provides an MDG analysis that 
includes the perspectives of both critics and proponents: „The MDGs were agreed by 
nearly 190 countries at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, as 
part of a global compact to focus developing countries and development agencies on 
specific development outcomes‟ (Colenso, 2010, p.34). He also draws attention to the 
fact that the two education MDGs – which respectively target the attainment of 
universal primary education by 2015 (MDG 2), and gender, that is, the elimination of 
such disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, and at all levels by 2015 
(MDG 3) – were set in spite of broader international education targets previously agreed 
upon at EFA conferences in Jomtien in 1990 and Dakar in 2000 (Colenso, 2010).  
 
Colenso (2010) thus cites both the critics‟ identification of shortfalls in MDG targets as 
well as the position of proponents who do not perceive any problem in attaining the 
goals. He goes on to highlight two connected challenges to the process of incorporating 
broader education aims into the two MDG targets. The first problem indicates that the 
MDGs reflect a further narrowing of the development agenda that stems from the 
Jomtien Declaration of 1990, which had already overlooked secondary education, skills 
development, and higher education – although the World Education Forum in Dakar in 
2000 did reinstate early childhood education and adult literacy as components of the six 
Dakar EFA goals (Colenso, 2010). The main criticism of the MDG targets is that they 
„further exclude key areas of education, including early childhood development, adult 
literacy (Robinson, 2005) secondary education (Lewin, 2005), skills development 
(King, 2005), and higher education‟ (Colenso, 2010, p.35).  
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The second argument concerns the excessive influence of donors in setting the MDG 
agenda. This is invariably done without proper consideration to the reality on the 
ground, where the prioritization of MDGs in the national education plans of countries 
that are heavily dependent on aid does not necessarily reflect their grassroots situations 
due to the influence of aid conditionalities (King and Rose, 2005).  
 
In the same vein, King and Rose (2005) emphasize the need to align development 
assistance to recipient country priorities if aid effectiveness is to meet the requirements 
of the Paris Declaration framework, a notion that is summarized by Colenso (2010) 
thus:  
 
Donors should trust the plans of governments and other national stakeholders 
and programme their aid together (harmonisation) in support of national plans 
and priorities (alignment), with clear results (results), for which states are 
accountable to citizens (accountability) (Colenso, 2010, p.41).  
 
A further observation on the setting of international targets such as MDGs 2 and 3 is the 
assumption that “one size fits all”, which disregards the different stages of development 
from one country to another. In addition, Samoff (1999) describes „the multi-faceted 
role of international development aid,‟ whereby attempts to address challenges in the 
education sector and achieve international goals have further complicated the provision 
of aid and, in the process, have contributed to the creation of a situation in which 
developing countries are left vulnerable to the conditionalities of donors. 
   
3.2 The Call for a SWAp 
 
The transition from the project approach to the SWAp was not made in a vacuum, but 
within the controlled environment of a changing political structure. International aid – 
which had hitherto mainly promoted neoliberal education policies and programmes – 
took a another twist with the end of the Cold War, when it began to concentrate more on 
assisting developing countries to meet the international targets of poverty alleviation, 
EFA and the MDGs (Novelli, 2010).  
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This move was largely influenced by the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, when aid provision began to shift its preoccupation with the 
forging of political allies (against the Soviet Bloc) to one that embraced democracy and 
good governance (Wangwe, 2002; Wroe, 2012; Novelli, 2010). 
 
Therefore, unlike the 1980s – when developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa were 
subject to the aid conditionalities of the structural adjustment programme as they 
struggled to recover from recession – the 1990s heralded the dawn of the SWAp, a 
period that witnessed a trend whereby aid integrated commitment to democratic ideals 
with a focus on the development of national policies and strategies (Wangwe, 2002; 
Novelli, 2010) to make advances in the education arena. 
 
3.2. 1 The Project Approach 
 
Before moving on to discuss the SWAp, it is imperative to define what the project 
approach entailed. As pointed out in Section 3.1, the project approach was among those 
used during the decolonization period to aid developing countries. The literature on this 
modality tends to focus more on the failure of the approach rather than attempt to define 
it. Donors had the power to decide which projects to carry out and how they were to be 
managed, which included setting up implementation units with the former assuming full 
control and monitoring the utilization of funds (Foster, 2007). From the 1990s, the 
modality was widely criticized, being held accountable for the fragmentation of aid, as 
each donor tended to focus attention on its own areas of intervention at the expense of 
wider sectoral issues and the recipient government‟s needs and priorities (Forster, 1999; 
Schacter, 2001; Hamblin, 2006; Al-Samarrai, et al., 2001).  
 
It has been argued that these shortcomings also contributed to failure in terms of 
intervention coordination and successful partnerships – critical prerequisites for aid 
effectiveness that were later advanced in respect of the SWAp approach (Schacter, 
2001; Hamblin, 2006). Consequently, the project approach is generally associated with 
the failure to achieve aid effectiveness, as will be seen later in the description of the new 
aid modality, the SWAp.  
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The project approach has also been blamed for inadequate ownership on the part of the 
recipient government; the creation of parallel implementation units; the overstretching 
of local capacity due to a proliferation of initiatives implemented by different donors, 
unsustainability beyond the life of the intervention and its institutional development; 
and the duplication of resources that leads to waste (Forster, 1999; Schacter, 2001; 
Hamblin, 2006; Al-Samarrai, et al., 2001). Moreover, a common criticism of this 
approach in terms of development aid management is that it keeps the recipient 
government away from the centre of control (Hamblin, 2006).  
 
According to Schacter (2001), the project approach also suffers from limitations in 
terms of accountability, a vital consideration around issues of governance in developing 
countries, which he attributes to the shortcomings of implementation strategies. 
Schacter (2001) goes on to argue that under the project approach, donors perceive 
accountability differently to the recipient government, this aspect normally being 
aligned to the needs and requirements of the providers of aid rather than project 
beneficiaries.  
 
All these objections to the project approach inevitably led to the proposal of the new aid 
modality that is a crucial element of the innovation in international development 
cooperation under review in this chapter. 
 
3.2.2 Definition of the SWAp 
 
In order to understand the current impetus of this new modality, it is necessary to 
establish just what a SWAp is. All the literature reviewed describes the SWAp in a 
similar manner, although academic commentators tend to be more critical than 
descriptive, a stance that is due in the main to their understanding of dynamic 
differences between theory and practice. Indeed, many practical examples of SWAps 
implemented worldwide reflect a clear disparity between the principles of the modality 
and its application on the ground (Buchert, 2002).  
 
As noted by Buchert (2002), different authors‟ definitions of the SWAp are founded on 
their various conceptions of its principles. The modality is also described based on a 
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comparison between what the project approach has failed to accomplish and what a 
SWAp is expected to achieve. Hamblin (2006) describes the SWAp as representing one 
of several comparatively new aid modalities that emerged in order to overcome the 
fragmentation and lack of sufficient ownership on the part of the recipient government 
that were manifested with the implementation of numerous discrete projects, which did 
not necessarily result in adequate support in terms of nationally identified development 
priorities.  
 
The following quotations delineate the SWAp: 
 
A SWAp is a process in which funding for the sector – whether internal or from 
donors – supports a single policy and expenditure programme, under 
government leadership, and adopting common approaches across the sector. It is 
generally accompanied by efforts to strengthen government procedures for 
disbursement and accountability. A SWAp should ideally involve broad 
stakeholder consultation in the design of a coherent sector programme at micro, 
meso and macro levels, and strong coordination among donors and between 
donors and government (Overseas Development Institute, 2001, p.1). 
 
The defining characteristics of a SWAp are that all significant funding for the 
sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under 
Government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and 
progressing towards relying on Government procedures to disburse and account 
for all funds (Brown et al., 2001, p.7). 
 
Courtney (2007) defines the SWAp in a very similar manner to the above descriptions, 
but with added emphasis on government ownership and common approaches. Similarly, 
King (1992) describes the SWAp in terms of its principles, highlighting the 
incorporation of sound policies, ownership and sustainability. It is notable that in 
defining the SWAp, most authors focus on its core principles. 
 
In common with many other key stakeholders keen to achieve positive change, UNICEF 
views the SWAp in terms of the rhetoric around it as an exceptional opportunity to work 
in partnership; and „to place children, and the fulfilment of their rights and needs, at the 
centre‟ (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003, p.3) of a process that develops sector 
programmes and policies. Furthermore, it is anticipated that education SWAp 
partnerships will play a significant role in mobilizing financial resources for the 
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realization of set international targets and goals appertaining to the sector (Malawi 
Local Donor Group, 2009).   
 
However, beyond the rhetoric, the interests of different groups must be taken into 
account to determine why they might opt for a SWAp. People generally like SWAps 
owing to a coherence of procedure that addresses the fragmentation of donor support at 
country level. According to Riddell et al. (2000), for organizations such as UNICEF and 
the World Bank, the SWAp offers extra opportunities to operate within the mainstream 
development agenda, including the setting of targets for the Poverty Reduction Strategy, 
MDGs and EFA. For governments, the SWAp offers more money, control and power. 
Finally, for DPs and donors, the SWAp reduces accountability, as recipient 
governments assume this role; and affords them greater agency effectiveness and 
interagency collaboration.  
 
3.2.3 Principles of the SWAp 
 
In defining the SWAp, the literature describes its principles and analyzes them in the 
light of experiences on the ground. To some extent, it also attempts to shed further light 
on the conceptual understanding of the SWAp as a modality for achieving partnerships 
and coordination of the effective delivery of international development aid. The main 
principles of the SWAp are partnership, government leadership, ownership by 
government, sector policies and strategies, capacity building, harmonization, alignment 
with government procedures and systems, coordination, and accountability (Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005; Buchert, 1998).  
 
The concept of partnership is crucial to the SWAp given that it revolves around the 
forging of an alliance to support a sector (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005). 
This is corroborated by (Buchert, 2002, p.), who observes that partnerships are central 
to the effectiveness of a SWAp. Moreover, in the context of international aid, the 
partnership represents the notion of aspiring to realize international unity (Fowler, 
1997).  
 
Hamblin (2006) recognizes the significance of the principles of the SWAp, 
underscoring the point that they were the basis for the initiation of the modality; and 
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emphasizes the importance of government ownership and coherence of procedures. In 
her comparative analysis of SWAps in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique, Buchert 
(2002) suggests that stakeholders expect the principles of the modality to guide the 
implementation process, although she also observes that such a procedure is invariably 
subject to many pitfalls. Following a case study of an in-service health education 
programme implemented in a province of Cambodia, Courtney (2007) comments that 
although the partnership remains essential if a SWAp is to be effective, it is not easy to 
recommend the best mode of operation, an observation that suggests that coordinators 
should proceed with caution in terms of partners‟ interactions. 
 
Hyden (2008, p.259) recognizes the Paris Declaration as „a significant juncture in the 
history of development assistance and co-operation;‟ going on to argue that the 
principle underlying the shift to the Paris Declaration framework emphasizes national 
ownership, a goal that all should strive to achieve rather than an actuality that simply 
requires acknowledgement. Hyden (2008) also concedes that the current development 
partnership framework assumes a high level of trust among partners that can only be 
achieved through open dialogue, concluding that this can only be realized through DP 
understanding that such changes in international development aid cooperation must 
extend beyond mere policy to embrace politics. 
 
Hyden (2008) outlines three main components of the Paris Declaration concept of 
which DPs should take note. The first is the “partnership” that aims at granting the aid-
recipient government ownership and more say in the utilization of financial assistance; 
the second is the “harmonization” of aid that allows DPs to speak with one voice; and 
the third is an “understanding” of the cultural and political realities in which 
development policies are implemented.  
 
Hyden (2008) asserts that this shift to the SWAp modality calls for a reassessment of 
the whole aid environment in which DPs operate and programmes are implemented, 
including the manner in which power functions in recipient countries. He argues that to 
date, DPs have operated on the assumption that there is a “negotiated order” between 
equal partners – DPs and aid recipient governments – and, consequently, a global 
agreement such that, „The prevailing notion among the DPs expresses itself in the idea 
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of “power to”; power in their view indicates a capacity or ability, not a relationship‟ 
(emphasis in original) (Hyden, 2008, p.263).    
 
3.2.4 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action  
 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 sets the framework for aid delivery, 
defining the conduct of the intervention partnership – including ownership of the 
development agenda by the recipient government and the incorporation of civil society 
– with the aim of rendering assistance more effective as national institutions determine 
development priorities (Hyden, 2008). The framework also sets the platform for 
increasing funding in order to help developing countries achieve the MDGs (King, 
1992; Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005). As noted in sections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2, the objective of the Paris Declaration was to strengthen the rationale for the 
SWAp. It not only refined the modality‟s partnership model by stipulating the principles 
to be followed, but also ensured that it was more prominent than was previously the 
case so that the international development community might acknowledge it as the way 
forward for the realization of aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
2005).  
  
The Accra Agenda for Action was endorsed on 4
th
 September 2008, with the aim of 
augmenting the implementation of the Paris Declaration and reaffirming its aims. The 
key issue it addresses is the continued commitment of national governments to the 
eradication of poverty by cementing existing partnerships and forging new ones for the 
achievement of development goals (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008). The Accra 
Agenda also acknowledges that much work remains to be done in terms of addressing 
the global challenge of extreme poverty that hinders access to basic needs such as safe 
water, health care, and education, especially for women and girls. It recognizes that 
these challenges cannot be met through financial aid alone, but also necessitates input in 
terms of addressing democracy, governance, economic and social growth, inequality, 
and environmental conservation (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008). 
 
The Accra Agenda identifies three major challenges that remain to be addressed. The 
first is country ownership. Developing nations need to adopt a strong leadership role in 
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the formulation of development policy, coordinating all those individuals engaged with 
and affected by it. The role of donors is one of support in respecting country priorities, 
investing in capacity building, and ensuring better use of their own systems in order to 
improve aid delivery. The second challenge concerns the building of more effective and 
inclusive partnerships. There is a management issue facing recipient countries in 
bringing together all development actors and ensuring effective utilization in the 
partnership of each of them for maximum impact in achieving development goals. The 
final challenge is to achieve development results and accountability for actions taken. 
The emphasis here must be on attaining tangible results from all the investment made 
and aid disbursed in a given country. Accountability on the part of the government and 
its DPs to taxpayers, parliament, and all the governing bodies concerned is paramount 
(Accra Agenda for Action, 2008).  
  
3.2.5 The SWAp in Other Developing Countries 
 
The literature provides insight into various aspects and experiences of the 
implementation of the SWAp in many countries. Based on his evaluation of the role of 
UNICEF in education SWAps in Eastern and Southern Africa, Virtue (2005) indicates a 
need to fund sector strategies that ensure government leadership and utilize ministerial 
procedure in financial disbursement. However, he further points out the need to resolve 
problems around the incorporation of projects into a SWAp.  
 
Through a comparative analysis of the implementation of SWAps in Ghana, 
Mozambique and Burkina Faso, Buchert (2002) highlights some of the unsuccessful 
outcomes:  
 
Conclusions of the comparative analysis have shown that what has been termed 
in these countries as [a] sector wide approach is far from a well-defined concept 
and far from one which has already been transformed effectively into reality. 
Neither can it be a formula to achieve what has not been achieved through 
project assistance. The approach should instead be considered to be a complex, 
evolving process that depends on flexible and adaptable learning by all involved 
parties. The underlying most critical issue may be how to include all involved 
parties, beyond government and agencies, in a negotiated process of change 
(Buchert, 2002, p.82). 
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Such a finding should raise serious questions for all actors involved in SWAp processes. 
Buchert‟s (2002) analysis indicates that there are many pitfalls in the process of 
implementing the modality; essentially, she reaffirms the all too often clear disparity 
between the rhetoric and the reality on the ground – where she found that principles 
were not applied – and highlights the challenge of defining and negotiating how 
partnerships should operate at implementation level. Courtney (2007) tends to 
corroborate Buchert‟s views on the SWAp partnership. However, Hamblin‟s (2006) 
more optimistic stance based on the rhetoric suggests that a SWAp can provide 
solutions to all aid problems associated with the project approach, and produce positive 
outcomes for both DPs and recipient government provided that the principles of the 
modality are adhered to.  
 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) underscores the role of aid-recipient 
governments in coordinating the development agenda. Walt et al. (1999) recognize the 
link between coordination and aid effectiveness. Courtney (2007) highlights the 
problems around coordination, collaboration and sustainability experienced in the 
Cambodian SWAp, particularly in terms of integration in relation to achieving aid 
effectiveness. On the other hand, Hamblin (2006) identifies a SWAp in Papua New 
Guinea that has experienced effective aid coordination; a view that Samoff (2004) 
corroborates but with the proviso that capacity building may be required in respect of 
coordinators‟ expertise.  
 
Courtney (2007) and Hamblin (2006) further indicate the importance of taking into 
consideration the roles of stakeholders at all levels, especially those operating at the 
grassroots such as school head teachers and their staff. Courtney (2007) also suggests 
the need for all-embracing collaboration and the development of partnerships that 
contribute to meaningful relationships among stakeholders. From her experience of a 
Ghanaian SWAp, Buchert (2000) underlines the significance of the competence of those 
entrusted with coordination, pointing out a link between the proficiency of the 
coordinator and programme outcomes.      
 
Smith‟s (2005) study findings on ownership and capacity also highlight the positive 
attributes of a SWAp in terms of aid effectiveness. However, he questions the ability of 
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the modality to adequately address capacity issues at all levels – again, particularly that 
of those operating at the grassroots – which is critical if the desired results are to be 
achieved. Therefore, he suggests that greater attention should be paid to capacity 
building than ownership because the latter is dependent on the former, and is also 
necessary if sustainability is to be ensured – a long-term aim that requires serious 
consideration in any SWAp.  
 
Samoff (2004) concurs with Smith (2005) on the significance of the capacity of those 
individuals involved in a SWAp. The former further emphasizes the need to respect the 
roles of both government and development partners, and to achieve effective 
partnership, leadership, ownership, coordination, and sustainability. He further 
identifies weaknesses in terms of government procedure in the disbursement of funds, 
inadequate coordination, and poor levels of ownership, concluding on a note of caution 
against continuing to operate in the project mode after a SWAp has been initiated 
(Samoff, 2004).  
 
Based on their synthesis of findings of research into the changing practices of aid 
coordination across a number of countries, Walt et al. (1999) describe this aspect of the 
SWAp as an area of particular importance in reinforcing the principles of the modality. 
This is especially necessary given the prescribed shift from the project mode to the 
SWAp, the latter demanding broader coordination that covers all sectoral policies and 
strategies. Walt et al. (1999) also observe that while shared coordination among many 
people representing all stakeholders – both national and international – is essential, such 
a practice is also widely supported by DPs. It is also noted that very little attention at all 
has been paid to aid coordination in the health sector (Walt et al., 1999). 
 
Murphy (2005) describes the experiences of a Ugandan SWAp that in the main 
preserved the principles of the modality at implementation stage with strong 
government leadership and ownership. He asserts that there is still a widely accepted 
notion that a SWAp is likely to achieve better results and aid effectiveness than the 
project approach. However, although the Ugandan SWAp is considered a model, it is 
not without its flaws. He identifies some of the challenges as capacity issues, inadequate 
procedures and mechanisms for coordination, and difficulty in establishing the turning 
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point to projects (Murphy, 2005).  He also highlights problems with inadequate and 
underdeveloped procedures and coordination mechanisms. Evidently, even in such a 
model, there remains a disparity between the manner in which the SWAp is 
implemented and expectations around what it can achieve.  
 
The OECD (2007) highlights other aspects of the SWAp, including the critical nature of 
ownership based on the need to improve aid coordination and ensure that the 
government takes the lead. It also emphasizes the strengthening of systems for 
monitoring and coordination, and the need to align aid with national development plans 
if it is to be effective. However, Samoff (2004) cautions against such a view, arguing 
that it overemphasizes government leadership at the expense of DP interests in 
transacting aid business. He also cites the power dimension, which cannot be 
overlooked as long as developing countries remain dependent on aid. Additionally, 
Samoff (2004) asserts that aid dependence and country-led development are 
incompatible: it is difficult to achieve the latter in contexts in which the former is 
manifest.   
 
Samoff‟s (2004) observations concerning the problem of Burkina Faso‟s aid 
dependency, which militated against the principle of government independence, are 
articulated thus:  
 
National and institutional interests remain important, but development partners 
collectively continue to instruct more than listen…thus undermining the 
dialogue and partnership that they claim to construct (Samoff, 2004, p.418).  
 
These observations suggest that as we wrestle with notions of country-led 
development, we must recognize that (a) aid dependence and country-led 
development are incompatible, and (b) as long as the heavy reliance on foreign 
aid continues, the immediate task is to work on transparency and clarity about 
roles, rather than assuming that external agencies have no interest or can ignore 
them; or that they will subordinate their own sense of what must be done to 
decisions of national education officials (Samoff, 2004, p.416). 
 
Other commentators have provided potential solutions to these problems, suggesting 
that specific measures be taken in the form of “partnership agreements” that provide 
clear guidelines for the conduct of stakeholders (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999; Foster, 
2001). Samoff (2004) makes an analogous proposal in advocating the establishment of 
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transparency measures and clarification of the roles to be played by all stakeholders in a 
SWAp partnership. Similarly, in his review of the status of the SWAp, Foster (2001) 
underscores the importance of a memorandum of understanding, with clearly delineated 
responsibilities guiding the conduct of business being essential for the improvement of 
relations.      
 
In his review of the provision and management of external support to education in 
Malawi, Foster (2007) asserts that the main obstacle militating against alignment and 
harmonization is the issue of transparency in the use of funds, a concern to which 
Samoff (2004) also alludes. Foster (2007) also indicates the need for a formalized, 
government-led process for aid coordination and dialogue at sector level. 
 
Finally, Buchert and Epskamp‟s (2000) critique highlights the difficulties of complying 
with the principles of a SWAp at implementation stage, revealing that, so far, no 
country has been able to put the SWAp concept into full practice. 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that relations between principles and practical 
application become complicated and context specific at the implementation stage of a 
SWAp. It is therefore necessary that special care be taken when analyzing such a 
modality and the manner in which its principles are applied is critically examined in the 
light of the specific context in which they are implemented. 
 
As a new modality, the SWAp was conceived at the global level, where, although 
decisions on international aid are made in accordance with the various and evolving 
development theories – as discussed in Section 3.1 and reiterated in other parts of the 
chapter – in most cases, this is done without due consideration to the situation on the 
ground or the involvement of those who are best placed to understand the challenges 
and dynamics to be addressed (Colenso, 2010). Such a contention could equally apply 
to the FTI and its requirements for accessing funds, as queried by Rose (2005). In a 
sense, this is an act of power that can be translated to the practical implementation of 
the SWAp process.      
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3.3 Theories of Power  
 
Any SWAp partnership comprises a social relationship that is subject to power 
relations. There is an imbalance of power between DPs and the developing 
country/recipient government in a SWAp partnership, given that the former donate 
money to the later. Literature reviewed claims that a recipient government becomes 
subject to its DPs not only due to its dependence on aid, but also on account of the 
controlling influence of the latter; as corroborated by Samoff (2004), who explicitly 
demonstrates the incompatibility between aid-dependence and leadership on the part of 
the recipient government when the interests of the donors take precedence over 
development.  
 
Power emerges as an important concept in the literature review. There are several 
crucial issues highlighted from the SWAp partnership appertaining to the principles of 
the modality that revolve around power. The roles of ownership and leadership of the 
SWAp process that are expected to be shouldered by the aid recipient government have 
not been fulfilled due to exacerbation of the existing situation perpetrated through the 
power of those donating the money, and a lack of capacity on the part of the recipient 
government – epitomizing the power imbalance in a SWAp setup. In turn, such lack of 
capacity affects the ability of the recipient government to coordinate SWAp 
programmes (Smith, 2005; Samoff, 2004 and Murphy, 2005).  
 
By role delineation, in addition to financial aid, donors/DPs are intended to bring 
expertise to the process, which also places them in an advantaged position of power 
compared to the recipient government. Consequently, they are able to influence the 
process to realize their interests, undermining partnership ideals (Samoff, 2004). 
According to the Paris Declaration framework donors/DPs are required to align aid with 
national plans and priorities. However, based on evidence from the literature review, 
this has rarely been accomplished due to the interference of donor priorities and 
interests.  
 
The multi-faceted role of international assistance that aims to address challenges 
confronting the education sector and simultaneously achieve global targets further 
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presents a complexity in the provision of aid in a SWAp partnership by attracting a set 
of conditionalities on the part of the donors (Samoff, 1999).  
 
Based on the experiences of the implementation of the modality elsewhere and a critical 
reflection on the general principles of its partnerships, all the aforementioned issues 
surrounding SWAp collaboration serve to underscore the crucial role that power has in 
the outcomes of education programmes implemented under this new aid initiative.   
 
Therefore, the notion of power derived from my literature review is that donors have 
power and this is why they are able to interact at the global level at which they make 
important decisions – some of which have led to changes in North–South relations and a 
move away from the project approach to the SWAp (Forster, 1999). These innovations 
have also linked aid to international poverty reduction targets in line with neo-liberal 
economic policies, EFA and the MDGs (King and Rose, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, my intention in this section is not to review the literature on power so 
much as to establish some key theories that will enable me to analyse and explain more 
clearly the education SWAp process in Malawi. The following theories are discussed 
with a view to realizing this objective. 
 
Weber‟s Distributive Theory: Weber‟s (1978) position on power is founded on his 
understanding of and orientation to social relationships, with the focus on a bilateral 
arrangement. In the distributive power conceptualization, one party in a social 
relationship is regarded as having more control and is therefore in a position to impose 
his or her own will regardless of the other‟s wishes. Therefore, this theory assumes the 
pre-existence of such a relationship. When one party gains power, the other begins to 
lose it, a process that proceeds along a continuum. This theory also holds that it is 
possible for either of the two parties in the relationship to assume control in the first 
place (Heiskala, 2001).  
 
Parsons‟ Collective Theory: Parsons (1960) hypothesizes that power extends beyond 
Weber‟s model in arguing that it might be amassed by two parties who can then agree to 
cooperate and wield their combined power over a third party or more actors. Therefore, 
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power has both collective and distributive functions (Parsons, 1960; Heiskala, 2001). 
Parsons indicates that power can be used in such a fashion as a resource. However, both 
Parsons (1960) and Weber (cited in Heiskala, 2001) regard power as being external to 
any particular actor. 
 
Foucault‟s Discursive Power (Foucault, 1991): This conceptualization focuses on how 
power is created and how it is promoted through different levels. It operates in the form 
of networks of relationships, the identity of actors/parties being dependent on the state 
of the network (referred to as the “climate” of the relationship). Such a powerbase might 
originate with a mother or child in a family network; or, as is the case with the present 
study, a DP or recipient government, the network being confined to the SWAp 
partnership.  
 
Foucault (1991) views power as neutral in terms of the identities of and its actors and 
relations between them. Based on the literature review, power manifested in macro-
level encounters between DPs and recipient governments may be viewed in terms of 
tactical episodes bound together by strategic operations. Therefore, some difference in 
approach notwithstanding, a structural view of power may be perceived not only as an 
„a‟–„b‟ relationship in which „a‟ exercises power over „b‟, but also one that is internal, 
each party‟s identity being dependent on the other (Foucault, 1991; Heiskala, 2001).  
 
Such a conceptualization differs from the distributive or collective approaches to power 
discussed earlier in this section in which the identity of „a‟ is independent of „b‟ in their 
relationship. On the contrary, this approach does not centre on „a‟ or „b‟ the parties 
themselves but on the relationship connecting the two, which introduces a power 
mechanism. In this arrangement, neither party can have complete power over the other. 
One can have an upper hand, but each has some power, for example, a guard and 
prisoner relationship (Foucault, 1991; Heiskala, 2001), but as is the case with the 
present study, a DP and recipient government. The key issue is the mechanism; when 
this changes or a new factor emerges such as an innovative policy direction – e.g. the 
Paris Declaration, which might bring a significant change in international development 
cooperation – it threatens to undo the power of those involved in the relationship. 
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Thus, according to Foucault (1991), power is proportional to action, is modified by 
events, and does not end with „a‟ exercising will over „b‟. Rather, „b‟ has the capacity to 
accept or define the relationship such that its resistance becomes deviance and changes 
the nature of the association. Such deviation creates a new discourse that is manifested 
as micro politics (Heiskala, 2001; Foucault, 1991; Deacons, 2002).  
 
According to Foucault (1991), the particular change branded deviance is an act of power 
if one considers who defines such deviance – those in power. Therefore, there is an 
imbalance and whatever discourse emerges is never neutral (Denegri-Knott, 2004; 
Foucault, 1982). This is corroborated by Denegri-Knott (2004) who asserts that it is 
through discourse that disciplinary power generates the difference between what is 
accepted as the norm and what is deviant. On the other hand, Deacon (2004) highlights 
the emphasis Foucault (1991) places on discourse by suggesting that it is not necessary 
to define power, but, rather, to examine the means by which it is exercised and the 
consequences when individuals exert power over others. This notion is taken a step 
further in discouraging the „separation of relations of power from and opposed to 
knowledge, truth and freedom‟ (Foucault, 1982, p.27). Thus, Foucault (1991) 
emphasizes the significance of inter-subjective acceptable knowledge of the way in 
which power is exercised and the links between knowledge and power.  His conception 
of power as covert or latent indicates that it works through actors rather than on them.  
 
Foucault (1991) further explains that belief systems gain power as more people embrace 
them as common knowledge. In this way, knowledge and truth instil a sense of self-
discipline in individuals through the construction of knowledge and value sets that they 
use to help others to manage their affairs (Deacon, 2002; Foucault, 1982). An individual 
in possession of knowledge (e.g. a teacher in relation to his or her student, or a doctor 
and patient dynamic) assumes the responsibility of subjecting him or herself as well as 
others to such knowledge. Thus, a field of expertise is embraced by many people as they 
subject themselves to such a belief system that forms their identity through induction or 
training as common knowledge, which is utilized to govern others (Deacon, 2002; 
Foucault, Foucault, 1982; Rabinow, 1984). Accordingly, this process constitutes 
„knowledge of the conscience and the ability to direct it‟ (Foucault, 1982, p.782). 
Knowledge and the notion of truth thus interact together. The exercise of this form of 
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power therefore thrives on the inner knowledge of the self and uses this to govern the 
individual. 
 
Lukes‟ Radical View of Power: In this hypothesis, Lukes (2006) describes power as 
imposing internal constraints on others who in turn acquire a belief leading to their 
consent or adaptation to domination. Both coercive and non-coercive measures can be 
used. He indicates that power as a concept is value dependent, being linked to 
assumptions. Lukes presents three dimensions of power as follows: 
 
First Dimension: Lukes (2006) believes that the exercise of power is intentional and 
active; and if there are opposing views, an individual holding power will defeat an 
opponent‟s preference: a pluralist viewpoint. The first dimension is concerned with 
behaviour, decision making, key issues that cause the difference, observable conflict, 
and subjective interests – which are regarded as policy preferences revealed by political 
participation. In other words, power is possessed by those who are able to get their way 
when decisions are made and operates to enable those decisions to be enacted.   
 
Second Dimension: This dimension concerns decision making and control over the 
political agenda, issues and potential issues, observable conflict, and subjective interests 
– which are regarded as policy preferences or grievances. This addresses criticism of the 
pluralist viewpoint of the First Dimension, and holds that power decisions are not only 
concrete but are also affected by other factors. Decision making can also include non-
controversial issues, for example, values and rituals. The main point is that power can 
be used to create or reinforce barriers during conflict; for example, decision making 
versus non-decision making, whereby decision making is viewed as change with a 
purpose – bringing in the alternative to that which already exists – and non-decision 
making represents choices that block alternative views or values. Essentially, non-
decision making is intended to address potential issues that can bring in changes to 
mechanisms – as with Foucault – which threaten the usual mechanism (Lukes, 2006). 
The second dimension therefore includes power that is not seen just in observable 
behaviour but encompasses the power to exclude both alternatives possibilities and 
people and groups.  
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Third Dimension: This dimension concerns decision making and control over the 
political agenda, issues and potential issues, observable and latent conflict, and 
subjective and real interests. It is concerned with the power to prevent the formation of 
grievances (dealing with issues before they surface) by shaping perceptions, cognitions 
and preferences to ensure acceptance of a certain role. Latent conflict concerns a 
conflict of interests in „a‟ with regard to the exercise of power, and the real interests of 
„b‟, which are excluded when the latter is either unaware of them or does not express his 
or her interests (Lukes, 2006). The third dimension of power includes the hidden 
mechanisms by which conflict is not visible, but nonetheless enables the powerful to 
ensure the compliance of the less powerful.  
 
Soft Power: Nye (2010): According to Nye (2010), unlike Lukes‟ (2006) three-
dimensional view that revolves around shaping others‟ preferences by using both 
coercive and non-coercive means, soft power involves the latter only: you attract people 
through your capabilities and make them desire and strive to be like you. 
 
China‟s growing power and influence on the international development arena has been 
widely recognized by the global community to the extent that Hyden (2008) is prompted 
to argue that, particularly where African countries are concerned, there is overt 
competition in aid provision between Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries and China. This contention is corroborated by Suzuki 
(2010), who observes that the change in China‟s increasing influence in the 
international political arena is evidenced by its exercising of „soft power‟ among its 
neighbours and developing countries in Africa – Malawi being one of them. 
 
Heiskala‟s Neo-structuralist Theory: Heiskala‟s (2001) hypothesis expands on the 
aforementioned approaches. It contends that macro relations alone do not determine the 
starting point of micro relations. This conceptualization regards each relationship 
between „a‟ and „b‟ as a power relation regardless of there being an inherent or 
institutionalized strategy. It thus represents a move away from Foucault (1991) in 
refuting the neutrality of power. Accordingly, all relations are power relations, those 
concerning “dispositifs” falling under micro power relations, while class relations form 
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a discrete group of dispositifs. Therefore, power cannot be confined to any single 
instance but is spread throughout the entire network of relations.  
 
According to neo-structuralist theory, manifestations of analytical power approaches do 
not need to be used as alternatives, but by placing them on a scale, analytical capacity is 
enhanced (Heiskala, 2001). For example, Weber could be at level 1: „a‟ and „b‟; Parsons 
at level 2: „a‟ and „b‟, with combined power over c; Foucault at level 3, with „a‟, „b‟ or 
„c‟ but with a power mechanism; and the neo-structuralist conceptualization at level 4, 
with different approaches on the scale rather than alternatives. As the area of application 
widens by moving up through the levels, the complexity of analysis also increases. 
These analytical power approaches therefore do not necessarily conflict with each other 
as previously argued, but can be used in a complementary way to form one unified 
concept – a neo-structuralist one (Heiskala, 2001).   
 
In a SWAp partnership, everyone is implicated in the discourse, as all members strive to 
achieve their aims not only as actors from various backgrounds representing different 
interests and agendas, but also as individuals interacting in such a forum. In the case of 
the present study, changes in international development aid supported by those in power 
– the DPs – brought about a transition from the project approach to the SWAp after the 
former was branded ineffective. This was later reaffirmed by the Paris Declaration, 
which redefined the partnership model, again supported by those in power; thus, 
presenting another discourse within the mainstream international aid dialogue. In terms 
of roles and responsibilities, the DPs were assigned the function of not only providing 
funding, but also expertise – they were branded as knowledgeable by those in power. 
 
Therefore, in accordance with the findings of my literature review, the 
conceptualization of power in this thesis adopts both Foucault‟s discursive theory in 
respect of the structural level and Lukes‟ dimensional hypothesis, paying particular 
attention to power dynamics in the SWAp partnership. Foucault‟s theory is adopted 
because power relations operate in discourses in which the actors become caught up – 
each one attempting to pursue his or her respective government‟s interests to some 
extent, not only at the lower structural level of a SWAp implementation, but also at a 
higher stratum where decisions on international development aid (as a power 
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mechanism) are taken, such as those encapsulated in the Paris Declaration and Accra 
Agenda for Action.  
 
Again, based on the literature review, I note that there are certain constraints on actors 
in terms of the representation of their views on important decisions made in a SWAp 
process (Samoff, 2004). Therefore, another dimension that my conceptualization utilizes 
derives from Lukes‟ notion of power, which principally concerns actors‟ possession of 
power and its exercise over others; people striving to have their will and interests 
represented in the SWAp decision-making process; and the manner in which the 
powerful secure the willing compliance of those they dominate by imposing internal 
constraints on them through coercive and non-coercive measures.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has highlighted the trends in international development cooperation that 
led to the introduction of the SWAp, a modality that is associated with effective aid 
delivery. It has linked international aid to development theories that continue to 
influence the provision of assistance to the South. It has also shown through experiences 
of SWAps in other developing countries that clear principles determining the SWAp 
notwithstanding, the implementation of the modality remains problematic.  
 
These challenges have risen due to issues of aid dependency, capacity, coordination and 
ownership in the context of the Paris Declaration framework; international development 
assistance that has tied aid to conditionalities and targets; and the effects of neo-liberal 
economic principles that continue to impede the effective implementation of the SWAp 
and its partnership interactions. These concerns further exemplify the gap between the 
rhetoric around the SWAp and the reality on the ground.   
 
Finally, the chapter has discussed various issues that make power a crucial determining 
factor in programme outcomes; given that the SWAp partnership is not only a social 
entity that is prone to power relations, but that the very introduction of the modality was 
an act of power in the realm of international development aid. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
 
4.0 Introduction      
 
This chapter describes the methodology for investigating the nature of the Malawian 
education SWAp partnership and its influence on this process by exploring the various 
actors‟ perspectives.  It provides the purpose of the study, and the research questions. It 
also explains the research rationale and reason for choosing a constructivist paradigm, 
and the ethical considerations. The chapter defines the research approach and the reason 
for deciding to use mixed methods, and then presents the ontological and 
epistemological considerations in this study. The chapter also describes the sampling 
and methods of data collection and analysis, and the reasons for selecting them. It 
explains the delimitations and limitations of the study and presents the research strategy. 
The conclusion is drawn from the key methodological considerations highlighted in the 
chapter. 
 
4.1 Purpose of the Study  
 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the Malawian education SWAp partnership 
and how it influenced the SWAp process. This became necessary after a literature 
review (see Chapter 3) highlighted contextual knowledge on a wide array of issues 
around SWAp experiences in other contexts (Silverman, 2005; Flick, 2009). One of the 
key issues emerging from the literature review is Buchert‟s (2002) observation that 
partnerships are central to the effectiveness of a SWAp. Another significant issue is the 
emphasis on the importance of collaboration, as the SWAp is a critical partnership 
strategy adopted by international aid agencies for the funding of state sectors in 
developing countries. Yet, the literature also draws attention to a number of outstanding 
problematic concerns around how these partnerships ought to be conducted (Courtney, 
2007) given that there have been such inconsistencies in the SWAps implemented 
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elsewhere. In the light of such findings, it was pertinent to focus the present study on 
partnerships in an examination of the perspectives of actors in the education SWAp 
process.  
 
Therefore, the main research question for this study is:  
 
How do stakeholders‟ perspectives on partnership influence the education SWAp 
process in Malawi – from the Policy Investment Framework to the National Education 
Sector Plan?  
 
In order to answer the main research question, this study required the investigation of 
those involved in the education SWAp partnership, a variety of actors that covered 
DPs/donors, government officials, and CSOs/NGOs.  
 
The following sub-questions were selected to understand the nature of the partnership 
and its influence on the SWAp process: 1) What motivated the emergence of the 
partnership in the education SWAp process? 2) How do the roles of different 
stakeholders in the partnership affect the education SWAp process? 3) What is the 
nature of the interactions among stakeholders in the SWAp partnership? 4) How does 
the partnership in the education SWAp process influence funding to the sector?  
 
4.2 Research Philosophy  
 
Owing to the nature of a study that focuses on understanding the structure of an 
education partnership, exploring the perspectives and opinions of its actors was a 
prerequisite to determining the effect the partnership has on the SWAp process. 
Accordingly, it was vital that I choose an appropriate philosophical framework to guide 
the study, since a philosophical worldview continues to influence the practice of 
research (Cresswell, 2009; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
 
Consequently, the study utilizes a social constructivist philosophical framework 
(frequently combined with interpretivism) to explore the views of DPs/donors, 
government officials, and CSOs/NGOs as actors in the education SWAp process 
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(Cresswell, 2003; Silverman, 2005). The central point of constructivism is that 
knowledge is socially and culturally constructed, and that reality, too, is socially 
constructed, and does not exist prior to its social invention (Jackson et al., 2005). This 
notion is similarly observed by Cresswell (2003, p.8):  
 
Thus, constructivist researchers often address „processes‟ of interaction among 
individuals. They also focus on the specific contexts in which people live and 
work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the 
participants. Researchers recognize that their own background shapes the 
interpretation, and they „position themselves‟ in the research to acknowledge 
how their interpretation flows from their own personal, cultural, and historical 
experiences. The researcher‟s intent, then, is to make sense of (or interpret) the 
meanings others have about the world.   
 
 
The constructivist position in understanding the various actors‟ perspectives on the 
process – right from the motivation for initiating the education SWAp partnership, to 
interactions amongst the actors, and their relationships with each other – is of particular 
significance in an effort to gain insight into the impact that the SWAp partnership had 
on the education SWAp process. The anticipation was that data collected from the field 
would assist in developing a pragmatic conceptual understanding of the partnership 
configuration and other theoretical explanations that would later be used in the data 
analysis.  
 
4.3 Ethical Considerations  
 
In conducting a study that requires collecting primary data, the observation of an ethical 
code is fundamental in order to ensure that no participant is put at risk, from the period 
of data collection through to the dissemination of the findings (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 
2003 and Dunne, et al., 2005). One way of ensuring that vital ethical issues were taken 
into account, was to have my research plans examined against University of Sussex 
recommendations, those in force at the time of the commencement of the study being 
the Sussex Institute Ethical Guidelines, as reproduced in Appendix E.  
  
This study entailed addressing sensitive and potentially confidential issues. It was 
therefore essential that I observe ethical considerations in my involvement and 
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interaction with respondents throughout the data collection period, thus ensuring that 
they were afforded due respect. Moreover, confidentiality and the protection of 
individual participants in this study were assured through the assignment of codes to 
each respondent and his or her organization (Bryman, 2004).  
 
Although I made a written document seeking permission to have respondents participate 
in this study readily available, it was not used after I had explained its aim and the 
relevant authorities made it clear that there was no need for a formal request. They did 
this because they found the research topic to be of interest, especially given that it might 
provide insights into how to improve the SWAp partnership; and they also knew and 
trusted me as one who had interacted with them before. Some of them further indicated 
that they looked forward to reading the research findings. Since all the respondents were 
familiar to me, arranging interviews was straightforward and conducted by telephone.  
   
At the beginning of interviews, it was necessary to provide information on the aim of 
the study to the respondents. This was done and I made it clear that they were free to 
participate in the study or decline. They all chose to participate and were keen to share 
their views on the SWAp process. They also readily agreed to have their interviews 
tape-recorded. Thus, upon receiving oral consent from the authorities (Bryman, 2004), I 
proceeded to administer the survey and conduct the interviews.  
 
Again, I initially planned to ask respondents to sign a consent form prior to their 
involvement in the study in order to ensure that their rights were protected (Cresswell, 
2003), but this was rendered unnecessary as we proceeded on trust. Nevertheless, 
ethical issues were carefully taken into consideration at each stage. I made it clear that 
all participants were free to seek clarification on any issue during interviews, which 
were conducted at respondents‟ offices or another location of their choice and at a time 
that was convenient to them.  
 
4.4 Research Approach 
 
As observed in Section 4.2 above, the nature of the study – and the research questions in 
particular – largely determined my choice of methodological tool (Tashakkori and 
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Teddlie, 1998; Flick, 2009; Silverman, 2005; Cresswell, 2003). The nature of this study 
entails the gaining of an understanding of the meaning and interpretations of the 
respondents‟ social world in which they interact as partners in the education SWAp 
process, „and make sense of it based on their historical and social perspectives‟ 
(Cresswell, 2009; Dunne, et al., 2005). This also requires exploring numeric 
descriptions that may call for both qualitative and quantitative data (Bryman, 1988; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Cresswell, 2009; Miles and Hubermann, 1984). An 
examination of the perceptions of actors requires in the main the collection of 
qualitative data that is amenable to the complexity of the study, hence the choice of the 
social constructivist position (Cresswell, 2009). However, quantitative data – which is 
often associated with the deductive style, focusing is it does on statistical data (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009) – was also used to provide information on the extent to which 
actors considered partnership relations to affect the education SWAp process; in terms 
of funding in particular, an area that this collaboration was expected to address.   
 
Accordingly, I opted for a combination of research methods. As pointed out above, the 
decision to opt for mixed methods was based on the nature of the research problem, as 
„certain types of social research problems call for specific approaches‟ (Cresswell, 
2003, p.21). This guided the move towards adopting a more qualitative than quantitative 
approach in the mix in order to derive rich data that would help explore issues in great 
detail and help understand the meanings and interpretations of the education SWAp 
partnership (Bryman, 1988; Cresswell, 2009).  
       
Another important factor that influenced my choice of mixed methods was the 
realization that all approaches have their biases and limitations; therefore, a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative analysis helps utilize the strengths of both and offsets the 
weaknesses inherent in any particular technique. Moreover, different sources of data 
allow variation in respect of interpretation and understanding, thus achieving superior 
results (Cresswell, 2009; Jick, 1979; Bryman, 2004; Greene et al., 1989). A rich variety 
of data collected both objectively and subjectively may be used to advantage thus: „If 
one allows the researcher to use both qualitative and quantitative methodological tools, 
then this embrace of both the subjective and the objective points of view is inevitable‟ 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.26). Therefore, no attempt was made to avoid or 
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eliminate the bias inherent in any one method, as each had its role in elucidating the 
respondents‟ understanding and interpretations as well as my own (Cresswell, 2003). 
Such a strategy would not be possible in a non-constructivist approach.  
 
It was thus decided to collect data using both qualitative and quantitative tools. 
However, the qualitative method is particularly appropriate to the present study, being 
associated with an inductive model (Cresswell, 2009), and with research „primarily 
working within the constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data 
and analyses‟ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009, p.4). The focus is on understanding how 
social actors construct knowledge and interpret the world, which is influenced by their 
background, culture and their interactions with others; and so the knowledge derived 
from the data is not objective but subjectively constructed. The qualitative method of 
data collection involves greater engagement with respondents when, for example, it 
takes the form of the semi-structured interview.  
 
While a combination of approaches with elements of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods has limitations in terms of the length of time involved in collecting and 
analyzing the data, another reason for adopting this strategy is its ability to generate 
multiple datasets and thus triangulation between them (Cresswell, 2003; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998; Bryman, 2004); therefore, providing an opportunity to gain the best 
possible understanding of the issues under study (Cresswell, 2009). Accordingly, I was 
able to integrate quantitative data into my qualitative dataset for a comprehensive 
analysis of the nature of partnership interactions and collaborations, and how funding to 
the education sector is affected in the SWAp process. 
  
Data were collected using the concurrent procedure – both quantitative and qualitative 
information is collected „at the same time and analysed in a complementary manner‟ 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.47) – and the subsequent analysis focused on common 
areas of agreement or disagreement between them. The concurrent procedure was 
preferred to the sequential one – in which the researcher first conducts a phase using 
one method followed by another phase using a different method (Cresswell, 2009; 
Greene et al., 1989) – because it was anticipated that doing so would reduce the amount 
of time required for data collection. This strategy was also adopted in the knowledge 
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that the mixed methods approach entails the collection of at least two different datasets, 
which in itself is a lengthy process. 
 
4.5 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations   
 
As indicated earlier, the predominant method in this study is a qualitative one that 
employs inductive techniques. Ontology refers to the nature of reality, which, according 
to the positivist paradigm, is believed to be singular and stable. On the contrary, from 
the viewpoint of the constructivist (also referred to as naturalist or interpretivist), reality 
is multiple, emergent and constructed – hence subjective (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998; Bryman, 1988). Thus, what is described as reality is the result of actors 
restructuring, shifting and constructing their social world through interaction with others 
based on background, culture, systems and subjective experience.  
 
The ontological stance of this study is based on the constructivist/interpretivist 
paradigm, which underpins its qualitative methodology in the understanding that reality 
is a socially constructed phenomenon (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998.; Bryman, 1988). 
With reference to the specific context of the study, the reality of the nature of the 
education SWAp partnership was constructed around the meanings and interpretations 
DPs, government officials, and civil society derived from their interactions in the 
process. Although they had substantial liberty to act based on their understanding of the 
environment in which they found themselves, they were limited in the ability to change 
their situations in respect of the SWAp process, as they were bound by the prescriptions 
of international aid at a higher level.  
 
However, the rationale for SWAps lies in the notion of development whose ontology is 
often considered unproblematic. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
participants‟ understandings of development from this perspective. However, purely 
from an empirical point of view in Malawi, the idea of linear development is not easily 
accepted, given the country‟s heavy dependence on aid, but also due to cyclical nature 
of disasters like flooding and persistent droughts, food insecurity, malnutrition, high 
incidents of malaria, HIV and AIDS, poverty and other factors which tend to affect 
development in the country including that of children (Malawi Multiple Indicator 
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Cluster Survey, 2006; Sharra, 2010). Aid flow has not been consistent and yet most 
development activities are dependent on it, such that any aid received is viewed as 
better than none. Aid and other factors tend to affect development at various stages and 
different periods to the extent that linear development sounds to be a too simplistic 
approach to Malawi. Thus cyclical development is what Malawians have known and 
experienced. Consequently, the views and perceptions of respondents about the reality 
of the education SWAp partnership were also likely to be influenced by this background 
and experience. 
 
Epistemology refers to what is taken as accepted knowledge, and the relation between 
the knower and the known. According to the constructivist paradigm, it is believed that 
the knower and the known cannot be separated, and that there is a relation between 
knowledge and reality (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Bryman, 1988).  
 
With regard to this study, attention was paid to its design, data collection, analysis, and 
the interpretation of results in order to draw meaning from DP, government and civil 
society views/perspectives, both as a comparison with my own understanding and in 
parallel with it as we interacted (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). This underscores the 
subjective stance I adopted in this study. Knowledge about the education SWAp that 
was learned from the actors was based on an interpretation of interactive experiences 
that were shaped by their culture, and historical and social perspectives (Cresswell, 
2009). Consequently, there was a relation between this constructed knowledge and 
reality in the education SWAp process.  
 
Although the objective standpoint of positivism believes that meaning exists in the 
world, that the knower and the known are independent, and hence knowledge reflects 
reality (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), overall, very little attention was paid to this 
viewpoint by the present study.    
 
4.6 The Researcher’s Positionality  
 
I was assigned the responsibility of participating in the Malawian education SWAp 
process as one who worked for a DP organization. Therefore, I had the opportunity to 
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join the SWAp partnership in late 2000 as one of the actors representing UNICEF, 
which was a full DP participant having worked with the government for many years. 
This naturally identifies me as an insider in the context of a study in which the 
participants were people I interacted with on a regular basis in the SWAp process. Even 
if one were to draw a clear partition between the two major actors in this partnership, 
that is, the government and its DPs, I would still be identified as an insider when 
interviewing both groups of actors. Thus, the positive aspects of an insider were enjoyed 
in both cases, which was a distinct advantage if one takes into consideration the division 
between the government and DPs in SWAp processes. Accordingly, I had privileged 
knowledge of the partnership, which I was able to exploit in order to help understand 
and interpret the situation (Gallais, 2003). Nevertheless, these details are provided 
merely to underscore my insider status as a researcher in this field of study.  
 
As an insider researcher, many aspects that an outsider might have needed to take into 
account during data collection were not applicable to me, since „the insider researcher 
shares the social world of the research participants‟ (Gallais, 2003, p.2). Thus, the dress, 
culture, traditions and customs of the participants were not alien to me. Consequently, 
gaining access to respondents was very easy even though they were members of the 
elite in their own way, but the risk of „taken-for-granted assumptions‟ (Hockey, 1993, 
p.199 cited by Gallais, 2003) due to my social proximity to them (Ganga and Scott, 
2006) remained high. Therefore, precautionary measures had to be taken. The choice of 
appropriate participants in this study was accomplished based on my knowledge of all 
those involved in the SWAp process.  
 
Gallais (2003, p.3) further points out the dangers „that the insider researcher will 
approach situations with assumptions and preconceptions applicable to the home 
group.‟ Therefore, I took steps to ensure that I did not make any premature judgements 
about participants‟ responses when I had prior knowledge of a particular issue. I relied 
on the information provided, but requested further details and clarification on certain 
areas based on my knowledge and experience. This was done in an effort to avoid any 
bias on the part of either the participants or myself arising from overfamiliarity and 
taken-for-granted assumptions.  
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Generally, I enjoyed a good rapport with all the participants and, based on responses to 
the issue of power relations, I judge that some of the common barriers that insider 
researchers encounter were not prevalent in this study. Respondents were sufficiently 
candid and did not withhold information on those critical issues around participation in 
the SWAp process that tended to be affected by power relations emanating from DP 
funding to the government. My assessment of this is based on the knowledge and 
experience I have of this social group as an insider with access to present information, 
as well as that for the previous ten years. Indeed, my experiences and the meaning I 
derived from them were shaped by the very background and the environment in which I 
operated (Gallais, 2003). 
 
4.7 Sampling   
 
Given that the study was predominantly qualitative – although it also incorporated 
quantitative methods – I was prompted to opt for purposive sampling, which afforded 
me the best opportunity to target the groups of people who were involved in the 
education SWAp partnership. Such a procedure allows the selection of individuals, 
groups and settings based on their ability to meet certain characteristics relevant to the 
case under study (Wiersma, 1995; Silverman, 2005). Careful consideration is given to 
the parameters of the population the study covers when deciding on the sample 
(Silverman, 2005). Accordingly, a purposive sample was selected subjectively in a 
manner that was different from probability sampling (Bryman, 2004); a randomly 
selected sample being deemed inappropriate for this study. On the contrary, the 
purposive method helped me identify a research sample that included organizations and 
individuals selected by virtue of their involvement in the education sector SWAp. 
Again, personal involvement in the SWAp process rendered the selection process 
straightforward and more meaningful.  
 
My sample population covered all DP/donor agencies actively involved in the education 
SWAp, the Government of Malawi (the Ministry of Education and other key 
departments), and CSOs and NGOs represented by the Civil Society Coalition for 
Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE). Specifically, the study included a total of 40 
participants, comprising education specialists from the following organizations: 
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Department for International Development (DFID); Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA); German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), now known as 
German Development Cooperation (GDC); World Bank (WB); United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID); African Development Bank (ADB); Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA); United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF); 
World Food Programme (WFP); the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
(Planning, Basic Education, Secondary, Education Methods Advisory Services 
(EMAS), and DTED); the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development; the 
Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Women and Child Development; and CSCQBE.  
 
I planned to collect data through document reviews, qualitative interviews and 
participant observation. However, I was unable to conduct the latter due to my 
professional relocation to another country. It was thus virtually impossible to conduct 
participant observation on two counts: firstly, I was no longer part of the education 
SWAp process in Malawi; and secondly, even if I could have continued to participate, it 
would have been difficult for me to attend meetings because of the distance involved. 
Therefore, this aspect of data collection was omitted and the study proceeded by means 
of the other techniques, with interviews forming the major part of my data collection.  
 
A total of 40 people participated in the survey, half of whom were interviewed. All 
survey forms were hand delivered and hand collected in order to avoid the non-return of 
questionnaires. This process proved to be beneficial, as I not only had the opportunity to 
further clarify the aim of the study when delivering the questionnaires but was also able 
to check whether all the questions had been answered when I collected them. 
 
A review of documents relevant to the area of study was conducted. This included 
reports on capacity gap analysis for the implementation of the NESP; fiduciary 
assessment; documents that comprised the application for FTI funding; sector 
performance reports; and other documents pertinent to education reform. This review 
contributed to the study by providing a broader perspective and up-to-date information 
that contributed towards the identification of other emerging key issues subsequently 
incorporated in the research process. Another significant dataset collected was a trend 
analysis of funding patterns since the initiation of the SWAp process, which entailed 
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checking through relevant financial documents for the decade 2000–2010 in order to 
ascertain each DP‟s funding trend. This provided data that was used to verify whether 
the SWAp partnership had helped to enhance funding to the sector. Data collected 
through the document review were used in triangulation not only to cross-check the 
accuracy of information collected through the survey and interviews, but also to 
ascertain whether there had been an improvement in sector performance. 
      
4.8 Data Collection Methodology  
 
This study, which mainly involved collecting qualitative data through interviews, gave 
me the opportunity to capture the perspectives and interpretations of DPs, government 
officials, and CSOs and NGOs operating in partnership in the education SWAp process. 
Interview questions were sufficiently broad to elicit a variety of responses that allowed 
participants to construct the meaning of their partnership interactions through the 
discussion (Cresswell, 2003; Dunne, et al., 2005).  
 
Interviews were conducted using a guide that had been carefully developed (see 
Appendix C). I chose a semi-structured format because of its ability to offer guidance 
on specified topics of interest to the study. Thus, after predetermined introductory 
questions, I was able to follow-up with enquiries outside the guide in order to seek 
clarification on specific issues. This made for an open-ended discursive interview that 
was particularly useful for obtaining further information and meaning on issues of 
power relations in the SWAp partnership (Bryman, 2004; Cresswell, 2003).  
 
The interview guide was developed based on issues relevant to the research questions, 
and consequently covered the principle areas of motivation for the emergence of 
partnerships in the education SWAp process; the roles of different actors in the 
partnership; and power relations among these actors (see Appendix C for details). I then 
developed a set of questions under each area that guided the elicitation of more detailed 
information. After developing the semi-structured interview guide, I piloted my research 
tool on a few people to determine its appropriateness and effectiveness.  
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The results of the pilot revealed the need to clarify two points: what the education 
SWAp entailed; and the period of the SWAp process, given that actors had different 
perceptions of its development. The present study covered the period from the 
implementation of the PIF to that of the NESP, examining the collaborations that 
emerged, and investigating the interactions of stakeholders in the education SWAp 
partnership from 1999 to 2010. However, the term “education SWAp” created a certain 
level of misunderstanding among a few actors who were of the opinion that it referred 
strictly to a full operational SWAp. Others believed that the process was confined to the 
period of the NESP.  
 
I thus found it necessary to clarify the composition of the education SWAp process 
when introducing the aim of the study before beginning an interview. I therefore 
implemented this elucidation at the pilot stage and the innovation proved to work. 
Consequently, there was no need to make any fundamental changes to the research tool, 
but merely modify it a little. Accordingly, this refinement became an essential part of 
my preamble at the beginning of each interview.   
 
I then proceeded to make interview appointments with the participants over the 
telephone, as indicated earlier, allowing them to choose where they wanted to be 
interviewed. It emerged that virtually all of them preferred their offices. In only three 
cases were interviews conducted by skype, as the respondents were out of reach and 
chose to be interviewed that way. I drew up my list of appointments on the basis that 
one interview session would not take more than one hour, taking travelling time into 
account.  
 
However, this schedule had to be constantly updated, as some interviews took longer 
than an hour. I did not stop respondents who talked for longer – in spite of the fact that 
qualitative study interviews have a tendency to generate large amounts of data, which 
might hinder effective analysis – since detail was viewed as necessary because it 
provides a contextual understanding of those being studied (Bryman, 2004).  
 
The tape recorder was used with the consent of interviewees in order to capture their 
responses, which were later transcribed for data analysis purposes. I deliberately left the 
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machine running for a while after each interview – although on three occasions, the 
respondent reminded me to switch it off – in order to capture more information, as I 
found that some respondents opened up after we had formally concluded the session 
(Bryman, 2004). Indeed, one respondent provided insightful information at the end of 
an interview on why some DPs who donated large sums of money wanted to exercise 
control over it. This would not have been captured had the tape recorder been switched 
off immediately after the formal conclusion of our discussion. Although this 
contribution was not directly utilized in the analysis, it provided a different perspective 
from that of the usual response during interviews.  
 
In most cases, interviewees were relaxed and eager to provide as much information as 
they could on the education SWAp partnership and how it affected the process – and did 
so with passion. Thus, gaining access to them as powerful people, which is normally a 
problem (Williams, 2012), was not an issue in my case due to proximity as a fellow DP. 
In two exceptional cases, the respondents became so emotionally engaged that I found it 
difficult to stop them, although the information they provided was rich and necessary, 
and formed part of the main data used in the analysis.  
 
Although there were isolated instances when I was kept waiting beyond the appointed 
time and interviews were also interrupted once or twice when respondents had to take 
telephone calls from their superiors, such eventualities could not in any way be 
interpreted as an intended display of subtle power. Thus, this study was not troubled by 
any of the complex, problematic issues that can arise when interviewing members of the 
elite, as in many ways I shared equal identity, status and authority with the respondents, 
a fortuitous occurrence that facilitated a smooth exchange of information (Odendahl and 
Shaw, 2010). 
 
In only one case did an interviewee keep reiterating the same point in response to 
almost every question. The participant repeatedly bemoaned the fact that the Ministry of 
Education had not revised the Education Act and felt that such an amendment was all 
that was needed to facilitate a smooth SWAp process. This line became so tedious that I 
was tempted to stop the respondent on several occasions. In an effort to deflect the 
interviewee from this refrain, I asked a probing question on the topic under 
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investigation, but this was not very successful, proving to be only a momentary 
diversion before the respondent was back on the same tack. Unsurprisingly, the data 
gathered from this interviewee provided little information that was relevant to the study. 
 
In addition to the data I obtained from my first round of interviews, I found that one 
emerging issue required further investigation. As special attention had been given to a 
specific area in which the interviewees were personally involved (Flick, 2009), I 
arranged to re-interview two respondents who were required to reflect on the two 
situations pertaining to the issue. Data collected though this technique were also 
recorded and transcribed. 
 
„Questionnaires, which are mainly strongly associated with the production of 
quantitative data and statistical analysis‟ (Dunne et al., 2005, p.41) were also used in 
this study to collect quantitative data to measure the extent to which the education 
SWAp process influenced funding to the sector. Since questionnaires are also useful in 
identifying underlying patterns, I collected quantitative data pertaining to aspects that 
covered various issues on how funding to the sector was affected by the SWAp process; 
partnership relations; the roles of stakeholders/actors; financing mechanisms; aid 
coordination; leadership; principles applied; and government priorities.  
 
Specifically, self-completion questionnaires (see appendices A and B) were used in 
which respondents were expected to answer all questions individually (Bryman, 2004). 
The two questionnaires, which were basically the same and only differed slightly in 
terms of personal data, mostly contained closed questions with the exception of a few 
open ones at the beginning that elicited personal information.  
 
I took into account the following considerations in designing the survey: the clarity of 
questions in order to avoid cases of non-completion; the ease with which respondents 
would be able to complete the questionnaire; and the use of closed questions that would 
render data analysis uncomplicated. Since the survey involved self-completion of 
questionnaires, it was essential that a covering letter accompany them (Wiersma, 1995) 
to stipulate the purpose and objectives of the study (Best and Kahn, 1986), and to assure 
72 
 
 
 
 
the respondents of their confidentiality. However, in practice, this was accomplished 
orally when hand delivering the questionnaires.  
 
A date was set with all participants when I would return to collect the questionnaires, a 
precaution that was taken not only to provide them with a deadline, but also to 
circumvent the postal delays that can occur in developing countries in particular. The 
respondents were given adequate time to complete their questionnaires; nevertheless, 
there were a few cases in which I had to return more than once because some people 
gave several excuses for not completing them. In a few isolated cases, I had to sit and 
wait for hours in reception areas while questionnaires were finished.   
 
4.9 Methods of Data Analysis                
 
As indicated earlier, 20 respondents were interviewed through a qualitative inquiry 
using a semi-structured interview guide. The aim was to gather information on each 
interviewee‟s perspective on and knowledge about the education SWAp partnership as 
the basis for drawing out the meaning of the actor‟s construct about his or her social 
world (Flick 2009; Cresswell, 2009). The initial analysis process began with the 
transcription of the tape-recorded data, as „qualitative research relies on understanding 
social realities through the interpretation of texts‟ (Flick, 2009, p.75).  
 
One major challenge I encountered during the transcription process was spending long 
hours listening to tape recordings and typing up the text, particularly in cases where the 
recording was poor, which meant rewinding several times to ensure that I had captured 
it accurately. However, this process accorded me an opportunity to familiarize myself 
with the data. As I personally transcribed all the recordings, it was easier to identify 
emerging themes well in advance of the coding, which would not have been the case if 
somebody else had transcribed the data for me. I was also able to relate these themes to 
those that had been identified during the literature review. Another significant 
opportunity the transcription process presented was my ability to establish with ease the 
core datasets that I would use in my main analysis, and the identification of those that 
presented new, emerging issues in the area of study which would require further 
research in the future (Flick, 2009).  
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Since this study was predominantly qualitative, analysis also followed a qualitative 
approach, data collected through the survey being used for triangulating information 
gathered through interviews. After careful consideration of the nature of my study, and 
the size of the sample and datasets, I opted for manual analysis rather than computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), which is expensive and time 
consuming to use (Bryman, 2004). This decision also took into account the fact that 
some critics claim that computer software tends to generate too much unnecessary 
detail, which could have made it difficult to obtain a rational analysis, particularly given 
the size of my sample.  
 
The transcripts of the tape-recorded data were coded by allocating labels according to 
the emerging concepts, themes and theories of the social world of those under study 
(Cresswell, 2003; Bryman, 2004). This approach is consistent with Flick (2009, p.306) 
in that, „Coding the material has the aim of categorizing and/or theory development.‟ I 
also paid attention to avoiding the common pitfalls of coding, and ensured that the 
context and coherence of responses were maintained during the process by applying 
recommended steps and considerations (Bryman, 2004).  
 
Four major issues were identified that formed the core of the analysis: 1) the emergence 
of the partnership, 2) personal relationships, 3) power relations, and 4) funding. Data 
organized according to various themes were then grouped according to each of these 
main issues. Limited episodic data on one aspect meant that further clarification was 
necessary in order to determine the impact of the role funding; that is, the effect that DP 
allocation of funds to the government had on both the interaction of actors in the 
education SWAp process and the operations of the government was incorporated into 
the analysis from interview data.   
 
This analytical approach in turn provided useful and relevant information for the 
analysis of actors‟ knowledge about the SWAp; relationship interactions and the role of 
each group of actors; power relations; and the influence that this partnership had on the 
SWAp process. The results of the analysis (see Chapter 5) highlight how knowledge of 
a SWAp affects the participation of actors; how power relations affect participation and 
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performance in the SWAp process; and how the delivery and utilization of funding to 
the sector affects this process. The analysis also sheds light on the basis of power and 
how it was exercised in this partnership. 
   
For the quantitative data, I used the sophisticated computer software application 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for my data analysis. These data were 
analysed through descriptive statistics and frequency tables. The results show that 
although funding to the sector has increased, it is affected by several other factors. The 
trend analysis data provided information on the pattern of funding to the sector by each 
DP, and this helped in the cross-checking of information on funding collected through 
the survey (Jick, 1979). Overall, the quantitative data was used to triangulate and 
enhance the findings of the qualitative data, but also added to the credibility and validity 
of the study (Jick, 1979). 
 
After generating tables of percentage scores based on a Likert scale that had three 
positives, one negative and one neutral, it was found that it was necessary to compress 
five categories into three – one positive, one negative and one neutral – in order to 
realize a clearer picture of the responses. Therefore, this was accomplished without 
tampering with the data collected in the field.   
 
4.10 Delimitation and Limitations 
 
Being specific to a particular group of people, the study confined itself to investigating 
the actors in the education SWAp process mainly through interviews and a survey. 
Nevertheless, one major limitation was a lack of funding to engage research assistants 
to help collect data quickly in a short space of time. As data were to be collected in 
Malawi, I could not achieve this by myself whilst working away from home in another 
country. However, this was turned to my advantage, since the data collection period was 
consequently prolonged in order to allow me to return at convenient times during 
holidays. This facilitated the collection of data that covered different phases of the 
education SWAp process, and hence presents a better picture of the interactions of the 
actors and their influences at various stages.  
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Another limitation (subsequent to the first point under delimitation) was that the study 
was confined to a small sample of key stakeholders actively involved in the education 
SWAp process. This became problematic during data collection as, in the absence of 
those who were actively engaged in the process, in some isolated cases, it was difficult 
to obtain relevant information from those who were relatively newly employed or only 
partially involved. 
 
In addition to the above observations, such a limited purposive sampling derivation has 
implications for the generalizability of the study findings, given that the sample might 
not be reasonably representative of the broader population (Miles and Huberman, 1984; 
Bryman, 2004; Bryman, 1988; Cresswell, 2003; Flick, 2009). Nevertheless, the study 
findings may be regarded as generalizable to the overall Malawian context, as they 
represent a case study of the actual education SWAp process that adequately and 
appropriately covered the interactions in the partnership of all those involved in the 
process. Although the results cannot be extrapolated to an international context, the 
insightful knowledge and lessons generated from the study could be utilized profitably 
in other SWAps in Malawi, including the implementation of a full SWAp in the 
education sector and beyond. 
 
4.11 Research Strategy   
 
My strategy for this study was that I should collect the data personally, as I could not 
afford to employ any research assistants. I determined that a period of one year was 
required for the fieldwork, which covered document analysis, the conducting of 
interviews, the administration of surveys, and participant observation (the latter of 
which was dropped, as indicated in Section 4.8).  
 
Preparatory work began with the development of research tools in 2008. Fieldwork on 
data collection began in January 2009, which entailed lengthy international and local 
journeys to research sites in Malawi, mainly in Lilongwe – where the key participants 
were based – but also outside the capital. There were no financial resources to support 
my travel, accommodation, or stationery and recording equipment expenses, which I 
was thus obliged to bear myself.  
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Appendix F provides the fieldwork schedule, which indicates the timing of its various 
stages taking into account the modifications made after dropping the participant 
observation element and the delay due to the late approval of my proposal. 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
The methodology used in this study has facilitated an understanding of actors‟ 
perspectives on how partnership interactions affected the education SWAp process. This 
chapter has described the aim of the study and the research question. It has also 
explained the research philosophy, the basis for deciding on a constructivist paradigm 
due to the nature of the study question, and highlighted the ethical considerations. 
 
The chapter has defined the research approach and the reason for the selection of mixed 
methods. This decision was based on the research problem and the realization of biases 
and limitations inherent in all methods. Therefore, a combination of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods was instrumental in collecting and analysing data that provided 
accuracy through triangulation and confirmation of the validity of the findings. It may 
be reasonably argued that the study managed to generate appropriate qualitative data 
that shed light on how partnership interactions affected the SWAp process; and the 
quantitative data provided insights into the extent to which funding was affected by 
various aspects of actor‟s interactions in the partnership.  
 
This chapter has presented the relevant ontological and epistemological considerations, 
and their implications for the study; clarified the researcher‟s positionality; and outlined 
how challenges faced by an insider researcher were addressed.  
 
The chapter has also described the sampling used, the research methods for data 
collection and analysis, and the reasons for their selection – which were basically due to 
the nature of the study. A purposive sample ensured that appropriate people participated 
in the study. The different datasets collected were cross-referenced for coherence.  
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The chapter has explained the delimitation and limitations of this study. The findings 
may only be generalized in the context of the Malawian education SWAp process, but 
lessons learned from the study could be useful in other SWAps both in Malawi and 
internationally. Finally, the chapter has highlighted the main strategy adopted and the 
fieldwork time frame. The next chapter presents a detailed analysis of the findings of 
this study based on data collected from all the methods employed. 
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Chapter 5 
 Towards a Sector Wide Approach  
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
The education sector in Malawi has undergone significant policy reform in the past two 
decades in an attempt to achieve alignment with the demands of international 
development aid trends. As part of the reform, Malawi‟s initial attempt to shift towards 
a sector wide approach was made around the development of the Policy and Investment 
Framework (PIF) in 1999, which incorporated the international commitments in 
education to which Malawi was a signatory, including the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All (EFA) Framework for Action (Policy and 
Investment Framework, 1999). The PIF was also viewed as a step towards developing a 
long-term development strategy for the education sector. As such, it provided an 
opportunity for the government to re-examine its 1995–2005 education strategy in order 
to give clear direction for policy priorities and reforms in the sector (Ministry of 
Education, Sports and Culture, 1999).  
 
It was therefore during the development of the PIF that relations were formed whereby 
development partners (DPs), civil society organisations (CSOs)/non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and Malawian Government officials began to work closely 
together in thematic groups, holding regular discussions on education. This period also 
marked a conceptual shift from “donors” to “development partners”, as the latter 
implies equality in the relationship, as expressed by one actor:  
 
Development partners‟ is about respecting each other; everybody has a 
contribution to make. In government systems of the West, ownership ideals are 
promoted, hence partnership – each partner has a contribution to make (DP1, 
Jan. 09).  
 
However, SWAp partnership attempts during the development of the PIF suffered from 
the effects of the project approach that was strongly prevalent among DPs at the time – 
as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.  
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Another major reform process was the Primary Curriculum and Assessment Reform 
(PCAR), which was initiated as a project in 2001, but was later incorporated into the 
National Education Sector Plan (NESP) where it came to be seen as an improved 
partnership arrangement in the form of an “embryonic” SWAp. Several DPs including 
Department for International Development (DFID), German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), United Nations 
Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) among others teamed up to jointly support the implementation of PCAR 
(PCAR Risk Assessment for the Supply Chain of Standards 2 and 6, 2007).  
 
From this prototype or “embryonic” SWAp around the PCAR, education partners began 
working closely on the development of the NESP. Therefore, the development of the 
NESP from 2004 became a widely recognized landmark reform, which is distinguished 
as the main SWAp document (see figure 5.1) that operationalized education policy aims 
and translated priorities into objectives, strategies, and financing for education (Foster, 
2007; Brown et al., 2007). Accordingly, the NESP is associated with signs of a 
meaningful education SWAp partnership that evolved from the implementation of the 
new PCAR.  
 
The following diagram explains how the education SWAp evolved in Malawi.  
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Figure 5.1: The Evolvement of the Education SWAp Partnership 
       
PI The development of the PIF marked the 
beginning of SWAp partnerships, with 
people working together in thematic 
groups.  
                        
                                                                    The Malawi Education SWAp Process 
  
The implementation of PCAR marked the 
establishment of an “embryonic” SWAp, 
with a few DPs working together to 
establish what became a prototype SWAp. 
 
 
  
The development of the NESP brought 
together all stakeholders – government 
officials, DPs and CSOs/NGOs – to work 
together to form a single large education 
SWAp partnership.  
 
Therefore, the questions of what constituted the Malawian education SWAp and how 
long it took to evolve into its mature form were not entirely clear, and were perceived 
differently by different actors.  
 
Generally, the literature suggests that SWAps emerged when changes in international 
interventions linked global poverty reduction targets, MDGs and increased international 
aid to developing countries to the primary education goals of the World Conference on 
Education for All (WCEFA) in 2000 (King, 1992; King and Buchert, 1999; Buchert, 
2002; Walt et al., 1999; Colclough, 2005; Virtue, 2005; Smith, 2005; King and Rose, 
2005). At that same time, change was occurring in the South. This was also the case in 
Malawi. Following the 1990 Jomtien and 2000 Dakar World Education Forums, Malawi 
embarked on partnerships for education reform, moving away from the traditional 
project approach towards a SWAp, a process that started partnership for the 
development of the PIF. The latter signified the first step towards a long-term 
development strategy for the education sector, a document designed to provide a clear 
direction for policy priorities and reforms in the sector. Since a SWAp is fundamentally 
about forming partnerships in support of a sector, such a relationship is viewed as 
central to the success of the approach, as observed by Buchert (2002). 
                  PIF 
                PCAR 
                 NESP 
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This chapter therefore presents data on the perspectives of various aid actors – DPs, 
government officials and civil society – in the education SWAp partnership in order to 
analyse and understand the SWAp process in Malawi, particularly by following the 
emergence of partnership and the linking of a SWAp to international aid and its targets, 
and enhancing coordination and harmonization.  
 
Utilising a mixed methods approach, data were collected from development partners, 
civil society and government officials through interviews that focused on three main 
issues: 1) the emergence of the education SWAp partnership; 2) the role of stakeholders 
in the education SWAp partnership; and 3) power relations. Data on a fourth issue, the 
education SWAp partnership and its influence on the funding of the sector, were 
collected through a survey. These four issues also form the four sections of this chapter.  
 
Development partners interviewed were primarily education advisors/specialists 
representing donor/aid agency organizations working in the education sector in Malawi. 
These individuals represented the ideology and interests of their respective aid agency 
organizations, being responsible and accountable for the implementation of the 
education programme activities that aid agencies supported.  
 
Government officials interviewed principally comprised the directors of all departments 
of the Ministry of Education – including the Directorate of Planning – who were 
responsible for overseeing a variety of policies; as well as those of the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry of Women and Child Development, who were responsible for 
government policy and planning. These individuals were also responsible and 
accountable for policy development and planning, and the implementation of the 
education programmes under their jurisdiction.  
 
Civil society members interviewed were key post-holders with member organizations of 
the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE). This body brought 
together all NGOs working in the education sector in Malawi. These individuals were 
not only responsible and accountable to the constituents in the civil society circle they 
represented, but also to the donors/aid agencies that funded them.   
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Interviewees are identified by affiliation, with a code and numerical designation to 
represent different individuals from the same institution and group, as follows: 
 
Figure 5.2: Identification of Interviewees   
 
 
Code 
 
Identification 
 
 
GOE 
 
Government official from Ministry of Education 
 
GOF 
 
Government official from Ministry of Finance 
 
GOC 
 
Government official from Ministry of Women and Child Development 
 
DP 
 
Individual from a bilateral development partner agency 
 
DPM 
 
Individual from a multilateral development agency 
 
CS 
 
Individual from a civil society organization 
 
5.1 Emergence of a Partnership – Linking the SWAp to International 
Aid and its Targets  
 
This section investigates in detail the varying viewpoints of actors on the impetus 
behind the emergence of a partnership in the education SWAp process. The first part 
examines the motivation behind the inception of an education SWAp partnership, and 
provides an account of differences in knowledge about SWAps among education aid 
actors as reflected from their perspectives. The second part examines the perceptions of 
different actors as they relate to the purpose and necessity of the SWAp partnership to 
enhance the coordination and harmonization of the education sector; and highlights the 
role a SWAp plays in achieving some of the aims of an aid programme. The third part 
examines the perspectives of these actors in terms of the achievements of the education 
SWAp partnership to-date, and asserts that non-adherence to the SWAp or its 
partnership principles can restrict the attainment of desirable results. The last part 
concludes by analysing the different perceptions of all the actors and the effects of 
dominant the neo-liberalist ideology that gives prominence to macro and micro-
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economic policy prescriptions, and affects policy priorities (Rutkowski, 2007; 
Hinchliffe, 1993; Smith, 2005).  
    
5.1.1 Linking the Education SWAp Partnership with International Aid and its 
Targets  
 
This section examines the perspectives of various actors in terms of what influenced the 
emergence of an education SWAp partnership and the implications of these views for 
their participation in such a partnership. Current literature on the SWAp largely ascribes 
the policy to a desire to meet the objectives of international development aid and targets 
for the achievement of universal primary education (UPE) by 2015 (King and Rose, 
2000). Several DPs were clear about this, equating the emergence of the education 
SWAp partnership in Malawi with trends in international development aid and the 
associated targets. This view may be attributed to the fact that their organizations were 
in part the architects of the SWAp and thus had a concomitant responsibility to ensure 
that it was implemented. As one DP stated, „we had to look at international 
developments in aid and this is what influenced government and development partners 
to come together and work together towards [a] sector wide approach‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
There was unanimity in respect of this linkage among DPs, who associated the 
emergence of an education SWAp with specific global forums that focused on 
international development aid and targets. This notion is noted elsewhere and more 
generally corroborated by King and Buchert (1999), Buchert (2002), Walt et al. (1999), 
and Colclough (2005). In their responses, DPs also demonstrated that they had 
knowledge of the origins of the SWAp, and that they represented the stances of the 
organizations they served, which were responsible for the emergence of the SWAp and 
promoted the shift towards its adoption.  Another DP indicated that, „This started with 
global influence – from Jomtien 1990 there has been more networking that has filtered 
to nations‟ (DPM3, Jan. 09). 
 
The association with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is yet another area in 
which DPs identified a linkage between a SWAp and international development aid 
targets. Hyden‟s (2008) description of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
84 
 
 
 
 
as „a significant juncture in the history of development assistance and cooperation‟ is 
relevant here, but actors in the Malawian context observed that there is a disparity 
between the readiness with which countries commit themselves to declarations and the 
ability they have to initiate the appropriate changes. Indeed, some DPs expressed the 
frustration they experienced in complying with the expectations of the declaration, as 
indicated by the following sentiment:  
 
We have head of A or B agreeing on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
but reform of the systems to respond to the good intentions of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness takes too long. Therefore, we have the 
declarations which are signed at [a] higher level, the reforms take too long to be 
implemented, and this frustrates the people on the ground and vice versa (DP1, 
Jan. 09).  
 
There is thus a need to match commitment to international declarations with timely 
appropriate action in order to avoid sending mixed messages.  
 
Another DP also associated the emergence of an education SWAp partnership with 
international development aid and targets by highlighting the protocols of the Paris 
Declaration, stating, „…I can say it‟s due to the international development agenda – the 
protocols; you have heard of Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness‟ (DP2, June 10). 
 
It is clear from DPs‟ statements that they had a shared understanding of the SWAp. As 
will be explained later, arguably, this was viewed as one way of positioning themselves 
strategically – maintaining dominance and retaining a leadership role – so that they 
might participate effectively in the SWAp partnership their organizations valued and 
promoted; thus, ensuring that their interests and targets were met.   
 
Samoff (2004) notes that the new aid terminology emphasizes partnership and SWAps, 
yet current research findings suggest there is more continuity than change from that of 
the project approach in aid relationships. Initial attempts at an education SWAp 
partnership designed around the development of the PIF suffered from the same effect. 
In Malawi, the education SWAp partnership was adversely affected because many DPs 
were still implementing their respective projects beyond the influence of the new 
approach.  
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Fully acknowledging the shortfall experienced in the partnership during the PIF process, 
one DP was quick to admit that, „The other challenge is that the implementation of [the] 
PIF was projectized… Development partners projectized the PIF; instead of 
complementing each other, we were focused on our projects‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). DPs 
acknowledged the failure of the PIF process to live up to the expectations of the SWAp. 
This was also clearly observed among government officials, who associated the 
emergence of the education SWAp partnership with the implementation of the PCAR 
rather than the earlier PIF as will be noted later.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the reasons given for continuing with the project approach during 
the implementation of the PIF was the lack of trust and systems that could ensure the 
protection of the DPs/donors‟ money. Therefore, DPs maintained a system that ensured 
the safety of their money, as indicated by the following comment: 
 
Development partners did not trust Malawi and viewed the country as not 
capable to handle their money. At that time, the corruption level went up and 
there was no accountability. Consequently, donors wanted to protect their 
money, so they used a system that could control their money, for example, 
projects (DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
Issues of trust and accountability where DP funds are concerned become complicated 
because DPs are not willing to risk their money. It is therefore not surprising that there 
was no progress recorded in terms of the harmonization of donor activities during the 
evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration due to issues around lack of 
confidence and trust in government systems. Unfortunately, this does not seem only to 
affect harmonization efforts but also alignment: „The real and perceived risks and 
relative weaknesses of country systems are serious obstacles to further progress with 
alignment‟ (Wood et al., 2008).  
 
Government systems constitute one of the elements of capacity development, which 
also includes the strengthening of skills and processes; and yet the overall 
implementation of a SWAp involves capacity building. If this is the case, and 
considering the critical role capacity development plays in the realisation of a SWAp 
process (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002; Smith, 2005), the question is at what stage can the 
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development of government capacity begin? Moreover, it must particularly be taken 
into consideration that systems development cannot be accomplished overnight and that 
capacity in respect of the SWAp process has been observed as an area of concern 
elsewhere (Brown et al., 2001).  
 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) definition, capacity 
development is „the process through which individuals, organizations and societies 
obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own 
development objectives over time‟ (UNDP, 2008, p.2). A further elaboration states that: 
 
This approach is premised on the fact that there are some capacities that exist in 
every context. It uses this existing base of capacities as its starting point and then 
supports national efforts to enhance and retain them. This is a process of 
transformation from the inside, based on nationally determined priorities, 
policies and desired results. It encompasses areas where new capacities have to 
be introduced and hence, the building of new capacity is also supported (UNDP, 
2008, p.2).   
 
Nevertheless, in the Malawian context, this seems to have been constrained to some 
extent due to the strong grip of DPs on their funds and the lack of trust. This is an area 
that requires continual assessment in order to ascertain the best chronological order for 
the implementation of a SWAp. Should capacity development precede any SWAp 
process, or should capacity development come at the beginning of the process? And 
what mechanisms should be put in place in a SWAp process to ensure that capacity 
development is achieved?   
 
Generally, DPs linked the emergence of the education SWAp partnership with trends in 
international development aid and the accompanying targets, and it was obvious that 
they had sound knowledge of the approach. The responses of two officials from the 
Ministry of Finance, which played a central coordination role in the process, also linked 
the emergence of the education SWAp partnership to international development aid and 
targets. However, such findings differed from the perceptions of most government 
officials, those from the Ministry of Education in particular. Even in a case in which one 
of the latter related the motivation for the emergence of the education SWAp 
partnership to international trends, this still revealed an element of uncertainty, the 
official stating that:  
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As I see it myself, I think it is a kind of international trend that came to us; so, 
the development partners from other countries introduced the SWAp process. I 
would strongly believe that our country was introduced to the SWAp process 
and when the advantages were considered, I think that is when it was considered 
that we should go the SWAp way (GOE5, May 09).  
 
Apart from pointing out the link to international development trends, this statement also 
implies that, in accordance with SWAp theory, its perceived advantages played a role in 
motivating the government to engage in this education sector partnership. Such an 
optimistic view can be challenging and problematic, as noted by Buchert (2002) in a 
comparative analysis of SWAp implementations in Ghana, Mozambique and Burkina 
Faso, which all yielded unsuccessful results owing to the gap between principles and 
practice. As pointed out in Chapter 3, Malawian government officials‟ way of looking at 
the education SWAp seems to confirm the state‟s blind faith in the approach that was 
expressed in the NESP during the time of development. Such a perception requires 
careful consideration of the factors that hinder the realization of the principles of a 
SWAp.  
 
Currently, the Ministry of Finance – which coordinates all donors/aid agencies – 
encourages all government ministries to adopt a SWAp and plays a central role in the 
management of the policy on behalf of the government.   
 
The views of officials from the Ministry of Finance echoed those of the DPs. The 
ministry officials linked the emergence of the education SWAp partnership to 
international development trends. Similar to the case with the DPs, this also indicates 
that at least this section of the government had some knowledge of the SWAp, which 
was probably acquired by these individuals as the result of their efforts to meet the 
requirements of the coordination role assigned to them by the ministry.  
 
However, according to actors‟ responses, such knowledge does not seem to have been 
possessed by government officials who were key players in the SWAps of their line 
ministries – as is further explored in the next section – which posed a potential 
hindrance to their effective engagement in the SWAp process. One Ministry of Finance 
official made the following comment:  
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It was mainly due to international trends. You can see that they are more 
focused and, in recent times, even some donors who were outside the direct 
support are now coming into the direct budget support (GOF1, May 09). 
 
5.1.2 Linking the Education Partnership with a “Mini” or “Embryonic” SWAp  
 
Contrary to the views of the majority of DPs, most government officials‟ who were key 
players in the education SWAp process attributed the impetus for the emergence of the 
education SWAp partnership to a “mini” or “embryonic” SWAp around the 
implementation of the new curriculum; and to a need to extend the SWAp experience 
initiated at this lower/project level to a much broader sectoral level. Many government 
officials agreed that the emergence of an education SWAp should be linked to an 
operational partnership around PCAR, but not the experience around PIF in which DPs 
focused on their own projects and little attention was paid to the broader picture of 
achieving a single common goal. One government official commented: 
 
In actual fact, looking at the partnerships, one of the partnerships that we could 
talk of is one under implementation of the primary curriculum and assessment 
reform, which is currently being used as a mini SWAp for the education sector; 
which drew together partners, a few partners, as a pilot for the future SWAp for 
the education sector.  As it were, much of the work that we are now doing in 
terms of the SWAp we are trying to base it on some of the lessons that we have 
learned from the PCAR process (GOE2, May 09). 
 
This statement shows that government officials were more inward looking than not, due 
to limited knowledge of international development aid that linked it to international 
development targets (King and Rose, 2005). Their differing experiences in the two main 
reform processes (PIF and PCAR) contributed to the adoption of views on what a 
SWAp partnership should look like based on informed judgment. Another government 
official remarked:  
 
The nature of partnership that looks like SWAp is like in [the] PCAR process; 
this is where we have seen a prototype of a SWAp.  We have seen a number of 
partners coming together joining hands with government to fund the 
conceptualization and development of the primary curriculum and assessment. 
Basically, what we have seen as a workable SWAp this far is around the 
reformed curriculum (GOE3). 
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Apart from revealing a lack of knowledge about the origins of the SWAp – and, to some 
extent, its theoretical concepts – the common perspective of these government officials 
also supported consistent comparison between the PIF and PCAR processes, which led 
to an inclination to relate the PCAR process to a SWAp more than to the development 
of the PIF process. Although the process of developing PCAR was initiated strictly as a 
project, its implementation later adopted a different approach, with several DPs 
supporting the implementation of this one programme, thereby creating a SWAp 
environment. One government official made the following remarks about the emergence 
of the SWAp partnership:  
   
In terms of the development of the PIF, not much, but what I have noted in the 
development of the NESP, there has been a deliberate attempt to try and forge a 
number of partnerships.  For example, within the NESP, apart from those 
partners that are contributing towards the PCAR process, there have been also 
deliberate attempts to drop in new partners who have not been participating in 
the education sector before (GOE2, May 09). 
 
Yet another government official also shared a similar view, commenting:  
 
My initial experience that I could be talking about will be in relation to a 
primary school curriculum... So, with that, we realized that there was a mini 
SWAp established where we had USAID, we had GTZ, and we had DFIFD and 
CIDA coming in to assist with the development of the new curriculum where the 
planning phase started in 2001(GOE7, May 09). 
 
It is clear from the various perceptions of government officials that the majority of them 
could think of a SWAp only in terms of an embryonic arrangement. This raises 
concerns about their level of knowledge of the SWAp, and about the expectations of the 
government with regard to ownership of the policy and taking the lead in line with the 
Paris Declaration. The literature on the SWAp emphasizes the centrality of capacity for 
ownership, leadership, alignment, and effective implementation of education plans 
(Smith 2005; Brown et al., 2001, Wood et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2007). Did these 
officials have the competence and SWAp capacity base commensurate with the 
expected role government had to play according to the Paris Declaration? Could they 
engage and participate meaningfully in a SWAp partnership?  
 
90 
 
 
 
 
This concern is reflected in the views of one DP, who pointed out that, „As projects are 
winding down, for example, on capacity, we look for opportunity to get government to 
develop capacity of government officers that will embrace the SWAp‟ DP1, Jan. 09). 
Could government officials develop to a stage at which they assumed responsibility for 
the SWAp partnership process as DP input is minimized, as pointed out by Smith 
(2005)? 
 
Another standpoint that was generally shared among government officials and DPs – 
but also, to a large extent, civil society, as will be observed later, given that it initiated 
the education SWAp partnership – was on funding, but with each actor emphasizing 
different aspects. While the DPs point of view focused on achieving the mobilization 
and efficient utilization of funds according to international commitment, the 
preoccupation of government officials was for the SWAp partnership to assist the state 
to address funding gaps in the sector, which would in turn also assist the government to 
achieve international targets. On the other hand, civil society was more concerned with 
ensuring that funds realized through the partnership benefited the intended target 
groups.  
 
The fact that all actors were concerned with funding tends to suggest the crucial role it 
played in this partnership; hence, the necessity of safeguarding against the common 
problem of it creating power relations that contradict the theoretical concepts of a 
SWAp. Three government officials independently declared that, „All these were the 
deposits [results] of setting up a SWAp. It is mainly to fill the financial gap that is there, 
and also to assist the government [to] meet the targets that were set at international 
level, i.e. EFA and MDGs‟ (GOE3, May 09).  
 
Another official indicated that, „The main purpose of partnerships is actually to 
reinforce funding‟ (GOE4, May 09); and another stated that, „We find that partnerships 
have developed because of inconsistencies that were there in the funding of activities for 
the ministry‟ (GOE1, May 09). 
 
The emphasis on funding was stronger amongst government officials than amongst 
other partners. Of particular importance here is the need to understand the Malawian 
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context, in which (in 2006/7) over percent of education sector budget non-salary 
expenditure was supported by international aid (Foster, 2007). Thus, the contribution of 
the education SWAp partnership process to improved funding to the sector became 
inevitable and crucial. It is therefore against this backdrop that government officials 
were more likely than not to express views that associated motivation for the emergence 
of the education SWAp partnership with enhanced funding to the sector.  
 
Such a viewpoint could also have derived from both individual and organizational 
dependency on international aid to initiate ministry programme activities, but much 
more on an individual basis because performance was assessed based on how much 
each official accomplished. Ministry officials depended on donor/DP funds to 
implement programme activities under their responsibility in the same way that the 
government was dependent on donor/DP funds to run the ministry, particularly so 
because the government budget for the sector‟s programmes was minimal. Such 
dependency tended to place government officials in the vulnerable position of 
dependency on the economic power of DPs where decision-making was concerned, as 
will be discussed later. Therefore, the issue of funding in this SWAp process requires 
careful consideration on the part of all actors in the partnership in order to ensure that 
SWAp principles are upheld and negative effects minimized.  
 
5.1.3 Consolidating the Role of New Actors  
 
Another distinct actor in the education SWAp partnership is civil society. The 
perspectives of civil society on what influences the emergence of education SWAp 
partnerships show that it is conversant with international development trends and 
international development targets. Its viewpoint also reveals something about its new 
role as a non-state actor in global governance (Sending and Neumann, 2006) and the 
development arena within the context of neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions, 
which, according to Malhotra (n.d.), have shifted power to civil society and the market 
as major development actors as a counter to the state.  
 
Malawian civil society highlighted areas it was concerned about within society 
pertaining to political change and governance in the country in 2000, time, which 
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prompted its inclusion in the education SWAp partnership. It played this role to its best 
ability to ensure that the partnership was organized according to democratic principles, 
as one civil society member demonstrated: 
 
I think generally speaking, arriving from the international forum and the 
realisation of the push that has been there for EFA and other MDGs, it just 
became clear that governments, especially in developing countries, cannot make 
any significant strides if they are not assisted… I would rather say the 
international development partners had an influence in coming up with 
partnerships, for example, just as I have said, the moment we adopted 
democracy, the development partners had to make sure that style should change 
from top–bottom to bottom–up or a mix (CS2, May 09). 
 
This civil society member‟s view revealed the hand played by international 
organizations in establishing and reinforcing the new role of this non-state actor: 
 
There has been a very strong hand played by development partners [such] as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and these other bilateral partners 
like DFID and GTZ to ensure that whatever we are doing we are doing in a 
manner that demonstrates democratic principles (CS2, May 09). 
 
These remarks were made in light of the prevailing situation in Malawi at that particular 
point in time. Prior to the innovations that were precipitated by international 
organizations within the context of global change in international development aid with 
its linkage to international development targets, the participation of civil society was not 
considered necessary and government perception of civil society in Malawi remained 
basically sceptical, just as was the case with Tanzania, as observed by Hyden (2008).  
 
Another view from civil society identifies the general problem of lack of knowledge, on 
the part of government officials in particular, about how a SWAp should be conducted, 
which seems to impede them in assuming their rightful role in a SWAp set up, as 
indicated by the following remarks:  
 
For instance, although there is much talk today about SWAp, many partners 
have inadequate understanding of how it ought to work. Even among 
government officials, who are supposed to take leadership in the SWAp 
processes, there is a feeling of lack of ownership and commitment… Even 
NGOs, who are believed to work with communities, have either little 
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understanding of the SWAp matters or do not have resources and capacity to 
sensitize the public on the policies relating to SWAp (CS1, May 09). 
 
It is apparent from the various perspectives of the three main actors in the education 
SWAp process that there was a disparity in awareness about the nature of this 
partnership. In contrast to the perceptions of DPs and civil society, which were in line 
with what the literature has to say about the emergence of the SWAp as a new aid 
modality, the views of the majority of government officials – mainly those with the 
Ministry of Education – were not. These were the same people who were at the centre 
of the education SWAp partnership, and expected to assume leadership and ownership 
of the process – which, according to Smith (2005), depends very much on capacity. It is 
also clear from the viewpoints of civil society members that lack of capacity and 
knowledge about a SWAp on the part of government officials is very likely to impact 
negatively on the process. This might also affect other actors as they attempt to facilitate 
the process for those implementing SWAp programmes on the ground. Indeed, limited 
knowledge of the area in which one operates can restrict meaningful performance.  
 
Differing perceptions about a SWAp notwithstanding, a common perception shared 
amongst all actors was the idea that it was a welcome aid modality to all and that the 
partnership seemed to exert a positive influence on the approach to education, as 
evidenced by their perceptions regarding achievements to date. Nevertheless, these 
actors were not blind to the shortfalls of the process, particularly in terms of the initial 
SWAp partnership around PIF. As far as these actors were concerned, this collaboration 
did not seem to amount to good SWAp practice because the lines on which the 
partnership were organised fell short of the principles of a SWAp. There was a gap 
between theory and practice, a point that emphasizes the need to adhere to concepts and 
principles when engaging in a SWAp partnership.  
 
This confirms Buchert‟s (2002) argument about partnership and the notion that a SWAp 
assumes the role of lowest common denominator in terms of success in education 
development; thereby cautioning against agreement on the rhetoric without due 
consideration for the implementation of the underlying principles. With education 
funding tied to global targets; emphasis on ending global poverty through 
internationally driven targets; and education playing the central role (Foster, 2005), it is 
94 
 
 
 
 
imperative that all actors in the education SWAp partnership have sound knowledge and 
share the same level of understanding in order to perform effectively in the process. 
Consequently, this has implications for the minimum knowledge or capacity base 
required of the government if it is to participate meaningfully in a SWAp based on 
human resources theory. This is an area that requires further investigation. 
 
5.2 Enhancing Coordination and Harmonization – What Do They 
Want to See? 
 
5.2.1 Enhancing Coordination and Harmonization – DP Expectations  
 
In expressing their views on the purpose of the education SWAp partnership, DPs 
acknowledged the importance of addressing sector priorities, coherence, coordination, 
and the problem of fragmentation – factors that form the basis of SWAp principles. Two 
DPs independently argued that „partnerships are necessary to ensure sector priorities 
are addressed and rid the sector of fragmented interventions‟ (DPM4, June 09). 
Another stated that „the motivation really arose from the fact that the development 
partners in the education sector were very fragmented in terms of their support to the 
Education Sector‟ (DPM5, May 09). 
 
One area of concern identified was the need for coordination in the sector, a factor that 
the project approach failed to accomplish when international aid was provided 
according to donor or DP priorities and managed through parallel implementation 
structures – a finding corroborated by Foster (2007). The views of DPs repeatedly 
highlighted the need to achieve coordination and avoid an excessively high profile or 
“flag raising” while pursuing the common good. “Flag raising” is a concept associated 
with the project approach whereby each donor desires overt acknowledgement of its 
achievements exclusively in terms of its own intervention, which is used as an element 
of performance assessment (Schacter, 2001). One DP pointed out the importance of „the 
idea of aid harmonization and alignment; and trying to get government leadership; and 
trying all of us to be able to coordinate; and be able to see, plan together and not 
duplicate efforts; and try to make our resources work‟ (DP2, June 10). 
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Emphasizing the need to work together and accord the government the opportunity to 
determine its priorities, another DP contended that, „The idea is to work together and 
avoid flag raising – the recipient country didn‟t have much say, but now the recipient 
country has been given [the]opportunity to decide and plan for their own country‟ 
(DP2, June 10). 
 
These views tend to reveal an aspect of certain expectations that the SWAp partnership 
is supposed to realize in line with the Paris Declaration, as pointed out by Hyden 
(2008); and that in promoting the maintenance of individual identity, as an aid modality, 
the SWAp offers a government the opportunity to determine its priorities as well as 
areas of concern. However, as argued by Wood et al. (2008), the issue of flag raising, 
which is compatible with individual identities and national efforts, should be avoided in 
a SWAp partnership. The implied expectation is that in a SWAp set up, these issues 
should be addressed. 
 
One major challenge to such expectation is how to get DPs to minimize the power and 
influence they wield due to their control over funding, and allow the government to 
assume its rightful role in setting sector priorities according to the Paris Declaration 
framework. This was especially vital in terms of the Malawian education SWAp 
partnership, where DPs tended to continue their traditional modus operandi, as 
demonstrated by the following statement from one government official about the 
introduction of Life Skills Education as a subject that was not examinable due to DP 
influence:  
 
[DPs] push a lot on Life Skills Education…[but] they would dictate this 
shouldn‟t be examined. Our context is different: [if] you don‟t examine a 
subject, that subject is not given any weight at all; but because it is a donor 
dictating, our priorities take second place. The same thing with policies; we can 
talk of community participation [but] what sort of community participation do 
we want? What we conceptualized and what we are operationalizing are at 
cross purposes (GO3E, May 09).  
 
 
DPs seem to have the power to make the government bow to their demands at any time 
in order to get their funding – this is the problem of aid dependency, with its subsequent 
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top-down approach, which can negatively affect partnerships (Aerni, n.d.). Therefore, if 
the recipient country‟s expectations are to be met, all actors in the partnership must 
adhere to SWAp theoretical concepts and give the government the opportunity to 
assume leadership and ownership. It also calls for substantial change in modus operandi 
and discipline on the part of the DPs.  
 
Such a view was unlikely to be expressed by anyone from the DP side as it was in their 
interests to maintain the status quo, but the fact that it came from the DP side shows that 
flag raising not only caused concern to the government, but also worried the DPs since 
it tended to undermine the efforts of other actors. Emphasizing the point that in a SWAp 
partnership there is no room for such one-upmanship, another DP commented on the 
contrary effect, which seems to be embedded in such an attitude, that the SWAp has on 
power relations: „Flag raising is also a power relation and therefore some may view 
[the] SWAp as a threat to the flag raising issue‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). This calls for a shift 
away from the individual high profiling that was prevalent among DPs in the project 
approach, towards the pursuit of a wider common goal that characterizes the SWAp 
process.  
 
Another view that some DPs expressed was the need for the partnership to develop and 
establish a long-term vision. This observation notwithstanding, DPs were unanimous on 
the need to address fragmentation and achieve harmonization, coherence and 
coordination in the sector. However, these goals also require that all actors conform to a 
SWAp theory in order to accomplish them. It is anticipated that these views on what the 
education SWAp partnership process is expected to accomplish should be matched with 
appropriate action if the gap between theory and practice is to be bridged.    
 
5.2.2 Enhancing Coordination and Harmonization – Expectations of the 
Government  
 
Consistent with the DP perspective, the majority of views articulated by government 
officials also revealed an area of concern about the experiences of the project approach. 
They were therefore inclined to express the desire that the government assumed the role 
of setting sector priorities, and that all actors should achieve a common goal, 
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harmonization, effective utilization of resources, and benefit from synergies. Driven by 
a desire to see positive change emerge from the SWAp partnership, one government 
official stated that:  
 
The main purpose of partnerships is to ensure that we subscribe to a common 
goal; once the ministry sets the agenda, the donor partners come in and work 
towards that particular agenda. The ministry has been following what a donor 
would want to do, which is the reverse of what should happen (GO1E, May 09). 
 
Arguing that the project mode that did not take into consideration what each actor 
contributed to the sector and fell short of benefitting from what each actor achieved, 
another government official pointed out that: 
 
One of the major goals for partnerships is to ensure that there is synergy in what 
the partners are doing because before organizations thought of partnering, there 
were lots of standalone interventions/projects which tended to pull the ministry 
in all sorts of directions (GO2E, May 09).  
 
A similar viewpoint to that of the above government official also emphasizes 
maximization of available resources through close collaboration of actors in the sector 
in order to achieve that the fullest potential: 
   
Certainly, these partnerships are necessary because if you are talking of making 
the best use of resources that are available – both financial and human 
resources – you have to come up with a common understanding of what you 
want to achieve for the education sector without necessarily pulling in different 
directions (GO2E, May 09). 
 
The views of government officials emphasized the need to address fragmentation; 
realize coordination and harmonization in the sector, as defined in the Paris Declaration 
for Aid Effectiveness (2005); and reverse the trend that had been observed in the project 
approach:  
 
First of all, you want to pool resources so that the sector is not fragmented into 
projects, but rather as a programme, and that the development partners are not 
setting the pace or the priorities. It is the responsibility of the country to identify 
priorities and then, of course, maximize the utilization of those resources in 
funding the education sector (GO4E, May 09).  
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It thus seems that government officials‟ main concerns were to see the reverse of the 
project approach that had placed donor priorities above those of the recipient country, 
and – a view that was echoed by DPs – to rid the sector of fragmentation. However, 
recognizing the state‟s responsibility to set sector priorities, the government officials 
placed more emphasis on public leadership, and the utilization of financial and human 
resources.  
 
Unfortunately, moving away completely from the project mode becomes problematic in 
a situation in which DPs have not yet attained the requisite level of trust in the recipient 
government, due to issues of accountability, as pointed out earlier. This has a tendency 
to affect funding to the sector, as expressed by one DP: „For example, DPs say in year 
one, a certain percent should go to [the] government through the system. Look at the 
system: implement SWAp on [an] incremental basis as they begin to trust government 
systems; [the] government should be willing to ensure accountability‟ (DP1, Jan. 09).   
 
Based on knowledge of the SWAp, another DP conceded that it was necessary for the 
government to assume control and leadership, stating that, „In a SWAp, government 
takes control and donors fund the programme, and use government systems (DP1, Jan. 
09).   
 
From such a situation, it may be seen that a SWAp process is affected by issues of trust, 
accountability, and the capacity of government systems/procedures to allow DPs to 
utilize them. Contrary to the notion of a SWAp based on the Paris Declaration that the 
government takes leadership of the process and DPs use state systems/procedures for 
the disbursement of funds, this is not easily achieved, as DPs continue to set 
conditionalities to be met before such an ideal scenario can be realised. One DP 
explained that such a notion implies „…the biggest foundation for the future SWAp, i.e. 
the pool fund which satisfies the Paris Declaration, requirements of harmonization, 
alignment, and using government procedures; but on condition that government 
procedures are in place if they have not been in place‟ (DP1, Jan. 09).  
 
The literature on SWAp also alludes to the problematic nature of conditionality, as 
exemplified by Brown et al. (2001, p.21): 
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 It is difficult to strike a balance between avoiding stop–go financing and 
maintaining a credible threat, especially where the dependence of sectors on 
donor finance is substantial. The advent of SWAps has seen some new 
approaches to enforcing conditionality: reintroducing earmarking and graduated 
sanctions by varying future commitment levels.  
 
This aspect raises a similar question to the observation made earlier in Section 5.1.1 on 
the minimum capacity required for government officials to engage in a SWAp process. 
Similarly, the question here is one of the minimum acceptable institutional capacity for 
government systems or procedures to qualify for use by DPs in a SWAp set up, 
especially given the understanding that a SWAp process is about developing capacity 
(Smith, 2005; Brown et al., 2001). However, this poses the further question as to what 
should come first: should development of government systems/procedures begin before 
the initiation of a SWAp process in order that they may be utilized as soon as the policy 
becomes operational?  
 
It was also clear from one viewpoint that DPs were reluctant to risk their money in 
using weak government systems/procedures, as hinted at in this statement: „Most people 
are risk-averse as we move from project to SWAp mode, and there is need for risk 
mitigation strategy to make people comfortable‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). Such a concern was 
evident among DPs, as pointed out by Brown et al. (2007). A typical example that 
illustrates these concerns and questions of capacity was provided by one DP when 
commenting on government procurement systems as they prepared to operationalize the 
education SWAp after Malawi had received Fast Track Initiative (FTI) funding.  
 
The FTI was launched in order to support developing countries in accelerating their 
efforts towards achieving EFA goals, one of its conditionalities being an effective 
SWAp partnership (EFA-FTI Secretariat, 2011). The FTI issue was a high priority as 
Malawian actors developed the NESP given that a sound national plan that incorporated 
poverty reduction was also one of the prerequisites (Malawi Local Education Donor 
Group, 2009). One DP emphasized this aspect by indicating that FTI requirements 
forced the government and DPs to cooperate on the improvement of state structures and 
systems with regard to procurement in particular:  
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I dare to say, that the Ministry of Education has never known what it is all 
about. There were two to three teachers who had been doing the procurement 
and did not have a clue about procurement; and there has never been given 
proper training. …they didn‟t know the difference between international 
competitive bidding and national competitive bidding (DP3, Oct. 10).  
 
The need for government procurement systems to exploit the confidence of DPs to the 
extent that they will use them is emphasized in Malawi Development Assistance 
Strategy 2006–2011 (2007). However, these observations seem to inadvertently confirm 
government concerns about inconsistencies between what DPs say at the planning stage 
and what they do at implementation level; and tend to reveal a capacity gap that needs 
to be addressed before a SWAp can be effectively implemented. The major question in 
relation to this shortfall is when does capacity become a real issue in the SWAp process, 
taking into consideration that this statement was made at the implementation stage of 
the SWAp/NESP? 
 
The view that the state should set sector priorities – which also conforms to the Paris 
Declaration – is based on the premise that if the government sets the priorities, it is 
likely to utilize funds efficiently in the areas it has identified, as noted by Hyden (2008). 
Nevertheless, the extent to which this can be accomplished also depends largely on 
interactions between actors in this partnership in relation to the theoretical concepts of a 
SWAp.  
 
5.2.3 Enhancing Coordination and Harmonization – The Watchdog Role of CSOs 
and NGOs 
 
The perspectives of CSOs and NGOs with regard to the purpose of the education SWAp 
partnership were in the main similar to those of government officials and DPs. 
Nevertheless, there was a slight variation, with CSO views focusing more on certain 
aspects such as enhancing policy formulation and implementation, participation of 
partners, realizing ownership, accountability, coordination, and maximizing resources. 
Moreover, civil society envisaged itself as playing the key role of watchdog in this 
regard. The observation that these facets of a SWAp should be underpinned was made 
at the Dakar Conference, which adopted the Dakar Framework for Action, a protocol 
that aimed to achieve high quality education for all and a 50 percent increase in adult 
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literacy by 2015. However, little progress had been registered towards the achievement 
of EFA goals or the MDGS, as noted by one CSO member who had attended the 
conference:  
 
They established that one major problem was that governments were not 
accountable and they were not transparent. And then they said it is important – 
as another principle of democracy – it is important that we should create a 
watchdog which is non-governmental to make sure that it is taking governments 
to task, look at the plans they make, what targets they set, and to make sure that 
governments are on target with their plans (CS2, May 09).  
 
However, the role of such non-state actors was determined at the beginning of the 
period of economic neo-liberalism, the so-called Washington Consensus era. During 
this period, with the World Bank concentrating on its poverty alleviation strategy, there 
was a shift from project lending to policy-based lending. This was characterized by 
macro and micro-economic policy prescriptions, including a global education policy 
and lending for education, based on a free market ideology and the corresponding 
notion of human capital (Malhotra, n.d.; Rose, 2003; Rutkowski, 2007; Colclough, 
1996); the details of which are discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
One CSO member underlined the need for ownership and participation in policy 
development in relation to improved coordination thus: 
 
Such an approach would help bring about an enhanced ownership, greater 
involvement of players, as well as teamwork in policy processes. This would in 
turn promote coordination, synergy, pooling of resources, and increased results 
in service delivery, as well as enhance accountability and transparency in policy 
implementation (CS1, June 09). 
 
Another CSO member pointed out the need for education partners to consolidate their 
efforts and maximizing the available resources, indicating that „…partnerships were 
formed simply to consolidate the efforts of the different partners while at the same time 
maximize on the usage of resources that they put together‟ (CS3, May 09).  
  
While some perceptions of this group of actors were consistent with those of DPs and 
government officials – including the viewpoint on improved ownership – the 
perspective of civil society pertaining to ownership draws out another dimension that is 
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critical to the partnership process and accords with general management principles on 
the decision-making process. This is derived from the premise that if people participate 
from the beginning, the implementation of decisions made will be easier than if they 
had not been fully involved. Rather than the notion that DPs and government officials 
expressed as national ownership of the development agenda whereby the state takes the 
lead in the development process (Malawi Government, 2007), the kind of ownership 
championed by civil society was that by all actors/stakeholders involved in the SWAp 
process. Such a relation was expected to translate into ownership of the NESP and 
thereby facilitate effective implementation of the plan. This view seems to be consistent 
with the notion of common ownership that characterizes the participation and 
involvement that civil society espouses.     
 
One CSO member explained what might be described as a “failed partnership” attempt 
during the development of the PIF, which had experienced limited participation, thus 
necessitating a change to democratic planning:  
 
We changed from desktop planning to participatory planning as an element of 
democracy... I would say that the PIF period was a bit dogmatic in the sense 
that…there was a man at the centre who probably sometimes even faked 
consultations and participation (CS2, May 09). 
 
The case of the PIF does not seem to conform to SWAp principles because it basically 
represents a top down approach and limited participation (Brown et al., 2001). 
However, the views of civil society on the experiences of the NESP tended to point 
towards a positive change in this regard.  
 
Other viewpoints expressed by CSO members focused on enhancing the process of 
policy formulation and implementation, with a hint of enhanced participation, indicating 
that, „From my own analysis, I believe the purpose of such partnerships has been to 
scale up sector wide and broad-based policy planning, implementation, monitoring and 
review‟ (CS1, June 09). Similarly, „The partnerships are necessary because it is 
actually argued that in policy planning, the best policies you come [up] with are not the 
ones you think are good, but the best policies are the ones in which the people are 
participating‟ (CS2, May 2009).   
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These perceptions tend to indicate the value that NGOs and CSOs place on the 
participatory policy formulation process. This view is consistent with the new role in 
global governance that these organisations have assumed. This is corroborated by 
Sending and Neumann (2006, p.652), who point out that, „...governmental rationality is 
at work whereby the political agency and self-association of civil society emerges as a 
key asset for the formulation of new policies and for the practice of governing 
societies;‟ particularly in ensuring that public opinion is represented.  
 
However, it is important to note that wide participation that ensures the representation 
of a variety of viewpoints is welcome in the SWAp process. According to Brown et al. 
(2001), the criteria for the assessment of participation in a SWAp include the 
involvement of civil society in identifying targets and NGOs in determining sector 
priorities – and the bottom line to all this is participation. According to neo-liberal 
economic policy, participation is encouraged whereby communities are expected to be 
involved in issues that affect them; and, in this case, civil society participation in the 
SWAp is taken to represent the views of the wider community.  
 
While acknowledging the participation of NGOs and CSOs in the education SWAp 
process, it is necessary to point out that their participation in Malawi was perceived 
largely by some of the representatives to be as tokenistic in nature, and came at the 
advanced stage of policy formulation. One CSO member alluded to recent government 
acceptance, pointing out that, „In some cases we have seen that the partnerships have 
recognized the role of civil society in SWAP processes‟ (CS1, June 09). However, this 
did not accord with the view of another CSO member, who, whilst recognizing the 
positive stance of the government in demonstrating its appreciation of civil society 
highlighting areas in which the former needed to improve, was also quick to point out 
previous sour relations: 
 
I think in the first years – between 2002 to maybe 2006 – there was some sort of 
hostility between government and civil society, where government was looking 
at civil society as people who just make noise. But, actually, sometimes, it was 
very difficult for civil society to engage meaningfully with the government 
departments. But this time around, I think there is a lot of positivity – things 
have normalized. [There] is also a positive change in terms of these 
partnerships (CS2, May 09).    
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Other perspectives of CSO members further revealed the new monitoring or watchdog 
role that civil society had assumed in global governance. Some of these views indicated 
that the new role of civil society organizations had also been widely acknowledged and 
endorsed by UNICEF and UNDP (2008): „CSOs have a key role to play in promoting 
government accountability and responsiveness, tracking progress and ensuring that 
ministries such as [the] MoEST
1
 are achieving their intended goals‟ (CS1, June 09).  
 
Civil society plays a major role in ensuring government accountability through carrying 
out various monitoring and evaluation of the public sector, a function that is also 
fulfilled by the strengthening of NGO capacity. This point was corroborated by one 
CSO member thus: „…civil society independent monitoring activities such as LEG2 
budget analysis and CSCQBE budget tracking surveys have been a trigger for public 
officials to account for their actions, especially in [the] use of funds‟ (CS1, June 09).  
 
In spite of the observed shortfalls in CSO participation in the education SWAp process 
– particularly during the critical initial planning stage – both DPs and government 
officials were unanimous on the role of civil society as a watchdog. However, this tends 
to raise concerns about the effectiveness of civil society in carrying out such a role with 
limited information on programme budgets or the rationale for decisions on programme 
activities. This concern emanates from the lack of CSO involvement at the planning 
stage, a problem identified by Brown et al. (2001) as a common phenomenon in SWAp 
processes that also has implications for ownership of the implementation process. The 
question thus arises as to whether the participation of civil society was deliberately 
restricted at a crucial stage of the Malawian education SWAp process in order to 
suppress its effective monitoring.    
 
Another CSO view suggests that they were concerned with partnership inequality due to 
the power politics that had a tendency to frequently affect the SWAp process and 
negatively influence policy development. This is exemplified by the following 
comment: „In my view, the shift was influenced by the growing need to change [the] 
attitude of stakeholders and reduce power politics, thereby bringing in a sense of 
equality in policy development processes‟ (CS1, June 09). Thus, unless the SWAp 
                                                 
1
 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. 
2
 Link for Education Governance. 
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partnership finds a way to reduce the influence of the power relation that is inherent in 
the act of DP funding provision, the policy cannot be implemented according to its 
principles and will therefore continue to be negatively affected.  
 
The views of different actors on the emergence of education SWAp partnerships 
notwithstanding, it is clear that there was a consensus in that the purpose of the 
partnership was to achieve the harmonization of aid; address the fragmentation and 
compartmentalization of aid arising from the project approach; and to achieve sector 
coherence and sustainability. These widely expressed opinions about what the education 
SWAp was expected to accomplish tend to indicate the extent to which the project 
approach had fragmented support to the education sector, and hence created high 
expectations for the new aid modality to reverse this trend.  
 
It is therefore not surprising to note that these views also seem to have underscored the 
element of high expectation that actors held in respect of the education SWAp 
partnership, which inadvertently depended on how they interacted and perceived the 
theoretical concepts of a SWAP. Such a stance can be problematic given the 
dependency on aid that Malawi – along with other developing countries – has on the 
North/developed countries. This relation also involves the corresponding influence that 
donors/development partners have on determining sector priorities that reflect their own 
interests and ideologies (Samoff, 2004; Brown et al., 2001). Such a relation can be 
identified as a power issue – who has the power to decide on sector priorities, policies 
and plans? This is another aspect of the SWAp that is examined later in this thesis. 
 
5.3 Has the Education SWAp Partnership Been Effective to Date? 
 
The question of whether the education SWAp process has proved to be effective seems 
to be closely tied to actors‟ perceptions of the actual emergence of partnership in the 
process. Moreover, the divergent opinions on what it has achieved so far tend to 
disclose firmly held beliefs that are rooted in the conceptual understanding of a SWAp.  
 
One imperative worth noting with regard to perceptions of SWAp partnership 
achievement is that data collection was carried out over a lengthy period and thus 
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covered different stages of the SWAp process. Consequently, the views of actors tended 
to vary depending on the stage of the SWAp process when the data was collected. These 
variations show that actors put emphasis on different priorities, which further tends to 
reveal the differing specific areas of interest, concern and expectations they had. Again, 
these do not seem to be completely divorced from their opinions on the emergence of 
the education SWAp partnership. This suggests that there is a measure of consistency in 
these actors‟ presentation of their views that could stem from their differing respective 
backgrounds.  
 
5.3.1 DP Perspectives on the Education SWAp Process – Theory vs. Practice  
 
In an attempt to highlight some of the achievements of the education SWAp process, 
DPs cited areas such as policy, planning, harmonization, alignment, capacity, funding, 
the sector plan, international targets, and implementation. Smith (2005) also identifies 
these factors as being central to donors when supporting SWAps.  
 
On the other hand, DPs noted the frustrations encountered around meeting FTI 
requirements: „Meeting the FTI standards was tough. The government at one point was 
frustrated because the document was going through so many reviews and so many 
consultants and from different angles, people would look at different issues. However, 
what featured most was the sector plan‟ (DP2, June 10).  
 
Indeed, the FTI process took a long time (Brown et al., 2007), with some DPs pursuing 
qualification vigorously in spite of the position of the government, which seemed 
powerless to stop the process, as one DP who seemed to share the government‟s 
frustration further observed:  
 
Again, it required the government to just lead the process and say „this is our 
plan, this is our document.‟ We have had contributions from all angles, but I 
think we have reached a stage where we want to own this plan and move 
forward, but there has been a lot of back and forth; it took more than five years 
to get the plan at this stage‟ (DP2, June 10).  
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Nevertheless, the majority of DPs pointed out that the partnership had achieved a plan 
that would guide their support to the sector. It seems that the most important 
achievement of the education SWAp process was the development of the NESP, upon 
which other subsequent achievements were based. The emphasis on ensuring the 
formulation of a sector plan is consistent with the theoretical concept of a SWAp 
(Brown et al., 2001), an area of emphasis that is supported by DP governments. This 
point was stressed by the vast majority of DPs who highlighted the sector plan as a 
positive change.   
 
The following statements from two DPs independently are indicative of this 
perspective:  
 
So far, DPs and government have developed the National Education Sector 
Plan; in the next ten years, all partners will buy into the plan. We now have an 
official policy document (DP1, Jan. 09).  
 
I think what has changed for the better is the development of the sector plan 
because this sector plan is now the document that has been agreed upon by all 
partners (DP2, June 10). 
 
Another DP view not only points towards the sector plan but also other areas that were 
improved, such as harmonization: „What has changed for the better are harmonization 
and alignment through [the] sector plan and joint sector reviews. Also, fundraising has 
been simplified as sector priorities are defined‟ (DPM4, June 09). 
 
It may be inferred from the above observations that the development of the sector plan 
not only received special recognition but also intrinsically formed the basis for 
collaboration in the education SWAp partnership. Moreover, it facilitated the process of 
meeting targets in other areas identified by the DPs. This emphasizes the underpinning 
function of the SWAp, which highlights the fundamental need for clear policies and 
strategies (Brown et al., 2001; Foster, 2007). At the same time, partnership is reinforced 
as a critical element of the SWAp (Buchert, 2002) that deserves to be well nurtured.  
 
The education SWAp partnership provided a platform for all actors to address issues of 
planning, funding, capacity development, ownership and leadership, and harmonization 
and alignment during the process of NESP development. The views of DPs who were 
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conversant with the 2005 Paris Declaration – now recognized as a landmark 
international agreement that strives to enhance aid effectiveness (Wood et al., 2008) – 
focused on its key elements:  
 
I think the streamlining of resources…has really [revitalized the] harmonization 
of objectives. …government takes the lead, but we development partners also 
provide technical information on how we interpret such objectives formulation – 
to me that has been very good. I think the NESP is going to be a very powerful 
document that we are going to use. …you talk of Millennium Development Goals 
– all of us are party to that. …But as development partners, our existence is to 
assist the government to attain these objectives...that we believe in (DP2, June 
10). 
 
Another DP highlighted a further aspect of the partnership that had been streamlined: 
„Fundraising has been simplified as sector priorities are defined‟ (DPM4, June 09), 
which facilitated the mobilization of funds.  
 
Ownership, leadership, harmonization and alignment are some of the key principles of a 
SWAp based on the Paris Declaration, which emphasizes government leadership as 
actors develop policies and strategies such as the NESP. Thus, DP activities – including 
systems and programme activities in the sector – are harmonized, and support is aligned 
to national development strategies and government systems (Government of Malawi, 
2007).  
 
The attitude of DPs can be largely attributed to their role in international development 
aid, and the consequent urgency and sense of mission of donor/DP governments to 
demonstrate results attached to these processes, as highlighted by Brown et al. (2001). 
However, contrary to views that identified the principles of the Paris Declaration as 
areas in need of improvement, evidence on the ground tends to show that DP activities 
did not conform to the theoretical underpinnings of a SWAp, as one government official 
indicated:  
 
 I believe that people were supposed to follow the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, but experience has shown that the principles were not fully 
applied. The whole issue is to harmonize aid, but we are just trying to do that, 
not that we have actually accomplished, and the principles somewhere, 
somehow, they were breached (GOE3, May, 09). 
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The literature on SWAps also highlights situations in which DPs‟ actions tend to 
undermine the government‟s role of leadership in policy-making processes (Samoff, 
2004; Brown et al., 2001), which lead to negative results.  
 
The views of DPs alluded to the principles of government leadership, harmonization 
and alignment in the interactions of the SWAp process during the development of 
policies and strategies, which supported international targets such as the MDGs. One 
DP view acknowledged interest in supporting these targets, but also emphasized a 
shared interest with the government when it came to MDGs, which the DP later 
described as a government agenda. However, these international targets were agreed 
upon by DP governments together with the World Bank, which linked aid to education 
and further funding to meet international targets such as the MDGs, EFA and its poverty 
reduction strategy (PRS) (Colclough, 2005).  
 
This is to be achieved within the context of human capital theory, which, being 
championed by the World Bank, is currently amongst the most dominant models in 
development today (Blundell et al., 1999; Marshall, 1998). To underscore this linkage, 
Brown et al. (2007) describe the NESP in light of the Malawian Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS), which represents the government‟s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS): „The NESP is a statement of the GoM‟s3 plan in education for the next 
10 years, in line with the MGDS.‟ Taking into consideration human capital theory, 
education also features as a means of reducing poverty and achieving economic 
development (OECD, 2007; Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 2006; 
Smith, 2005).  
 
The question for many developing countries with regard to these international goals is 
what the basis is for determining this benchmark; how does this yardstick measure all? 
Special considerations should have been made because not all countries are at the same 
level of education development, in spite of FTIs that in themselves presuppose the 
attainment of a certain level of development in order to access the funds.   
 
                                                 
3
 Government of Malawi. 
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Some DPs pointed out that the capacity of the ministry had been improved and training 
programmes implemented. One DP expressed another aspect of capacity declaring that, 
„What has changed for the better includes systems – financing systems – capacity to 
implement policies‟ (DP2, June 10). 
  
Although DPs cited systems development at the Ministry of Education, this tended to be 
an area that remained a challenge to the implementation of the NESP, which was signed 
and mandated as the main education SWAp document in Malawi. Evidence from both 
the literature and those DPs interviewed after the NESP had been approved points to 
glaring gaps in the capacity of the Ministry of Education with regard to the development 
process of the SWAp and how the NESP might be implemented.  
 
The literature on SWAp highlights capacity problems, particularly with the 
implementation of the NESP (Brown et al., 2007, 2001). It is worth noting that some 
improvement in capacity had been accomplished, such as that in terms of generating 
timely statistical data, as alluded to by one DP who cited „…planning statistical data 
produced on [a] regular basis and timely; the partnerships have facilitated this‟ 
(DPM3, Jan. 09),which can be corroborated. However, the situation on the ground 
tended to conflict with these views, particularly in respect of capacity around systems. 
Therefore, the perspectives on capacity expressed by DPs could have been driven more 
by what they expected to achieve rather than what was actually accomplished. Indeed, 
several DP views seemed to reflect their theoretical understanding of a SWAp more 
than the reality of practice.  
 
Since DPs are accountable to their home governments in ensuring that SWAps are 
implemented efficiently in the developing countries to which they provide aid, the 
imperative for the former is to effect appropriate changes that are seen to achieve 
results. Therefore, their dispositions could be motivated by the sense of urgency that is 
prevalent among DPs to show that they are achieving results within the stipulated time 
frame, regardless of the reality on the ground which may indicate that nothing concrete 
has been accomplished, as also observed by Brown et al., (2001).  
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In spite of the fact that DPs suggested that government capacity to engage in a SWAp as 
well as its ability to implement the policy was lacking, the same DPs also identified 
government capacity as an area that had been enhanced through the education SWAp 
partnership. The explanation for this contradiction could lie in the DP preoccupation 
with government capacity building and encouraging it to implement a SWAp, which is 
consistent with the whole notion of adopting such a policy. As pointed out previously, 
their views on capacity tended to emphasize the gap between theory and practice. Just 
because government officials were engaged in the SWAp process it does not necessarily 
follow that the capacity of individual officials or that of the ministry as an institution 
was automatically developed.  
 
There is therefore a need to reconceptualize the whole capacity issue as it relates to a 
SWAp process, and highlight the requisite type of capacity and the level at which it can 
be assumed to have been attained through such a policy. There is evidence to suggest 
that the capacity the Malawian SWAp process was expected to realize was not fully 
attained, as indicated by one DP who expressed concern in terms of quantity and quality 
with regard to government officials:  
 
 I think also the SWAp is trying to achieve some kind of format whereby you are 
reducing the transaction costs of meeting government people; they are busy 
people, they are understaffed, and they have capacity limitations, so the same 
issue should not be discussed three times (DP2, June 10).   
 
Another aspect of capacity that DPs brought out was linked to resources: „The 
resourcing of funding is broadened, the resourcing of technical expertise also is 
broadened, and this is a big benefit‟ (DPM2, May 09). However, this raises questions 
about how much of it has been translated into increased funding to the whole sector; let 
alone basic education, an area of priority to many DPs.  
 
Another DP highlighted better funding: „Funding has improved – funding for 
programmes that have been identified‟ (DPM3, Jan. 09); but this was with specific 
reference to funding the PCAR programme while there were still unresolved issues 
around DPs not fully disclosing what they might commit to funding the NESP (Brown 
et al., 2007). There were additional concerns whereby government views seemed to 
reveal an element of frustration at the inability of some DPs to commit to the pool fund 
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and a general failure to coordinate SWAp partnership terms, as one CSO member 
indicated:  
 
The 2007 MGDS Review for Education noted that some donors‟ central policies 
do not allow them to commit themselves to joint agreements with fellow partners 
in development; thereby, prolonging unilateral or bilateral agreements and 
implementation respectively, for example, Agency DP2 and Agency DP5. In 
addition…there is [a] tendency for donors to oversubscribe to a particular 
subsector, for example, primary education, at the expense of others (CS1, June 
09).   
 
Funding is an area that needs to be highlighted and addressed in this partnership as it is 
closely linked to the SWAp, which is a modality for disbursing international aid 
effectively and consequently expected to improve funding to a given sector. This 
renders funding a potential area of interest in terms of realizing positive results to all 
actors in the partnership.   
 
Probably inspired by the stage at which the education SWAp then was, one DP 
explained the course of its development:  
 
[The] processes of coming up with the SWAp have also been effective because 
we have been setting up the SWAp Secretariat and various donors have been 
providing support in terms of technical assistance in various specific areas. 
There is the Policy and Planning Committee, which is the coordinating body for 
the SWAp process; it is the highest-level body for coordination. And under that, 
we have the technical working groups, which are also providing input to the 
SWAp process… Each subsector programme is developed by the technical 
working groups and is going to be monitored by the same… We are all sitting 
together – government and development partners – deciding on what budget and 
what priorities (DP2, June 10). 
 
This perception has been provided in order to paint a broad picture of the process after 
the NESP had been approved together with the FTI and its funds released. Therefore, 
some technical assistants (TAs) referred to in the statement were those provided during 
preparation for FTI qualification and others were those required to support the 
implementation of the SWAp or NESP.  
 
Unfortunately, the issue of TAs in terms of government capacity building/development 
has not been widely debated. TAs are hired by DPs, in most cases from their national 
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catchment areas, and are thus perceived as representing their own interests at the 
expense of the host government. The GoM (2007) explicitly expresses its wish to 
reduce technical assistance, indicating the need to develop state TA policy guidelines. 
On the other hand, Brown et al. (2001) highlight the utilization of TAs as a donor/DP 
strategy to overcome capacity problems. Nevertheless, such a policy should be 
considered with caution, taking into consideration the issue of sustainability, and the 
transfer of knowledge and skills around the capacity building of local officials.   
 
Admittedly, FTI preparations took a long time, as pointed out earlier by one DP, and as 
also acknowledged in relation to NESP development by Brown et al. (2007). This 
process had negative repercussions for the partnership because it created uncertainty 
over why overall FTI preparation was delaying the NESP, and why some actors were 
impeding the release of much-needed funds that could have addressed several issues 
confronting the sector. Although the significance of FTI funding cannot be 
underestimated, the process of qualifying for the funds can be painfully slow and 
demanding in terms of sector plan development; and the experience in Malawi was no 
exception. In an attempt to explain the long painful process while at the same time 
trying to maintain a unity of purpose amongst the DPs, one of their number commented: 
 
What I have also noted is that, again as development partners, we have different 
formalities and different mandates. For some, focusing on the FTI was the thing. 
Focusing on the FTI was the main point, but as an education planner myself, 
what I am trying to say is that FTI is just one of those things which we should be 
doing on a daily basis, we should not forget everything else because of FTI 
(DP2, June 10). 
 
The FTI process took six years, from the initiation of the NESP in 2004 to its approval 
and the release of funds in 2010. The whole issue of developing a sector plan in the 
context of the FTI as a qualifying yardstick meant that the NESP as the key document 
had to undergo several amendments to suit FTI qualification criteria, as alluded to by 
one DP:  
 
I am confident that the process of developing the sector plan has also led into 
having the FTI endorsement; but first, it was the sector plan then the FTI 
process, just like a litmus test of whether we can pass international standards of 
education planning (DP2, June 10). 
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The FTI issue should not be considered in isolation, as the initiative is nested within 
World Bank policy as an element of the education SWAp partnership at country level. 
Apart from unleashing its own vast resources, the FTI is still identified with the World 
Bank (FTI has been replaced by Global Partnership for Education) and may therefore be 
viewed as a way of ensuring that its agenda to influence education policy is 
consolidated within FTI qualification criteria. Accordingly, the questions to ask about 
FTI are what is the basis for determining these criteria? Whose interests do such criteria 
try to serve? And why is the World Bank responsible for FTI funds?   
 
Yet another DP view reveals something about the conflicting interests of DP 
governments in respect of macro policy issues that could identify the FTI as a 
prerequisite for pooling funds:  
 
Maybe the FTI process has got specific benchmarks in terms of where we come 
from.  If we do the FTI and endorse it, it is a deliverable to one donor; maybe 
it‟s not a deliverable to the other donor. Our deliverable is just a plan (DP2, 
June 10). 
 
What tend to be at stake in SWAp processes that affect policy and strategy development 
are the influences of different DPs, which, unintentionally, are not always the same. 
This may be one of the reasons why international development aid does not seem to 
register much progress in sub-Saharan Africa. This aspect has also been identified in 
relation to the general aid environment in the Malawian context by Booth et al. (2006, 
p.x):  
 
 First, Malawi seems to be an extreme case of a pattern of interaction between 
government and donors that weakens aid effectiveness throughout the region. 
The pattern has to do with the logic of the aid relationship, but is often 
intensified by donor behavior, as has happened in Malawi. 
 
Consequently, all actors in the education SWAp process need to take precautionary 
measures in the way they interact in this partnership and strive to achieve meaningful 
results just as they did with the project approach.  
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5.3.2 Government Perspectives on the Education SWAp Partnership – Principles 
vs. Practice  
 
While DP views on the achievements of the education SWAp partnership to date were 
broadly positive, government officials‟ perceptions were slightly different. Although the 
majority of them highlighted areas of enhanced planning and funding (which were 
linked to the activities of the embryonic SWAp around PCAR) and the common pursuit 
of goals, quite a number of their remarks revealed discontent in the way the partnership 
influenced the education SWAp process, particularly in the development of the NESP.  
 
Contrary to the principles of the SWAp, government officials highlighted issues around 
micro versus macro policy development and micro versus macro politics that seemed to 
have adverse effects on education policy formulation (which was also suggested by 
CSO and NGOs members). DPs were regarded as persistently attempting to influence 
the NESP process in line with their countries‟ ideologies, policies and interests – which 
is in contradiction of the Paris Declaration. Therefore, it seemed that the recipient 
government was prevented from taking the lead and assuming ownership in determining 
sector priorities. The following comments made by one government official stand as 
evidence to this effect: 
 
Development partners just used the education ten-year development programme 
as an entry point for their agendas; because much as maybe technocrats in 
government would like to push their priorities to be in the development plan, 
donors found their way to articulate issues to align with their support policies. 
So, in some cases, where maybe government would have liked to have a teacher 
training programme which would run for two years, donors would say, „No, run 
[a] training programme for one year, and we will put the rest of the money 
towards rehabilitation of TTCs [teacher training colleges],‟ instead of training 
our teachers. So, in terms of priorities, we wanted more teachers and not more 
structures in teacher training colleges; that is not what we wanted (GOE3, May 
09). 
 
There were other similar complaints from government officials who expressed some 
frustration at the undue influence DPs had on the overall policy development process – 
which raises the question of who has the autonomy to determine the priority areas that 
are addressed in an education policy document. Contrary to the Paris Declaration – 
which underscores the government‟s role in setting its own priorities based on the 
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situation the ground in order to achieve effective utilization of donor funds (Hyden, 
2008) – empirical findings reveal that DPs tend to hold the power to influence priority 
areas based on their own interests. This poses another dilemma in policy-making in 
developing countries, in which tension seems to arise due to conflicting interests 
between macro and micro policy, and macro and micro politics in the interaction 
between DPs and the recipient government.  
 
The big question in this regard is who knows what is best for any country other than its 
own people – who have the widest understanding of the context in which they operate. 
If the state is accorded the liberty to identify priorities that go into sector plans, its 
government will ensure implementation of these priorities because they will be regarded 
as directly addressing issues that are of concern to the country. However, if DPs assume 
this responsibility and failure is registered, they have a tendency to blame the recipient 
country, an argument that Easterly (2009) advances in his detailed article “Can the West 
Save Africa”. Additionally, he argues that blaming Africa for its failure to embrace 
change implies that the West and its DPs know what is best for the continent or a given 
country on it, and that their ideas are right. 
 
The majority of government officials highlighted planning, funding, and working 
together/sharing ideas and knowledge as areas that had improved due to the SWAp 
partnership. However, again, the emphasis on funding was made with particular 
reference to the implementation of the PCAR programme; which is consistent with what 
these actors identified as the embryonic or mini SWAp that emerged from a project 
initiated one by DP, but was later embraced by others. Therefore, this raises the 
question of whether such a funding enhancement can be applied across the board: 
 
...there was a time when we were in [had a] problem with textbooks for 
Standards 3 and 7. Had we, for example, depended on the traditional partner, 
who is Agency DP1, to make the provision for the textbooks last year, we 
wouldn‟t have implemented the curriculum in Standard 3 and 7. But in the 
partnership, we also had Agency DP4 who had resources for the procurement of 
textbooks; we were able to let Agency DP4 help us in procuring for Standard 3 
and 7, let Agency DP1 do Standard 6, and, for next year, let Agency DP1 do the 
procurement for Standard 4 and 8. That kind of arrangement is helping (GOE2, 
May 09). 
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When one compares these views with those of the DPs, it is apparent that each actor had 
specific areas of interest: while DPs focused on the sector plan, the government was 
more concerned with funding. This is consistent with government perceptions on the 
emergence of the education SWAp partnership, whereby funding also featured 
prominently as one of the main reasons for setting it up. Notwithstanding the ostensibly 
positive focus on funding – particularly with reference to PCAR – there was still a 
dissenting voice on the government side, which seemed to reveal an aspect of 
inconsistency on the part of the DPs as they pursued their own areas of interest. The 
latter appeared to switch policy at will when it came to implementation, disregarding 
promises made at the initial planning stage, as one government official pointed out:  
 
I can say fairly, the partnerships have been effective in the sense of collecting 
bits and pieces of resources to form one huge resource, but challenges are still 
there because you find other partners saying we will provide so much; so, within 
the framework you count them as in, but during implementation they are 
standing outside (GOE1, May 09). 
 
Some further comments from the government perspective provide corroboration of the 
perception that although DPs might have promised funding, they did not necessarily 
honour agreements: 
 
So, donors in some cases can say one thing at planning stage and mean a 
different thing at all [altogether] in terms of implementation.  So yes, in terms of 
amounts of money that have trickled into the government coffers, we can say 
they are quite substantial, but with strings attached – they would still want you 
do what they have envisaged (GOE3, May 09). 
   
…I find a problem is that when people have pledged we will give you so 
much...in the end, they don‟t provide that; and it has forced government to go 
look for other sources to supplement in order to close the gap. So that in the 
PCAR process…we have had donors saying, „Money is not a problem – we will 
fund that.‟ But, of late, you find that they are freezing – some kind of fatigue – to 
the extent that government has got a list of activities to do, but funding is not 
coming…to the extent that when they want to give us money, they would now 
want to do micromanagement (GOE1, May 09). 
 
Such revelations tend to show who had the power to make decisions, on funding in 
particular, which left the government doubly dependent on the DPs. This created 
unequal partnership relations that were regarded as defeating the rationale of the SWAp 
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because it could not be implemented according to its theoretical concepts. The DPs 
exerted a lot of influence and were inclined to dictate what they wanted to accomplish 
on account of their control over the purse strings. Thus, the success of a SWAp requires 
that DPs/donors minimize the power of funding, along with its corresponding influence, 
and begin to support the recipient government based on priorities identified by the 
latter.  
 
5.3.3 NGO and CSO Perspectives on the Education SWAp Partnership – 
Principles vs. Practice  
 
The CSOs and NGOs, expressed views that, on the one hand, reflected agreement with 
both DPs and government officials on enhanced planning, policy development, funding, 
and the opportunity to work together; but, on the other, expressed different views that 
were consistent with the new ideological stance of the watchdog.  
 
One CSO member alluded to the lack of trust that DPs had in the government that was 
seen to be affecting progress towards funding: „This was compounded by low levels of 
confidence in donors on partner government institutions, more especially in handling of 
finances ... ‟ (CS1, June 09). Consequently, there is a need for the partnership to be 
guided by SWAp principles. While acknowledging a positive achievement, another 
CSO member also concluded with a precautionary sentiment: „To some extent, the 
partnerships have been effective in ensuring the constant resource availability to the 
education sector; although much needs to be done to nurture the culture of [the] SWAp‟ 
(CS1, June 09)  
 
Another CSO member, who identified policy development as an area for improvement, 
also raised a concern about participation that might have implications for the 
implementation of the SWAp programme:  
 
A number of things have changed for the better in the SWAp process, and these 
include policy development: a sector wide policy has been developed in the 
name of NESP, thereby ensuring that the education sector moves from a 
fragmented to a consolidated policy framework. However, the process of 
developing it was not broad based, and that makes it difficult for communities to 
effectively participate in implementation (CS1, June 09). 
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This individual also suggested a corrective measure for the achievement of effective 
implementation: „In the final analysis, a lot has to be done to devolve the language of 
SWAp to the lower levels of policy implementation; more especially, at school, 
community and household levels (SC1, June 09). 
 
 
Another viewpoint of civil society that accorded with its role as watchdog focused on 
assessment, citing the example of ongoing review as a useful process for monitoring 
progress; however, his remarks also implied that there was room for improvement:  
 
Generally speaking, the annual joint sector reviews are quite helpful, although 
the extent to which we are learning from them is very minimal. But the mere fact 
that the ministry is able to bring together stakeholders and partners maybe once 
or twice a year and review our programmes, and see where we are going, and 
review our policies is a very positive change (CS2, May 09). 
 
Such NGO and CSO viewpoints were consistent with the global mandate that 
empowered them to oversee the process and therefore ensure that the education 
partnership was implemented according to SWAp theory. However, while highlighting 
areas for improvement consistent with essential elements of SWAp, they were also 
concerned with the shortcomings of the partnership and elements of weakness in the 
process. One CSO member made the following remarks on government leadership:  
 
I think what has never changed, what is worrying people, is the high turnover of 
key people in the ministry. Because between probably 2005, when we had a 
major education conference leading to a number of reviews to date, we have 
[had] I don‟t know how many ministers, I don‟t know how many PSs,4 and every 
time we are losing institutional memory. Every time a new PS comes, people 
have to begin inducting him on things which some of us felt they‟re obvious, so 
we are losing on that one (CS2, May 09). 
 
One view that civil society generally held very strongly was the positive change in the 
relationship between it and the government: „On the positive side, is the acceptance by 
government of the existence of the civil society and its contribution‟ (CSC2, May 09). 
 
Contrary to other countries in which NGOs and CSOs are state-funded (Sending and 
Neumann, 2006), the Malawian context differs in that these organizations are financed 
                                                 
4
 Principal Secretaries. 
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by DPs/donor countries. This also serves to explain the inherent hostility that has 
persisted between NGOs/CSOs and the government. Such a situation could possibly 
also explain the relation between civil society and the government in Tanzania, where 
the government seems to have little to do with civil society (Hyden, 2008).  
 
The advent of the Malawian education SWAp partnership process with the 2005 Paris 
Declaration setting the agenda for development assistance meant that, to a large extent, 
civil society felt a sense of insecurity in terms of accessing DP funds. Its perception was 
that all funding from that moment would be transferred through the government, 
rendering it, civil society, hopeless and helpless where its organizational function was 
concerned, as clearly explained by one CSO member:  
 
The development of the NESP, and actually sharing of roles within the NESP 
between the government departments and the civil society, and the freeing of 
development partners to say, because when we were developing the NESP and 
hearing of SWAp, we were thinking that probably the government will close 
funding to the civil society, and funding will only be going to government. But 
this time around, we know that depending on the quality of your programmes, 
development partners are open to fund civil society and government (CS2, May 
09). 
 
This statement reflects the complexity of CSO operations in developing countries. 
Indeed, the position of civil society seems fragile in the sense that it is as dependent as 
the government on funding, and this might weaken the ability of the former to articulate 
problems arising from the activities of DPs who fund their very existence. Another 
constraint might originate from the fact that the government has the political power to 
ban CSOs if they do not conform to political pressure on the ground.  
 
The worst case scenario would be one in which, relegated to a position of mere 
competition for DP funding, the government and civil society engage in a witch-hunt 
for each other‟s malpractices with a view to reporting them to the DPs. The question to 
ask here is whose interest does civil society aim to protect – that of the government or 
the DPs.   
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5.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that the emergence of the Malawian education SWAp 
partnership was directly linked to international aid its targets, and internal reform 
processes such as the PIF and PCAR, which were initiated under the influence of 
international aid trends that required developing countries to adopt the SWAp as a new 
aid modality to replace the project approach.  
 
The process of adjusting to the demands of a global community that tied aid to 
international targets such as poverty reduction, EFA and MDGs created the partnership 
for education SWAp process, which saw the coming together of the government, DPs, 
NGOs and CSOs to collaborate in the development of an education SWAp document, 
the NESP. This partnership, which began with small thematic groupings, evolved into a 
single large education SWAp alliance, with the inclusion of civil society as one of the 
main actors assuming a watchdog role. The incorporation of civil society in this 
partnership was prompted by pressure from a global governance and international 
development agenda in the context of a neo-liberal economic policy prescription, which 
accorded the market and civil society a new role as non-state actors (Malhotra, n.d.; 
Sending and Neumann, 2006).  
 
The SWAp has been identified as a promising aid modality. In spite of shortfalls 
experienced during partnership interactions in the education SWAp process – 
particularly during the PIF period when most DPs still operated in the project mode – 
the purpose of initiating such an education policy was associated with the following 
qualities: improved planning, harmonization, alignment, coordination, ownership, 
government leadership, enhanced funding, and capacity building.  The three main areas 
of most concern to all actors in this partnership were planning, funding and 
harmonization. The need to address the effects of fragmentation that characterized the 
project approach featured highly in this partnership.  
 
Capacity was identified as an area of great concern, particularly in terms of the ability of 
government officials to engage in a SWAp process according to the principles of 
ownership and leadership – as a certain amount of capacity is required to lead the 
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SWAp process by bringing together DPs and civil society, and clearly advancing 
government priorities.  This therefore meant that the government needed a minimum 
capacity to engage meaningfully in a SWAp process that itself involved the further 
building of government capacity. Contrary to the identified lack of capacity among 
government actors, this was one area that was claimed to have been enhanced.   
 
While there were areas that saw some improvement and achievement, these were slight 
due to continual problems with partnership interaction that were manifested in the 
conflicting interests of the government and the DPs. Funding to the sector was 
improved to some extent, but only in relation to the implementation of PCAR in spite of 
inconsistencies between what DPs pledged and what was actually delivered. Efforts 
towards harmonization and alignment, as well as ownership and leadership, were 
constrained by DP attitude in placing their priorities above those of the government.  
 
Although there was common understanding of the concepts of a SWAp and that the 
process was to be guided by the principles in the 2005 Paris Declaration, the partnership 
continued to experience some negative power relations. DPs used the power of funding 
to influence their priorities in the development of policies and strategies. This adversely 
affected the SWAp process and frustrated the government.   
 
There are two main issues relating to this partnership that require further investigation 
and theorization. The first is around capacity and the notion that a SWAp involves 
government capacity building. In the Malawian SWAp experience, right from the 
beginning, government capacity was identified as wanting; a finding that calls for a 
redefinition of the minimum capacity required to implement a SWAp. If engaging in a 
SWAp process helps build capacity, the question is why is it that SWAp experiences 
from many countries have identified a lack of capacity at the initiation stage (Brown et 
al., 2001).  
 
Such capacity is associated mainly with the competence to efficiently absorb the large 
amounts of money that are made available to implement SWAp programmes, a point 
made by one DP who was interviewed about the absorption of funds after Malawi had 
obtained FTI assistance who indicated that: 
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I know the Ministry is trying to do their best and agreed that we need to look 
into other new professions to get better people and we have to pay them; we 
have a complete problem now that is in procurement because to spend US$267 
million over three years in addition to the Government budget then we have to 
have a strong unit there which knows how to deal with procurement (DP3, Oct. 
2010). 
 
Therefore, another concern is the issue of trust as it relates to the capacity of the 
government. DPs‟ lack of trust restrains them from releasing funds to governments 
through certain funding modalities that they perceive as risky. This is what deters them 
from using government systems and procedures for disbursement and procurement. 
They have consistently claimed that government systems and procedures are weak, even 
after going through a SWAp processes. In the Malawian SWAp experience, DPs 
claimed that capacity had been enhanced; therefore, the question is has their level of 
trust also been enhanced such that they have sufficient confidence in the government (as 
owners of the SWAp) to facilitate the disbursement of funds.  
 
The other issue around the SWAp partnership concerns the role of civil society in the 
process, given the Malawian context – or that of any other sub-Saharan African country 
– in which CSOs are funded by DPs and tend to be in constant competition with the 
government where funding is concerned. They, at the same time, can easily become 
vulnerable to changes in state policy if they do not toe the line of the government of the 
day. The questions to pose in this regard are what impact does civil society have on the 
SWAp process; whose interests are they protecting – those of the government or the 
DPs – and how effective is their watchdog role. 
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  Chapter 6 
Relationships – Do Different Actors Facilitate or Hinder the 
Realization of the Aims of the Education SWAp Partnership? 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
While Chapter Five focused on differing views on the motivation for the initiation of 
the education SWAp partnership, this chapter examines the various actors‟ perspectives 
on their relationships and roles in the process. The first part investigates these 
relationships in detail, arguing that they can affect SWAp interactions either positively 
or negatively. The second part explores the actors‟ roles in the partnership, asserting 
that the government‟s leadership role can be affected by funding DPs provide, but also 
other factors. The third part examines actors‟ perceptions of their roles in the light of 
DP government and country office systems and mandates, contending that these can 
either facilitate or hinder the realization of the aims of the education SWAp partnership. 
The last part concludes by analysing the different perspectives of all the actors, and 
considers how the role of the government is affected by the prescriptions of 
international development aid in the context of a neo-liberal ideology that embraces 
civil society as an actor (King, 1992). 
     
6.1 Relations within the Education SWAp Partnership  
 
From the perspective of the majority of DPs, relations in the education SWAp process 
focused on the government and themselves in a partnership between two principal 
actors, civil society rarely being viewed as a major player. There was also emphasis on 
DP relations being organized around areas of focus or comparative advantage based on 
the different role of each DP in facilitating its support to the government. However, 
whilst corroborating one perception of relations among DPs, such views also disclosed 
an element of uneasiness in having a single individual, the DP chairperson, represent 
them to the government. Yet, this was one of the principles of the SWAp in that it was 
intended to reduce DP operational costs and save government time (Hamblin, 2006).  
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DPs expressed views on their role in this partnership that could not be completely 
divorced from the issue of power relations, one of them indicating that, „We have DPs 
on one hand and on the other, government – to define the relationship, donors seem to 
have more power than government‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). Thus, some DPs focused on the 
nature of relations among different actors; while others referred to their relation with 
civil society in the education SWAp process, although this was not widely viewed as 
part of the main partnership.  
 
In describing relations among the different stakeholders in the partnership, DPs tended 
to underscore their unity when dealing with the government as the most effective way 
of supporting it. These points were made in the knowledge that no single DP could meet 
all the needs of the government; as one DP remarked, „Partnership demands that we 
look at education systems holistically; none of the DPs has capacity to do everything 
alone‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). Another DP commented, „This is a big sector and none of the 
DPs will focus on the entire tip of the whole sector, so we focus on a specific item; the 
others will focus on a specific subsector until you get a global perspective of assistance 
into [on] the whole sector‟ (DPM2, May 09).  
 
Other DPs described the partnership in terms of DP operational areas and modalities, 
and their unity as they associated with the government (although such views seem to 
have been challenged from two angles, as will be pointed out later). One DP indicated 
that:  
 
The relationships that we have are based on what I could say [call] comparative 
advantages: we know as DPs who is doing what and where they are mostly 
impacting, but as we relate to government, we try to make sure that the 
relationship of DP to government is one relationship; it‟s not individual 
relationships (DP2, June 10). 
 
As highlighted earlier, although DPs generally agreed that they should maintain a 
singular relationship with the government in which they were represented by one DP 
chairperson, there were some dissenting views expressed by a few DPs that reflected 
elements of mistrust in this particular SWAp arrangement. Their fears included the 
argument that instead of representing their views adequately to the government, such a 
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chairperson might take advantage of the position to advance his or her organization‟s 
agenda – a point that corroborates the notion that DPs tend to prioritize their own 
national or organizational policies – as expressed by one DP: 
 
We have a chair and a deputy and these represent DPs; and meet with 
government every week, and DPs meet every fortnight [the chair then meets with 
the PS]. This is a recent development that we are trying to achieve. The risk is 
that an individual, instead of pushing the agenda of DPs, the individual might 
push the agenda of his or her agency (DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
Another DP voiced a similar opinion: 
 
There are times when various development partners might want to push their 
own agenda over and above the national agenda, depending on what they think 
is important, also priorities that are set by their programmes, and also by their 
governments. So, there are some – not necessarily conflicts – but pulling around 
maybe, to want to operate in isolation (DPM5, May 09).  
 
Highlighting a similar aspect of a partnership subject to different priorities, another DP 
remarked, „The relationship may be positive if that system is working, but if there is lack 
of trust in the process and maybe other DPs are going to the government and 
discuss[ing] issues of their own interest without others knowing, that becomes a 
problem‟ (DP2, June 10). 
 
These perspectives tend to reveal an aspect of covert competition among DPs whereby 
each tried to maintain leverage over the others, which opposed the principle that all 
partners in the SWAp process should be equal without any particular one being 
accorded more space to advance his or her organization‟s agenda. However, it was 
observed from interactions in the partnership that it was the DPs who attempted to 
perpetuate such behaviour.  
 
Emphasis on the unity of DPs can be linked to their expectations of the SWAp, which 
was supposed to accord them less accountability as the aid recipient government 
assumed that role, allowing them to realize closer interagency collaboration, as pointed 
out by Riddell et al. (2000). However, evidence from the present study suggests that this 
aspiration was threatened by the DP quest to fulfil individual government agendas, 
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which negatively affected relations between DPs and the probability of enhanced 
interagency collaboration.   
 
Some DPs expressed views on relations around the different areas of focus that guided 
their support and contributions, one of them stating that, „Within the DP partnership 
group, we have certain areas in which we operate‟ (DP1, Jan 09). Another DP said, 
„Basically you will be finding that DPs have principal areas of focus within a sector; 
and it all just means that therefore, if we are now pulling everything into a SWAp, then 
we have a global view of areas that are being addressed in a sector‟ (DPM2, May 09).  
 
As already pointed out, operation according to areas of comparative advantage seems to 
be a logical arrangement, given that no single DP had sufficient expertise or resources 
to adequately support the government; hence the need for a partnership. However, 
despite the fact that the majority of DPs agreed on areas of focus, comparative 
advantage, and expertise, such views did not go unchallenged: 
 
In terms of „A‟, we are also trying to explore new areas; no one should really 
confine another DP and say that you stay in that area and that is my territory. I 
think comparative advantage is good because that is where you have been 
working and that is where your knowledge is, and that is where your lessons 
are; but that should not prevent you from exploring other areas (DP2, June 10). 
   
Other perspectives of DPs focused on the quality of the partnership, one of their number 
indicating that, „The relationship has to be open and transparent, and sometimes it is 
not, but we are working towards it‟ (DP3, October 10). Another DP pointed out that, 
„On relationships, there is mutual respect and orderliness‟ (DPM4, June 09), which, a 
certain lack of trust due to covert competition among DPs notwithstanding, seems to 
accord with the principles of a SWAp based on the Paris Declaration framework.  
 
There were other viewpoints that touched on the issue of leadership, and concerns about 
how the prescribed leadership was threatened through the nature of relations in the 
SWAp partnership. One DP said, „I would say much as leadership and the largest voice 
should be coming from government, the development partners, because of the resources 
and the expertise they are able to mobilize, have had a lot more say in the process‟ 
(DPM1, June 09). A similar view to this was articulated by another DP, who stated that, 
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„On the DPs, certainly you‟ll probably be referring to issues like besides the 
chairs…you have a kind of sleeping partners…[the influence of whom] would depend 
on the amounts that they have on the table, the quality of participation – the people who 
are participating‟ (DPM2, May 09).  
 
Although all DPs shared some common values that should have guided their 
professional conduct, the partnership tended to experience challenges due to other 
factors emanating from within the DP family. These were closely linked to the funding 
they provided to the government, a situation that further undermined the role of 
leadership and the concomitant ownership the government was expected to assume in 
the SWAp partnership according to the Paris Declaration. The financial muscle of the 
DPs seems to have exerted a greater influence on the manner in which the education 
SWAp partnership functioned, with each DP only too ready to advance its own and its 
government‟s priorities. This tended to negatively affect leadership and coordination not 
only on the part of the government but also within the DP community, as lamented by 
one member: 
 
There are still some donors…maybe because they are big in financial terms and 
still bypassing the structure of the SWAp coordination which we are trying to do 
by going directly to the Secretary for Education, having their own negotiations, 
their own meetings… And that is a wrong thing, and misunderstanding of [sic] 
the importance of coordinating (DP3, Oct. 10). 
 
Another dimension of the partnership leadership that seemed to concern DPs in terms of 
their relationship with the government was the frequent changes made at high 
ministerial level. This was regarded as not only hindering progress on the education 
SWAp process, but also perpetuating the government‟s dependency on DP knowledge, 
as pointed out independently by two DPs: 
 
The lack of leadership on the part of government can be attributed to an extent 
to the frequent changes in the leadership of the ministry, particularly at the 
minister and PS levels. This has obviously slowed down the process, with the 
result that this process, which started as far back as years ago, is not [has not 
been] completed. (DPM1, March 09)  
 
One problem is that there is [a] high turnover of PSs in the Ministry of 
Education. This limits them and they depend on DPs, who have more knowledge 
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and information. Likewise, there is [a] high turnover of directors, for example, 
Dr Jamu [pseudonym] replaced by Dr Dambo [pseudonym] (DPM3, Jan. 09).      
 
When the NESP SWAp document was approved and FTI funds secured, one DP 
expressed disappointment that the Ministry of Education had lost its Director of 
Planning (as referenced in the above quotation) to an NGO that was sponsored by 
another DP. Unlike other occasions on which the Ministry of Education had changed 
leaders due to the government redeploying civil servants in its ministries, this change 
was prompted by the individual himself going in search of better pay. One DP who was 
outraged at this turn of events considered it to be poaching from the government and an 
act completely unacceptable:  
 
We have seen a number of people, some of the best people of the ministry for the 
last one, two years, being poached by particularly Agency DP2 and Agency 
DP2‟s country firms hired by Agency DP2 or funded by Agency DP2, to do 
different consultancies in [the] education sector.  They hire the people from the 
ministry …and they offer them ten times as much as they get in the civil service 
at the moment. And the last [latest] one to be poached is the Director of 
Planning, Dr Dambo [pseudonym] (DP3, Oct. 10).  
 
Arguably, the frequent changes in leadership at the Ministry of Education could be 
viewed as weakening the leadership role of the government and its ownership of the 
whole education SWAp process as well as its effective coordination; and could clear the 
way for the DPs to take over on a role intended for the government on a permanent 
basis.  
 
The DPs had little to say about their connection with civil society in the partnership, 
broadly confining their comments to its role, with no proper description of their 
relationship with civil society. As pointed out in Chapter Five, this further underscores 
concerns around the effectiveness of civil society in the education SWAp partnership, 
especially given the critical nature of this role in terms of monitoring and supervision. It 
is feared that in the absence of an adequate clear relationship with key actors in the 
partnership there can be no meaningful monitoring and supervision of the 
implementation of education SWAp programmes. 
 
Therefore, what the literature on SWAps suggests in the way of improving aid delivery 
and effectiveness notwithstanding, it seems that there are yet more unresolved 
130 
 
 
 
 
problems. The problematic nature of the SWAp partnership is partially identified by 
Courtney (2007), who found in his study of an education programme in Cambodia that 
it was difficult to specify correct professional conduct in the partnership. Based on my 
observations of the complex nature of the relationship in the education SWAp 
partnership in Malawi, which is affected by factors at several different levels, I am 
inclined to agree with Courtney‟s observation. However, beyond this, based on the 
evidence provided, I question the integrity of DPs that subscribe to global declarations 
and changes in international aid modalities while internally maintaining their separate 
mandates, interests and priorities. 
 
Currently, issues of partnership relations are diverse and complicated, and therefore – 
contrary to what Ratcliffe and Macrae (1999) describe as having clear guidelines that 
help regulate the conduct of DPs and government – they require more than what has so 
far been suggested. The SWAp under study was subject to a set of guidelines drawn up 
under a code of conduct, yet all these challenges still existed.  
 
Whilst DP perceptions of relations in the education SWAp partnership were varied, 
those of government officials focused predominantly on the area of funding as the basis 
of the relationship. Almost all government officials described the relationship in terms 
of power relations, with only a few highlighting other aspects. Their perceptions 
revealed a type of relationship that was dependent on the amount of funds a DP brought 
to the government, which would in turn determine the kind of relationship the DP would 
enjoy in the partnership, as expressed by one government official thus: 
 
It all depends on what each partner is bringing to the partnership… You are 
looking at amounts of money in a particular programme, if you have one 
development partner who is pumping in a lot of money into a particular 
programme, sometimes they will tend to want to have their say. They say, „I have 
the money, so I will be calling the shots‟ (GOE2, May 09). 
 
In another statement, the same government official expounded further on how a 
relationship that thrived on money not only affected DPs but also influenced decisions 
taken in the partnership:   
 
What I have observed is that the partner who is contributing the most would 
want to have a bigger say, and that‟s one that I am seeing as a major challenge. 
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You also see that even when the other development partners are discussing 
amongst themselves, the very same partner who is contributing quite a lot would 
want to influence the thinking (GOE2, May 09). 
 
Another government official expressed similar views on funding, resources and the 
decision-making process. While acknowledging a degree of equity in the relationship, 
this government official was quick to identify a point of concern: 
 
Generally, I can say that the relationships are fair, but you find that in any 
game, a see-saw could be found in the sense that when it comes to resource 
mobilization, the development partners have another heart because the 
government may not have resources, and that means decision-making is still 
skewed. So you might say we want a 100 million [dollar] programme…but the 
donor partners come and say, „No, as long as you don‟t have capacity, then we 
will give you 50 million…‟ Because they have money, they will have more say 
than those who don‟t (GOE1, May 09).  
 
This government official elaborated further on the challenges faced in the partnership 
due to the observed skewed decision-making in favour of DPs that seemed to insist that 
they should only grant a certain percentage of the funds requested by the government:   
 
„If you want us to give you 100 million [dollars], you should tell us what you are 
going to provide;‟ forgetting that government already has resources that it is 
already providing in that particular subsector… „You are asking for 10 million 
when you haven‟t provided even 2 million,‟ but the structure within government 
is already worth 20 million. And these are the challenges that we are having in 
terms of power relationships (GOE1, May 09).   
 
Another government official identified how those with money tended to influence 
interactions in the partnership, stating that, „Those who have got the money…even the 
development partners, if they have money, they have more say; normally, their influence 
is much more than those who do not contribute much‟ (GOC1, May 09). This point was 
echoed by another government official who was equally concerned about this practice, 
asserting, „You also see that even when the other development partners are discussing 
amongst themselves, the very same partner, who is contributing quite a lot, would want 
to influence the thinking‟ (GOE2, May 09).     
 
Another area that one government official highlighted was how DP funding could be 
seen to facilitate the special relationship the two actors enjoyed:  
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Some feel we are doing a lot and ours is the best, and also we are pumping in a 
lot of money in this; and others also feel that they receive favours from 
government. It‟s like there are some donors who feel more favoured by 
government, more accepted by government, than others (GOE3, May 09). 
  
The views of officials from the Ministry of Finance also revealed an element of 
concern, not only over a relationship based on the money that DPs provided, but also in 
terms of SWAp process leadership and how areas of comparative advantage were 
exploited. However, unlike officials from line ministries, those from the Ministry of 
Education, as the lead ministry in this SWAp, seemed to concentrate on a desire for the 
partnership to operate in line with the Paris Declaration framework. One of the latter 
stated that, „The critical thing is that the Ministry [of Education] is supposed to be the 
lead agent, the rest of the partners in whatever way, whether they have got more money 
or less money, they are treated as equal‟ (GOF1, May 09). For their part, what was 
critical was that the Paris Declaration framework should be faithfully implemented, and 
they wanted to see the Ministry of Education – supported by the government‟s line 
ministries in the SWAp process – take the lead as central coordinators. 
 
The majority of government officials focused on how the funding provided by DPs 
tended to stifle the equality all stakeholders in the partnership were expected to enjoy. 
This corroborates the finding that there was a contradiction inherent in the dynamic 
between the SWAp process – which was expected to enhance assistance to the 
education sector and contribute to effective aid delivery according to the Paris 
Declaration framework – and the unequal relations created due to DP funding. 
 
The perceptions of government officials also indicated that the areas of focus, expertise 
or comparative advantage of each DP constituted another aspect of the power that 
tended to affect relations among actors in the partnership: 
 
….the other power is obviously the expertise. During meetings, if one has got 
more ideas, knowledge and what have you, they are given the floor and of 
course they dominate; but, at the same time, you can see that knowledge is also 
power (GOC1, May 09). 
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This was also observed by another government official who expressed similar views of 
concern on the conflict created in the partnership by DP‟s areas of expertise:    
   
In terms of power relationships, I see a lot of friction among our development 
partners in the SWAp arrangement.  The main area of friction is priority areas; 
there are partners who want to indicate that the priority area…they are funding 
is the most important, demeaning the areas that others are supporting… People 
come into the SWAp with a complex, a superiority complex, and they want 
others to feel inferior… Again, frictions come about because of the amounts of 
money people pump in (GOE3, May 09). 
 
This highlights a concern over how knowledge, expertise and areas of comparative 
advantage can be manipulated to influence relations amongst actors by enabling or 
limiting the level of participation and the priorities set in the partnership.   
 
Additionally, government officials described the partnership in terms of the policy and 
strategy agendas different DPs brought to the development process, which also tended 
to affect relations (a perspective that was highlighted by some DPs as well). Some DPs 
seemed to be fixated on the fulfilment of their agendas, attempting to control 
interactions within the partnership in a bid to ensure that their priorities took precedence 
over those of the government. One government official put it as follows:  
 
The government itself, through the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, 
has defined its development agenda and, to a great extent, that has helped us. 
But there are times when you might see one development partner trying to move 
in a particular direction, trying to push forward its agenda, which may not be 
within government‟s agenda for that particular year (GOE2, May 09).   
 
Another government official also expressed his opinion on the agenda DPs brought to 
the SWAp process, indicating the need to exercise discretion and diplomacy when 
dealing with them: 
 
It is obvious that you have characters that are strong headed; you have 
situations where somebody has definitely come with an agenda; but, to me, the 
agenda should be seen as like water put in [a] plastic bag, and should be able to 
change its shape and fit into the other. Yes, indeed, there have been scenarios 
where people have tried to dictate (GOE4, May 09). 
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This government official went on to clarify a certain aspect of the DP agenda that 
affected relations in tending to confine support to basic education, citing an example in 
which the donor‟s priority was not the same as that of the state: 
 
A good example is the way we are probably seen from the perspective of a donor 
in terms of interventions at basic education level. They want us to pump in so 
much, but we are also saying that as a nation, we need to train people; we need 
to move people up the ladder. Malawi wasn‟t meant to be…only having basic 
education… [However,] they might be saying that basic education is a very 
important agenda (GOE4, May 09). 
 
The Paris Declaration framework discourages the unilateral setting of the agenda by 
DPs; yet they tend to continue to advance their own priorities, an attitude that questions 
their integrity in terms of alignment with the declaration to which they are signatories. 
A DP‟s agenda should be sufficiently flexible to allow compliance with the recipient 
government‟s agenda. This recommendation tends to affirm a similar observation made 
earlier in this thesis whereby DPs‟ mandates and systems have not yet demonstrated 
adaptation to the Paris Declaration.  
 
CSO and NGO members highlighted three main areas that were affected by relations in 
the SWAp partnership – funding, leadership, and technical expertise or comparative 
advantage – which are in the main consistent with those identified by the DPs and 
government officials cited above. However, CSOs/NGOs also systematically examined 
the relationship from four different angles. The first was the general picture of the 
whole partnership; the second was relations between the government and the 
DPs/donors; the third was relations between the government and CSOs/NGOs; and the 
fourth was relations between DPs/donors and CSOs/NGOs. However, CSOs/NGOs 
tended to concentrate on their expectations of the role they played in the partnership, as 
demonstrated by the following extracts. 
 
One CSO member described the general picture of the partnership as one of „…mutual 
respect and orderliness‟ (CS1, June 09); and another described relations as generally 
„…positive because everybody wants to assist with the process‟ (CS2, May 09). A third 
CSO member looked at the general relationship with regard to the procedures that were 
intended to guide actors‟ interactions „…in terms of how they are going to be seen to be 
respecting each other‟s ideologies because they come from different backgrounds‟ 
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(CS3, May 09). These views seem to portray a picture of expected norms in the 
interaction of actors in any partnership.  
 
One CSO member described relations between the government and the DPs, indicating 
that, „There is a strong relationship between government and donors mainly because 
government looks…to the donors for the financial and technical muscle that they have‟ 
(CS1, June 09). This view supports those held by both government officials and DPs, 
but also hints at conflict between the two actors; a viewpoint that another CSO member 
corroborated: „The major problem between government and development partners is an 
issue of money‟ (CS2, May 09).  
 
CSO members also described relations between the government and civil society as 
weak and one that was viewed with suspicion, one of them indicating that: 
The relationship between government and NGOs is a bit loose and weak. 
Government is suspecting NGOs as troublemakers or agents of opposition 
political parties.  Although this is [can be] the case, the relationship has been 
growing for the better following the SWAp processes (CS1, June 09). 
 
Another CSO member expressed similar views: 
 
The relationship generally between government and those of us in the civil 
society is still characterized by some sort of suspicion. Suspicion because 
maybe…it is a bit tense because sometimes you could be saying the truth as a 
civil society representative about something that is not working, and those in 
government…they may not want to say „yes‟ because they are afraid of 
repercussions (CS2, May 09). 
 
This CSO member also expressed caution: „…but we should also be mindful that we are 
working in a relationship where one is a government and the other are considered as 
those who are governed‟ (CS2, May 09); but further elaborated on the different 
approaches adopted by government officials and CSO members in their interactions: 
 
There is I think a professional difference – those of us who are in civil society 
have nothing to lose to tell [in telling] a government official, „You are not 
working here; there is a problem here,‟ when those in the government feel they 
have everything to lose when they accept they are not doing things well (CS2, 
May 09). 
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From a governance point of view, it seems that both government officials and CSO 
members were subject to government authority; it was just that CSO members were not 
employed or remunerated by the state, whereas civil servants were. This could be the 
main reason why government officials needed to proceed with caution when it came to 
criticizing the government – because they were part of the state system – although there 
was at times room to separate an individual from the general system.  
 
An interesting point about the Malawian context is that it reveals some deviation in 
relation to the current widely held global notion that the role of the state as the primary 
development actor is increasingly being challenged by other major actors, such as the 
market and civil society (Malhotra, n.d.). The impact is very limited in the case of 
Malawian civil society, and thus restricts its participation and equality with other actors 
in the education SWAp process.  
 
This also reveals that although civil society recognizes its new role under the global 
agenda and is rightfully striving to play its part, it also acknowledges some limitations 
to the fulfilment of this role due to its relationship with a government that has the upper 
hand. This entails some restraint on the part of civil society in performing its function 
because the government seems to be very suspicious of the motives and activities of 
CSOs. Nevertheless, this could be regarded as conferring a certain balance, a notion that 
is corroborated by Sending and Neumann (2006, p.651):  
 
In this perspective, the role of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out 
global governance functions is not an expression of a changing logic or 
rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is 
redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon with an entity 
that is both an object and subject of government. 
 
 
Another CSO member expressed a similar view, pointing out that the lack of knowledge 
among government officials also affected interactions and relations between actors in 
the SWAp process, which allowed DPs and their external consultants to take an upper 
hand due to their knowledge of the country:  
 
137 
 
 
 
 
It is quite embarrassing to find that external consultants or external people are 
coming here in the name of development partners to be telling us what we 
should be doing; even telling us what our data is saying and what we should do. 
This puts people in government in an awkward position where they are not able 
to defend the policies and they are not able to clarify where we should go… 
There is a problem, but I don‟t know whether it‟s lack of capacity in the 
government offices (CS2, May 09). 
 
Thus, this issue not only affected relations in the SWAp partnership, but also reflects 
the serious capacity issue that was identified in Chapter Five.  
 
In conclusion, the way in which the SWAp partnership was conducted meant that 
relations between the government and DPs/donors tended to be influenced by various 
factors. DP funding to the government affected leadership and trust. Relations were also 
adversely affected by DPs‟ exploitation of their expertise and areas of comparative 
advantage, which were used to control the decision-making process. The DP agenda 
was yet another area that was found to affect the relationship, as it could conflict with 
government priorities. Since the SWAp was designed to enhance sector resources, 
neither education funding nor DP expertise should have had a negative impact on 
relations in the partnership. Indeed, it was the government that was supposed to take the 
lead and determine its agenda priorities in this process.  
 
Thus, practice based on relations in this SWAp process does not seem to have been 
consistent with the Paris Declaration framework. This suggests that in order to improve 
relations in the education SWAp partnership and beyond, it is necessary to 
reconceptualize the whole SWAp partnership through a process of critical reflection and 
encouragement of DP willingness to engage in such a forum. 
 
6.2. Different Actors’ Roles in the Education SWAp Partnership  
 
Different roles were played by the various actors in the education SWAp partnership; 
and interviews conducted for this study shed light on the nature of these roles and by 
whom they were played. The majority of DPs perceived the roles in the partnership 
according to the same basic pattern with which they identified the relationship as 
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principally divided between DPs and the government. Very little was said about the role 
of CSOs or NGOs, in spite of the fact that DPs had identified the need to broaden the 
partnership to include other actors who could play some crucial roles. The DPs also 
enumerated several roles played by different actors in the partnership, which included 
leadership, coordination, financial support, technical support, and capacity 
development, including the provision of technical assistance and consultancy in specific 
areas. The DPs also described the roles played by different actors based on their 
mandates and areas of comparative advantage. 
 
In terms of key roles, DPs consistently identified the two major actors in the 
partnership, themselves and the government, two DPs independently stating: 
 
…we need to categorize the partnership between the development partners on 
one end and the government on the other. There are expectations from each side 
that the government should lead the SWAp process, and that the role of 
development partners is that of facilitators of the development process. We need 
to facilitate in terms of our technical knowledge – the expertise we have on 
education – and this is something that we can provide to government because 
the government has capacity problems in so many different areas (DP2, June 
10). 
 
Roles were as evidenced by the current activities, principally divided into that of 
the DPs as a whole and that of Government of Malawi; Government of Malawi 
taking the principal lead and the DPs supporting in both technical and financial 
areas. Government of Malawi is expected to provide the human resources and 
the logistical support (DP4, January 09).  
 
Other than identification of the two major actors in the partnership when ascribing roles, 
these DPs‟ views also highlight the distinct leadership role that was expected to be 
played by the government, which was in accordance with the Paris Declaration 
framework. Three DPs voiced similar stands on leadership: „Government plays the 
leadership role‟ (DP3, Oct. 10); „Well, of course, the overall driver of the process is the 
Ministry of Education‟ (DPM3, May 09); and „In a SWAp, government takes control‟ 
(DP1, Jan. 09).  
 
However, other DPs revealed different perspectives on leadership based on realities on 
the ground. One of their number pointed out that, „The government is supposed to lead 
and own the process, but we have seen capacity limitations on the government side, so 
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we are developing the SWAp; it is the question of both government and DPs leading in 
certain aspects‟ (DP2, June 10). Another DP said, „I can say that the whole SWAp 
process really is a process that is driven by development partners; otherwise, if it was 
government initiative, this should have started a long time ago‟ (DPM5, May 09). The 
views of another DP indicated a similar opinion: 
 
It is my view that the government for a long time did not take the leadership that 
was expected of it in moving both the NESP and the SWAp process forward. This 
created a vacuum which the development partners filled, and this was not 
necessarily good for the process (DPM1, June 09). 
 
Another interesting revelation is that only one DP expressed views that recognized that 
the role of the government was to identify sector priorities and set the policy agenda. 
This DP asserted that, „The government is there to set policy – that is their role; the 
government is there to develop plans; the government is there to provide the resources 
necessary‟ (DP2, June 10). 
 
From these views, it seems that although the Ministry of Education was expected to take 
the lead in the education SWAp process, it did not take full responsibility for leadership. 
This situation raises questions about the legitimacy of the ownership of the development 
process, and further asks whose agenda and priorities were reflected in the NESP as the 
main education SWAp policy document. Nevertheless, the government had been 
identified as lacking in expertise and capacity, a situation the DPs exploited to facilitate 
the SWAp process, including the appropriation of the technical working groups (TWGs) 
that the government chaired.  
 
Another DP standpoint highlighted two views that were commonly shared amongst the 
majority of them on their role in funding and the provision of technical expertise: 
„Development partners play a different role, they play the role to help support the 
government not only financially, but improving the whole system‟ (DP3, Oct. 10). 
Another DP spoke of „…DPs supporting in both technical and financial areas‟ (DP4, 
Jan. 09).  
 
The negative aspects of funding in connection with relations in the education SWAp 
partnership notwithstanding, as pointed out by many actors, such aid provision still 
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stood out as a major role that DPs were expected to play. In addition to funding, 
technical support to the government was another area that DPs recognized as their role. 
Yet, while technical support might seem easier for the government to regulate, funding 
remained a delicate issue because of the influence and power relations it generated (a 
point that is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). However, it is important to note that 
in order to address the conflict created by increased funding and the resultant position of 
influence, DPs were duty bound to conform to the requirements of the Paris 
Declaration.      
 
Another common perspective DPs revealed was their role in providing support to the 
government based on their areas of expertise or comparative advantage, a standpoint 
that is consistent with that identified when defining the partnership. Views of DPs on 
this aspect show that they valued operating in their areas of expertise or comparative 
advantage, which was important not only to them but also to the government in order to 
avoid the duplication of efforts and enable the latter to determine and fill the gaps. Two 
DPs further expressed their views on areas of expertise or comparative advantage, 
independently pointing out that: 
 
In this partnership, their roles depend on what sort of niche they have within 
[the] NESP – that is one aspect; but also, when you look at [the]NESP and 
capacity building of the ministry, various partners, too, have different roles in 
terms of…the level of…implementation (DPM5, May 09). 
 
Usually, every donor or development partner will have a bench [position] within 
the entire continuum of the sector, so that is how we are kind of constituted to 
define our roles… I did not touch on the issue of avoiding duplication; if those 
roles are not observed there is high possibility of double-crossing [duplication] 
of activities leading into confusion (DPM2, May 09). 
 
The opinions of DPs on the function of CSOs and NGOs in the education SWAp 
process were not precise enough to determine the role that this group of actors was 
envisaged as playing in the partnership. Their role was described in relation to other 
factors, which suggests that it had not yet been fully assimilated, acknowledged or 
appreciated. Such DP perceptions are clearly reflected in the following statements: 
 
There is need to realize that the civil society organizations as a whole are part 
of the partnership. There is partnership between DPs and civil society which is 
beneficial to the project mode and when left out can pose a challenge. SWAp 
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brought them on board to strengthen the civil society advocacy and mobilization 
on how to implement SWAp Roles – we sometimes focus on government and DPs 
and forget civil society – for example, to work together on M&E5(DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
 
I think one important role of the civil society is to be of course critical to [of] the 
education sector; but critical in a creative, positive way, but not just in a 
negative way to criticize the sector. They should also be critical on [of] the 
budget. For instance, I know that they do that – and I appreciate that very much 
– and they do an analysis of the budget after it has been presented to 
Parliament… So, I think they play a key role (DP3, Oct. 10). 
 
Another example is on advancing the agenda emanating from UNESCO
6
 – 
everybody has [the] same knowledge and information. For example, civil society 
are even more knowledgeable and can advance agendas without difficulties; and 
[are] effective in following up on recommendations from international meetings 
(DPM3, Jan. 09). 
 
 
The role of CSOs and NGOs was not recognized by DPs as one of those played by the 
main actors, such as the government or themselves, but as a secondary function. The 
CSO/NGO role was identified with the watchdog task of monitoring and ensuring 
accountability, and with that of representing the interests of the community at large in 
undertaking advocacy and mobilization, but not playing a major role in setting the 
development agenda. Another element to the definition of the role of civil society in the 
partnership was that it tended to be prescriptive, which left it little room to act 
independently.    
 
Contrary to the views of the majority of DPs, most government officials identified the 
setting of the agenda as one of the major roles of the government. On the other hand, 
government officials tended to agree with DPs on the provision of financial support and 
leadership. However, this seems to have been a point of contention dependent on other 
variables that came into play in the partnership, which, in turn, affected the role of 
setting the national agenda.  
 
According to the 2005 Paris Declaration, the role of setting priorities on the 
development agenda is assigned to aid recipient governments (Hyden, 2008); a function 
that the government officials in this study were clearly aware of, one of their number 
                                                 
5
 Monitoring and evaluation. 
6
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.   
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stating, „I think, on the roles, mostly government is to set the agenda and then carry out 
the activities‟ (GOE1, May 09). Another official said, „I think the first thing which you 
have to see coming from the ministry is that of setting the agenda, being the lead agent, 
and showing that ownership is by Malawians‟ (GOE4, May 09). Another government 
official expressed this notion through the example of an overarching policy document 
that broadly determined the government agenda: „The government itself through the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy has defined its development agenda and, to 
a great extent, that has helped us‟ (GOE2, May 09).    
 
Government officials seemed to emphasize the point that setting the agenda was at the 
heart of the government, and prioritizing its development agenda without much outside 
interference was expected in the education SWAp process. As discussed earlier under 
relationships, the intervention of DPs on this particular issue was not very welcome, but 
nevertheless tended to prove successful under duress of responding to the financial 
support of the DPs. Thus, international development aid being provided under certain 
conditions that forced DP representatives to pursue them through influencing priorities 
in policy and strategy documents can be seen to perpetuate the tying of aid to these 
conditions; a practice that contravenes current protocol in international development aid 
(The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005).  
 
Government officials also identified leadership as another role of the government, but  
there were some elements of uncertainty about this, as expressed by one official who 
stated that, „Personally, I take it that the ministry is taking the lead and this leadership 
has also been delegated to the Directorate of Planning‟ (GOE1, May 09). Another 
government official said:   
 
Holding all factors constant, the leadership is supposed to be by the ministry 
and the office for [of the] Secretary for Education… However, because of the 
influence some of the donors have, using their clout in terms of amounts of 
money they inject into the SWAp, you find that leadership is being taken by such 
donors (GOE3, May 09).  
 
In expressing similar views on leadership, another government official noted, „I think 
leadership, basically to us, is through [the] Ministry of Education‟ (GOC1, May 09). 
Another said, „The leadership role, the way I see it myself, is that it should be taken by 
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the Ministry of Education and the others supporting the ministry‟s agenda‟ (GOE5, 
May 09). Another government official remarked, „All the mechanisms are there as one 
way of ensuring that there is proper coordination, although the overall leadership is 
supposed to rest with government‟ (GOE2, May 09).      
 
There were two other areas that the majority of government officials focused on, which 
were those of providing financial support and technical expertise to the government. 
These were unanimously identified as roles of DPs in the education SWAp partnership, 
a viewpoint that accords with that of the DPs themselves. Indeed, there seem to have 
been no conflicting standpoints to such a perception, as clearly articulated by one 
government official, in that „mostly, development partners are there to fund [and] 
provide technical expertise‟ (GOE1, May 09). Another government official commented, 
„the partner is there to complement, to support, be it financial, be it technical, and even 
moral‟ (GOE4, May 09). In agreeing with this view, another government official stated 
that, „The development partners give budget support and they also give technical 
assistance and policy advice‟ (GOF2, May 09). All these perceptions tend to confirm 
that these DP roles were widely accepted by both actors.  
 
However, as was observed earlier in terms of both government officials and DPs, 
financial support and technical expertise could also become potential sources of conflict 
in terms of influence over the partnership. Such conflict over the amount of funding in 
particular was not compatible with the conceptual understanding of a SWAp.  
 
There were a few isolated perceptions of the CSO/NGO function on the part of 
government officials that basically accentuated the identified role of monitor, one 
official remarking that, „They are typical watchdogs; they are there to ascertain that 
certain things are being done accordingly and therefore they inform both of us‟ (GOE4, 
May 09). Another government official also pointed out that, „The civil society plays the 
oversight role – they are like watchdogs –  they will alert you on issues that require 
redress and make a lot of noise; so that becomes an indicator that in one particular 
area we are not doing well‟ (GOF2, May 09).  
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Another government official expressed views on the role of CSOs and NGOs in line 
with the watchdog position, explaining that: 
 
Civil society will also offer some checks in the implementation of these 
particular programmes, but also looks at – as of late –  into the performance of 
various aspects of education: relevant capacity, but also quality and how these 
programmes are being implemented. So, it‟s important that we have different 
stakeholders for checks and balances (GOF1, May 09).  
   
In keeping with the requirements of its global governance function (Sending and 
Neumann, 2006), the role of civil society seems to have been well recognized by 
officials from the Ministry of Finance, as the central coordinating body that was 
intended to guide all sectors in the operationalization of a SWAp as a new aid modality. 
However, similar to the DPs that did not seem to give prominence to the CSO/NGO 
role, the majority of government officials failed to focus very much on the role of civil 
society and, certainly, no indication was given that it was on a par with other actors in 
the partnership. Moreover, although there was a common realization among officials 
that the government was supposed to take the lead, their remarks tended to reveal that 
this role was not well actualized in spite of an ardent desire to achieve overall control of 
the SWAp process. Indeed, contrary to the Paris Declaration framework, the leadership 
role in this partnership did not reflect international SWAp ideals.  
 
The CSOs and NGOs also expressed their views on the various roles played in this 
process, which were largely in agreement with the perceptions of DPs. Thus, CSOs and 
NGOs identified the role of the DPs as that of providing financial and technical 
expertise, but believed that the role of leadership lay with the government, although 
they did not necessarily consider this the case in practice.  One CSO member confirmed 
that „…donors offer financial and technical assistance‟ (CS1, June 09). Two others 
independently highlighted views on leadership and technical support: 
 
There is an understanding that the leadership role is expected to be done by the 
government through [the] Ministry of Education… [However], from my 
observation, the SWAp process has been more donor and consultant driven; 
government has been on the receiving end (CS1, June 09).  
  
Although it is not always good, they [the DPs] are in the driving seat… I was 
privileged to read the initial draft of the NESP, but you could see the donor 
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language in the NESP; so they are in the forefront in shaping the agenda; 
although I would still like to recommend that the ministry needs to still take 
control and make sure that they are the ones leading the process, with the 
donors providing the technical support (CS3, May 09). 
 
One CSO member identified the government and the DPs as the main players, with their 
own role as mere participants in the partnership and if consulted the views might not 
necessarily be considered:  
 
[Our] main role is that of a participant. If I look, for example, [at] the civil 
society – because we still look at government and the development partners – 
the external development partners…[are] key players... We do not necessarily 
participate in the setting of the agenda. Honestly speaking, the setting of the 
agenda is done between [the] planning department in the ministry and the 
development partners, and we are consulted…we are not part of setting the 
agenda (CS2, May 09). 
     
However, this standpoint seems to be contradicted by another CSO member who noted 
that „in recent times, the civil society has also come in to influence [the] policy agenda‟ 
(CS3, May 09). 
 
From the CSO and NGO perspective, it was clear that the government‟s leadership role 
required some adjustment in order to be fully realized and a lot of work needed to be 
done in order to create an enabling environment beyond the Paris Declaration 
framework.  
 
All actors were in agreement on the coordination role that was played by the 
government and the DPs, as indicated by one government official who said, „There is 
coordination in two respects: although, overall, the coordination is supposed to come 
from government, but at [a] slightly lower level, there is also coordination from 
amongst the development partners‟ (GOE2, May 09). However, coordination was 
generally implemented through the TWGs in which key stakeholders and actors 
involved in the education SWAp partnership were represented. The government chaired 
while the DPs assumed the responsibility of facilitators, as indicated by the following 
perceptions of different actors: 
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The coordination of roles of different partners is done through technical 
working groups… Members meet to plan and monitor their activities and they 
are chaired by [the] MoE
7
. Policy and Planning is like the master technical 
working group and all DPs attend the meetings (DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
There are technical working groups which are chaired by the ministry directors 
according to thematic areas… Those are chaired by the ministry directors and 
facilitated by DP members (DPM2, May 09). 
  
The different stakeholders have an opportunity of attending our policy and 
planning committee meeting, which is an umbrella body, and from there, they 
have [the] opportunity of dealing with the directorate of planning as an entry 
and exit point… The ministry is in charge of coordination (GOE4, May 09). 
 
The ministry takes the lead and the development partners just facilitate. They 
are also part of the technical working groups…so the development partners 
have also distributed themselves across the technical working groups (CS2, May 
09). 
 
The perspectives of different actors on the roles of the various stakeholders in the 
education SWAp partnership presented diverse views that reveal some critical issues 
around leadership and ownership in the process. They also identified how DP financial 
support tended to undermine the government‟s role in terms of leadership and setting 
the agenda. In the interests of aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration stipulates that the 
government should assume leadership and ownership, and set agenda priorities in a 
SWAp process. Again, based on the notion of a SWAp that has clear roles for each 
group of partners and is intended to promote a democratic partnership that facilitates 
increased financial support, it was expected that DPs would enhance funding to the 
education sector. Therefore, the monetary aid DPs provided should not have disrupted 
the clearly defined roles of each group of actors.  
 
However, the evidence from the perceptions of actors has shown that in spite of 
identifying roles clearly, in practice, the government‟s leadership role was compromised 
not only on account of the funding DPs provided, but also because the mandates and 
priorities of the latter tended to compete with those of the government. The role of civil 
society was also prescriptive and undermined, thereby limiting its ability to fulfil its 
role. These revelations tend to indicate that efforts to improve international development 
                                                 
7
 Ministry of Education. 
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aid and cooperation through the SWAp modality notwithstanding, there are still 
challenges based on a disparity between SWAp rhetoric and the realities on the ground. 
 
6.3 Do Different Actors Facilitate or Hinder the Realization of the 
Aims of an Education SWAp Partnership?  
 
As highlighted in Chapter Five, the views of actors in the education SWAp partnership 
accord with the concern that the global agreements to which many DPs and 
governments subscribe notwithstanding, the signing of them is not always welcomed 
with appropriate internal changes to the regulations, mandates and systems that would 
facilitate the implementation of such international declarations. The perspectives of the 
majority of actors in this study reveal that DPs and their governments‟ mandates and 
systems were often seen to conflict with their expected roles in the SWAp process; and, 
consequently, they hindered the realization of the aims of the partnership. Even where 
the need for innovation had been embraced, the rate at which DPs mandates and 
systems changed was observed to be far too slow to facilitate effective realization of the 
aims of the SWAp process.  
 
Some perceptions of DPs on this issue are as follows: 
 
Each DP has [a] legal framework/mandate which can either facilitate or 
become a challenge to the SWAp process. For example, Agency DPM5 has 
reviewed internal systems to suit the SWAp requirements. DPs have to look at 
their systems, whether they facilitate or hinder the SWAp process. The way [the] 
SWAp has been developed allows for those who will not be able to pull funds – 
for example, Agency DP5 and Agency DP2 – to still participate. Whether 
financial or legal, these systems allow/facilitate [the] SWAp (DP1, Jan. 09).  
 
I think it is important here to say that and this is what I have experienced not 
only here in Malawi, but in…32 years in Africa – and I worked for Agency 
DPM2 before. We have to realize that there is a limit to how much we can align 
the way we work because we all have obligations to duty headquarters; that 
every organization has its own agenda to some extent (DP3, Oct. 10). 
 
Because of divergent interests, we all know that we have one ultimate goal of 
achieving Education for All; but if you go to a level lower than that, we may see 
that the interests may differ. Not necessarily differ in the sense of trying to pull 
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each other apart, but in the sense…[of] the focuses that are maybe mandated by 
our head office (DP2, June 10). 
 
This was not only a concern to bilateral DPs, but equally affected multilateral DPs: 
 
I am using my experience from the SWAp in the health sector. You find that the 
development partners would agree to move into [a] SWAp arrangement, but 
internally, their own mechanisms, they have not really augmented these...to fit 
with the needs and the operations of a SWAp (DPM2, May 09). 
 
We have very rigid funding modalities where we need to be accountable to those 
that give us money.  Although we are participating in the SWAp…there are times 
when some decisions are not in conformity with our financial rules and 
regulations…but luckily for us, the decision to participate in SWAps came from 
the headquarters. So, there are likely to be some changes within the financial 
rules (DPM5, May 09). 
 
From the foregoing perspectives, it may be observed that DP mandates and internal 
systems restricted the way these donors operated, which could adversely affect the 
partnership, thereby limiting the realization of SWAp goals. This further poses a big 
question in terms of whether the process was realizing the main principle that the 
SWAp partnership was central to the success of the undertaking, as stipulated by 
Buchert (2002) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005).  
 
It was also probable that the readiness and rate with which DPs adjusted to the demands 
of the SWAp partnership were dictated by their initial interest as organizations in 
engagement in such a modality. The multilateral DPs tended to be more flexible and 
introduced changes because the partnership presented them with a wonderful 
opportunity to carry on operating according to the mainstream framework of the 
development agenda (Riddell et al., 2000), whereby they were able to continue to 
influence the MPRS, EFA targets and MGDs. For example, UNICEF viewed the 
education SWAp partnership as an exceptional opportunity to ensure the realization of 
children‟s rights and needs (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003). 
 
While DPs explicitly highlighted the limitations they experienced due to their 
governments‟ mandates and systems, which were slow to adjust to SWAp requirements, 
the views of government officials were more concerned with DPs driving and 
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influencing the agenda, or NESP priorities intended to ensure that DPs operated in 
accordance with their respective mandates. This affected the leadership role the 
government was expected to play as well as relations between the various actors in the 
SWAp process.  
 
Similarly to the DPs, CSO and NGO members were also able to distinctly express how 
the mandates and systems of the former tended to hinder the realization of the aims of 
the education SWAp partnership, two CSO members independently stating that: 
 
Development partners have not aligned and committed themselves to some terms 
of partnerships. For instance, the 2007 MGDS Review for Education noted that 
some donors‟ central policies do not allow them to commit themselves into joint 
agreements with fellow partners in development; thereby prolonging unilateral 
or bilateral agreements and implementation respectively, for example, Agency 
DP2 and Agency DP5. (CS1, June 09).   
 
The way they are behaving initially, you see that while they all do understand 
that they need to have a common basket…you still see that Agency DP2 says, 
„No, no, we will still protect this portion of ours;‟ Agency DP5 says „No, no, the 
common basket is not our take.‟ So, yes, they have still [a] common 
understanding of [a] common approach, but they still maintain their own 
ideologies (CS3, May 09). 
 
Another observation on mandates and systems being slow to change was that – apart 
from affecting the realization of the aims of the entire education partnership – they also 
seemed to broadly affect individual actors in the DP group who consistently faced 
challenges in the performance of their roles in the partnership: 
 
Within rules and areas of focus of DP support, there is a conflict with what 
operates on the ground…  At [a] broader level…education specialists are 
confined to what their institution says is their mandate, and yet one can find that 
if we do it that way, it will not have more impact (DP1, Jan. 09). 
 
Maybe I want things to move in one way, but perhaps the „B‟ headquarters, or 
the Ministry of Development, or the „B‟ Development Bank has [a] totally 
different agenda. Definitely, we see that you observe the Ministry from „B‟ 
sometimes has other ways of imposing things on us to do, which is contradicting 
to what the sector is doing (DP3, Oct.10). 
 
Therefore, while individuals representing DP governments and their respective 
mandates might have held different views, they were seen to be helpless in terms of 
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instituting changes that would facilitate the realization of goals in the education SWAp 
process. Apart from upholding the mandates and adhering to their internal systems, 
these individuals were confronted with realities on the ground, where they failed to 
respond according to the situation because of these very mandates and systems; and this 
tended to cause a lot of frustration amongst the DPs.  
 
If this situation goes unchecked, there is a danger that these DPs will succumb to a 
sense of ineffectiveness and frustration, particularly as they operate in a competitive 
environment in which those that are constrained by their mandates and systems tend to 
be less recognized. This can have an effect on the general performance of the individual 
and, ultimately, the agency. 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has highlighted several important issues pertaining to relations and roles 
amongst the different actors in this education SWAp partnership. Although the DPs 
were largely in favour of unity between their agencies so that they might provide 
effective support to the government, elements of mistrust and an aspect of covert 
competition amongst them seem to have existed. Such a stance can be concluded from 
their perceptions of a SWAp for which they were expected to become less accountable 
as the government assumed the lead role in a context of closer interagency collaboration 
(Riddell et al., 2000). However, this aspiration seems to have been overtaken by a quest 
to fulfil their individual government agendas, an aspect that created a spirit of 
competitiveness. Unity was also challenged in part by this competition, as some DPs did 
not adhere to their areas of comparative advantage or expertise. 
 
The Paris Declaration demands that the recipient government sets the agenda according 
to its own priorities; therefore, if DPs take the lead in this respect, it is construed as 
contravening the principles of the declaration. This questions the DPs‟ integrity in the 
Malawian context in terms of their willingness and readiness to modify their actions and 
conform to the Paris Declaration to which they were signatories, the common 
understanding being that funding provided by DPs was expected to enhance the 
performance of the sector. 
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Frequent changes in leadership at the Ministry of Education have been identified as a 
factor contributing to the hindrance of progress in its SWAp process. Arguably, this 
affected the leadership and ownership of the process that the government was expected 
to assume, and might have given some DPs the opportunity to perpetuate the 
undermining of the government‟s role in the SWAp partnership. This echoes Courtney‟s 
(2007) findings based on his experience of the Cambodia education SWAp, which 
highlight the complex nature of relationships and the difficulty that is encountered in 
specifying appropriate conduct in a partnership. This further suggests that it requires 
more than a clear set of prescribed guidelines to regulate the behaviour of actors in such 
a partnership (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999), particularly so as actors in the SWAp under 
study had a code of conduct. This demands the reconceptualization of the whole SWAp 
partnership, taking into consideration all the dynamics of the relationship. 
 
Although expected to constitute one of the main actors in the SWAp partnership, civil 
society was rarely viewed as part of the main relationship, which seemed to exist 
between or concentrate on the DPs and the government only. No interviewee was able 
to come up with an adequate description of relations between civil society and the other 
actors in the partnership other than the notion that it was confined to the role of 
watchdog. In the absence of adequate relations that might facilitate a meaningful system 
of checks and balances, this naturally becomes an area of concern, especially given the 
critical nature of a role that should be concerned with monitoring and supervision. 
Although civil society recognized its new role in the education SWAp partnership and 
was willing to play it, there were limitations to its ability to do so. This was due in the 
main to its relations with a government that tended to constrain it, as corroborated by 
Sending and Neumann (2006) in respect of the relationship between the government 
and civil society in Tanzania. 
 
All actors acknowledged that, in order to avoid the duplication of efforts, it was 
necessary for a clear definition of the roles to be played by each based on their areas of 
expertise or comparative advantage. This would also help identify gaps and ensure that 
all areas in need of support were covered. The two main roles identified for DPs in 
general were funding provision and technical support to the government, although it 
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was highlighted that the former tended to cause problems around power relations. Yet, 
as long as those who donate the most fail to conform to the requirements of the Paris 
Declaration, the situation is bound to continue. This further confirms the notion that 
power acquired through funding to a sector will conflict with the roles expected of each 
actor in the process. 
 
There were a number of issues around the duties of the government in this SWAp. The 
role of the government was generally to provide financial support and leadership, and 
set the agenda, the latter of which included the identification of priority areas. 
According to the government, these tasks were not fully realized due to pressure from 
DPs that provided financial support, in spite of the fact that the Paris Declaration clearly 
assigns these roles to the recipient government. These issues become critical not only in 
terms of attaining leadership and ownership of the education SWAp process, but also 
with regard to the aid effectiveness that the Paris Declaration framework emphasizes 
(Hyden, 2008). This element also stresses the challenges of the SWAp modality and 
underscores a disparity between the SWAp rhetoric and the realities on the ground.  
  
The role of CSOs/NGOs in the education SWAp was not clearly spelled out beyond 
their broad watchdog function. However, in some ways, their role was prescriptive, 
leaving little room for them to act effectively. Thus, the function of civil society in this 
process does not appear to have been fully assimilated or acknowledged; indeed, it 
seems to have been something of a peripheral role compared to those of other actors. 
 
It has been noted that DP government mandates and internal organizational systems 
restricted their functioning in the SWAp process. In a sense, this tended to create some 
conflict with their role as DPs. Indeed, the evidence has shown that even though DPs 
might have attempted to embrace the innovations necessitated by a SWAp, their internal 
systems were too slow to change and adapt to the requirements of the modality. Another 
aspect that was highlighted in the main by the government was that DP mandates and 
internal systems tended to cause conflict around the setting of national priorities in the 
process, as DPs were regarded as attempting to influence the NESP agenda to bring it in 
line with their respective government policies.  
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These revelations pose the fundamental question of whether DP governments are 
genuinely subscribing to the SWAp and the Paris Declaration. There are also cases in 
which individuals representing DPs hold different views on the conduct of a SWAp to 
those of their governments. In both instances, individuals representing DP governments 
find the resultant situation restraining and frustrating, particularly when operating in a 
competitive environment in which those who are flexible enough to respond to the 
demands of the sector are well recognized. This could have a negative impact on the 
general performance of individuals, their agencies, and the entire SWAp process. 
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Chapter 7 
Enhancing Funding to the Sector 
 
7.0 Introduction   
 
The SWAp is seen as a vital strategy in achieving partnership and coordination for the 
effective delivery of international aid (Buchert, 2002; Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, 2005). Partnership is a central issue in this thesis as the main research 
question asks how it influences the Malawian education SWAp process. Establishing 
the manner in which this SWAp partnership operated and enhanced funding to the 
sector is thus crucial. Therefore, in examining the results of a survey and quantitative 
data collected in a trend analysis of DP funding over seven years, this chapter explores 
how the SWAp partnership influenced education funding.  
 
The first section discusses how the SWAp partnership influenced and improved funding 
to the sector. The second section examines how the SWAp partnership affected 
coordination and considers government administration in the SWAp process. The third 
section discusses the financial mechanisms employed, and assesses the extent to which 
they improved funding to the sector. The fourth section addresses various other aspects 
of the SWAp partnership and examines how they affected participation, funding and 
related issues. Drawing on the findings of the preceding discussion, the last section 
provides an analytical conclusion in relation to the concept of this modality as a strategy 
for achieving partnership and coordination for effective aid delivery, with particular 
focus on how the education SWAp partnership improved funding to the sector.  
 
7.1 The SWAp Partnership and Funding to the Sector  
 
In order to gain an insight into DP funding, it is necessary to look at the trend since the 
inception of the NESP and ascertain how the SWAp process has influenced funding to 
the sector. In Malawi, education is the fourth largest aid recipient sector, and is 
supported by 14 DPs/donors across 33 projects (Government of Malawi, 2010). After 
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many years of experience with the project approach and realizing the benefits of a 
SWAp, in cooperation with its DPs, the Government of Malawi through the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology proceeded to move towards the implementation of 
this innovative modality. Government views on the SWAp at this time were clearly 
articulated in the initial version of the NESP document: 
 
A sector-wide approach (SWAp) is an approach to service delivery that brings 
government and partners together in a manner which promotes national 
ownership, alignment of sector objectives, coherence of financing, and 
harmonization of procedures.  [The] MoEST perceives a SWAp as providing a 
solution to problematic issues arising from a traditional project approach (NESP, 
2006, p.6).  
 
As noted in Chapter 5, one of the factors regarded as contributing to the effectiveness of 
the education SWAp was funding, although the significance of this was in a sense 
tempered due to the power relations experienced in relation to DPs who donated more 
money. Therefore, most identified shortcomings were related to the need for 
improvement in funding procedures. It may be argued that this was largely due to the 
failure to effect a swift transition from the project approach to a SWAp during the PIF 
period up to the implementation of the NESP. Table 7.1 below provides a summary of 
the trend in the disbursement of funds to the education sector by DP from 2004 to 2010.  
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Table 7.1: Aid disbursement to the Malawian education sector by DP/donor from 2004 
to 2010 (in US dollars) 
 
DP/donor 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ADB 778,818 4,639096 7,300,514 2,625,106 2,356,221 7,538,039 4,184,043 
Canada 496,584 2,266,991 1,200,893 3,590,389 5,558,990 7,519,946 1,457,462 
DFID 3,923,761 7,415,359 7875,309 9,942,780 17,992,995 13,493,031 14,988,196 
EU - - - - 124,230 - - 
GTZ 1,340,490 1,963,364 3,431,079 1,964,374 4,627,535 4,084,710 946,766 
ICEIDA - - - - 387,929 25,419 - 
Ireland - - - - 413,607 372,760 - 
Japan 181,979 395,191 208,008 97,817 556,530 3,799,701 1,803,151 
KFW 219,407 376,700 3,392,973 1,081,351 1,759,171 306,306 - 
Norway - 607,655 477,855 375,799 728,436 295,360 - 
UNFPA - - - 53,146 25,702 - - 
UNICEF - - 2,520,974 1,131,044 2,237,923 - 2,993,085 
UNESCO - - - - - - - 
USAID 8,421,010 - - - 7,415,193 7,348,159 3,836,090 
WB - 4,964,000 - 3,626,000 - - - 
WFP 15,362,048 27,652,026 31,896,224 27,662,607 62,084,764 61,553,058 38,925,059 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from Ministry of Education planning data 
 
Based on actual aid disbursement patterns as opposed to projected figures, the general 
trend is that most of these donors provided far less than they had projected at the start of 
projects. Some clear examples where donors failed to honour actual commitments 
include the following: 
 
 UNICEF only disbursed $1,131,044 but had made an actual commitment of 
$27,723,600 in 2007  
 WB only disbursed $4,964,000 but had made an actual commitment of 
$32,200,000 
 UNESCO committed to donating $1,300,000 in 2009 and $49,000 in 2010 but 
nothing was forthcoming 
 ICEIDA committed to donating $4,088,432 in 2005 but no aid was disbursed in 
that fiscal year 
 
There are fluctuations and inconsistencies in funding to the sector (see Table 7.1) that 
are consistent with this study‟s qualitative data analysis. DPs adjusted funding 
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arrangements and schedules with scant regard for the Government of Malawi or the 
implications for the programmes in question. Such inconsistency greatly affected the 
implementation of education programmes, as was the case with the PCAR, which is 
cited as an example in Chapter 5. These practices ran contrary to what the NESP 
expected of DPs in stipulating that the coherence of funding should be maintained. 
Indeed, the delivery of aid was intended to be planned and consistent so that the 
government might have greater control over policymaking and the implementation of 
sector programmes. 
 
Table 7.1 also shows that in the case of some donors, initial disbursement at the 
initiation of a project amounted to the largest proportion of their contribution and, 
thereafter, funding steadily decreased over the ensuing years – USAID is one such 
example. Arguably, this could be attributed to DP specialization in pilot projects on the 
understanding that other DPs would sustain successful pilots at programme level. This 
further highlights the flawed conception of the project approach, which generally 
requires large amounts of money at the initial stage to prepare the ground for long-term 
implementation, after which funding is steadily reduced over the remainder of the 
intervention‟s lifetime. However, the opposite situation obtained where other DPs were 
concerned, their funding disbursement steadily increasing over time – typical examples 
include DFID and WFP – which is a more acceptable model in the SWAp context. 
 
Over the past few years, there has been a general shift of disbursement modality from 
emphasis on pooled sector support (which commonly characterizes a SWAp) to general 
budget support. Although the latter predisposes aid to address the effects of political 
fluctuation more than the former, both types of aid disbursement are acceptable in a 
SWAp, although the preferred modality seems to be pooled funds to a sector. In 
Malawi, only a few DPs and donors such as the European Union (EU), Department for 
International Development (DFID), German Development Cooperation (GDC), African 
Development Bank (ADB) and Norway have donated funding through both budget 
support and projects, other DPs/donors providing assistance through projects alone 
(Boyle et al., 2008).  
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In terms of the utilization of government systems when disbursing aid, none of 
Malawi‟s 14 DPs/donors makes full use of this utility, although the concept of a SWAp 
requires the adoption of common approaches and DP use of government disbursement 
procedures (Brown et al., 2001). However, a few DPs make partial use of the 
government system, including the EU, DFID, ADB, World Bank (WB), GDC and 
Norway. Table 7.2 presents information on the number of projects that were running in 
the education sector in the 2009/10 fiscal year and the percentage of aid funding 
facilitating them. 
 
Table 7.2 Projects running in Malawi in the 2009-10 fiscal year  
 
Organization/Country Years Contribution 
DFID 7 33% 
USAID 7 9% 
Canada 3 6% 
Japan 3 6% 
ADB 2 17% 
GDC 2 5% 
UNICEF 2 7% 
ICEIDA 1 <1% 
Ireland 1 1% 
WFP 1 8% 
WB 1 8% 
UNESCO 1 <1% 
 
Source: Malawi Aid Atlas, 2010  
 
These data corroborate findings from interviews conducted in this study in terms of two 
issues that were noted in Chapter 5 as areas worthy of further consideration. The first is 
the perception that DPs continued to operate in project mode due to a lack of trust in the 
government‟s ability to account for the money; and the second is the lack of capacity of 
government systems. The question is whether DP failure to utilize government 
disbursement procedures was an issue of capacity on the part of the government or a 
lack of trust in terms of financial accountability on the part of the DPs. This is an area 
that requires further investigation, particularly given the finding that even where 
government systems were considered to be well developed, DPs continued to employ 
their own structures (Wood et al., 2008).  
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The project approach has been identified as the easier option for DPs in terms of 
ensuring accountability as they are able to control and monitor the use of their funds 
closely according to interviewees. However, the SWAp is associated with issues of 
capacity development, including that of government systems, which the evaluation of 
the implementation of the Paris Declaration recognizes as a major concern: 
 
One of the most important obstacles to implementing the Declaration is the 
concern about weaknesses of capacities and systems in partner countries. This 
obstacle is repeatedly identified in almost all of the evaluation, even though the 
countries assessed here include some of those with the strongest capacities and 
most advanced systems among all partner countries (Wood et al., 2008, p.ix).  
 
The report suggests that one reason for this could be that DPs still cling to some old 
perceptions around the issue of trust in recipient governments, which subsequently 
impedes the shift to a SWAp. The percentage contributions made by each DP/donor 
represented in Table 7.2 reveal some consistency with the observations about power 
relations presented in Chapter 6 and 8, whereby DPs exercised power in the SWAp 
process proportionate to the amount of money they donated.  
 
Chapter 3 explained the SWAp and traced its emergence to changes in global 
development aid in connection with international targets, which resulted in DP countries 
promising to increase international aid to developing countries at the World Conference 
on Education for All in 2000 (King, 1992). Consequently, as this thesis has consistently 
emphasized, issues of funding are of central importance to aid recipient governments 
because a sector budget not only determines its own performance but, more importantly, 
how the country is progressing towards the achievement of international targets.  
 
There is a general expectation that a SWAp will bring among other things increased 
funding to the sector. Data from this study‟s survey also provided information on how 
the SWAp process influenced aid to the Malawian education sector, which indicates 
improved funding in spite of other factors, as presented in Table 7.3).  
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Table 7.3: Perceptions of the degree to which the Malawian education SWAp 
partnership improved funding to the sector  
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
16 84.2% 14 87.5% 5 100% 
To some 
extent 
3 15.8% 2 12.5% 0 0 
To no 
extent  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS  
 
DPs were more positive than government officials about the SWAp partnership having 
contributed towards improved funding to the sector, with 87.5 percent and 84.2 percent 
respectively indicating it had improved funding to the sector to a large extent. However, 
the CSOs/NGOs scored the highest (although there were comparatively few of them), 
with unanimous agreement (100 percent) that the partnership had improved funding to 
the sector to a large extent.  
 
The high absolute ratings serve to underscore the level of optimism actors shared in the 
education SWAp partnership in terms of its potential to improve funding. The highest 
percentage scores in all three categories of partners indicate that the education SWAp 
partnership improved funding to the sector to a large extent. No one from the three 
categories of partners indicated that the partnership had improved funding to the sector 
to no extent. Variation in scores between the three groups is small. The distribution of 
scores is thus on the positive side. These scores are also consistent with information 
obtained through the funding trend analysis above, which – a decline in funding by a 
few DPs that can be largely attributed to their adherence to the project approach 
notwithstanding – indicates that DPs steadily increased funding to the sector during the 
development of the NESP.  
 
Another area of significant impact on this SWAp process was partnership relations, as 
observed in chapters 5, 6 and 8, principally in Chapter 8. Data from the survey show 
that this aspect affected both DPs and government officials. This emphasizes the role of 
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relationships in the SWAp partnership, and power relations in particular. Table 7.4 
below provides information on how relations between different actors affected funding 
to the sector. 
 
Table 7.4: Perceptions of the degree to which partnership relations affect funding to the 
Malawian education sector   
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
18 94.7% 14 87.5% 4 80.0% 
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 1 20.0% 
To no 
extent  
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
 
It is evident from the data presented in Table 7.4 that all three groups of actors were 
concerned about partnership relations and the role they had in affecting funding to the 
sector. The vast majority of actors returned the highest rating (to a large extent), thus 
demonstrating unanimity that partnership relations affect funding and could hinder 
effective mobilization of funds to the sector. The government scored the highest (94.7 
percent), with DPs second (87.5 percent) and CSOs/NGOs third (80 percent).  
 
Qualitative data also highlight the power relations factor in the education SWAp 
partnership, which created an imbalance in participation and affected partner 
relationships negatively. As previously identified, power relations affected actors‟ 
participation in the SWAp partnership decision-making process. Consequently, the 
study found that such a dynamic potentially jeopardized efforts to enhance funding to 
the sector and improve aid effectiveness.   
 
Data collected through the survey also provide more information on the extent to which 
the principles and pattern of the education SWAp partnership influenced funding to the 
sector (see Appendix D). With regard to the first aspect, CSOs/NGOs returned the 
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highest score, with 100 percent indicating that principles applied at various stages of the 
SWAp process affected funding to the sector to a large extent. DPs scores revealed a 
proportion of 81.3 percent and government officials 63.2 percent.  
 
In terms of the second aspect, government officials scored the highest, with 89.5 percent 
indicating that the pattern of the SWAp partnership influenced funding to the sector to a 
large extent. The DPs‟ score was 75 percent, and CSOs/NGOs scored the lowest at 40 
percent. Comparatively, government officials‟ scores indicate that they were more 
concerned with the pattern of the partnership than its principles, believing that the 
former could affect funding to the sector more than the latter. However, generally, the 
scores reveal that both aspects affected the flow of funding.   
 
The above data analysis shows that the manner in which a SWAp partnership is 
conducted affects funding to the sector. From this evidence, it is clear that there are still 
issues that need to be addressed in the Malawian education SWAp partnership before it 
can begin to contribute significantly towards improving funding to the sector. Based on 
this evidence, hindrance to the enhancement of funding to the education sector caused 
by these factors could account for Malawi‟s failure to meet international targets in terms 
of both EFA and the MDGs.  
  
7.2 The Coordination Role of the SWAp Partnership  
 
A SWAp has also been identified as a modality for achieving aid coordination for 
effective delivery of international aid, and sector policies and strategies. Within this 
framework, the emphasis is on effective collaboration at all levels and developing 
relationships that contribute to meaningful partnerships. In independent studies of 
SWAps in Burkina Faso and Uganda, Samoff (2004) and Murphy (2005) respectively 
emphasize the need to achieve coordination and ownership in a SWAp process. Thus, a 
SWAp partnership should pay particular attention to coordination, which will in turn 
contribute to effective aid delivery. Accordingly, tables 7.5 and 7.6 present data on how 
the coordination of this education SWAp partnership was affected. 
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Table 7.5: Perceptions of the degree to which Malawian education SWAp partnership 
relations affect aid coordination     
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
17 89.5% 12 75.0% 4 80.0% 
To some 
extent 
2 10.5% 4 25.0% 1 20.0% 
To no 
extent  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
 
In terms of the perception that partnership relationships affect coordination to a large 
extent, government officials score highest (89.5 percent); CSOs/NGOs come second (80 
percent); while DPs are third (75 percent). These data show that the three groups were 
unanimous in their view that partnership relations were affected by aid coordination in 
this SWAp partnership. Chapter 6 highlighted a similar concern about relations that 
affected coordination meetings because of skewed participation, mainly caused by the 
conduct of some DPs who donated more money to the government than others did.  
 
However, there are interesting results in respect of responses concerning the extent to 
which the government coordinated the education SWAp process, as presented in Table 
7.6.  
 
Table 7.6: Perceptions of the degree to which government coordinates the education 
SWAp process 
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
13 68.4% 12 75.0% 3 60.0% 
To some 
extent 
6 31.6% 3 18.8% 2 40.0% 
To no 
extent  
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
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Although all three groups of partners agreed that the government coordinated the 
education SWAp process to a large extent, the scores are proportionately lower when 
compared to those on other factors that affected funding to the sector. In terms of 
perceived government coordination, DPs scored the highest (75 percent); government 
officials returned the second highest rating (68.4 percent); and CSOs/NGOs scored 60 
percent. Thus, it may be inferred that these scores in fact reveal an element of weak 
government coordination, an area that is closely linked to ownership and leadership in a 
SWAp process.  
 
Other studies of the SWAp have also highlighted the problem of poor government 
coordination and ownership (Samoff, 2004; OECD, 2007), a finding that suggests there 
is a need to improve coordination by focusing on ways of enhancing ownership. This 
element of the process is perpetually challenged by issues of leadership, meaning that 
capacity becomes a major concern in terms of government relations with other actors in 
these forums. As previously observed, coordination is closely linked to ownership, 
capacity and leadership. Yet, government ownership and leadership in the Malawian 
SWAp process tended to be compromised due to competition created by DPs who 
donated more money than others did and thus wanted to take the lead in the SWAp 
partnership, as corroborated by the qualitative data discussed in the preceding two 
chapters.  
 
This study‟s survey data (see Appendix D) also provides information on the extent to 
which leadership in the SWAp process influenced funding to the sector. From the scores 
returned, it may be seen that most actors agreed that leadership in the education SWAp 
partnership process influenced funding to the sector to a large extent. Indeed, the vast 
majority of DPs held this view (93.8 percent); the CSO/NGO score was 80 percent; and, 
although the government officials‟ score was the lowest, 73.7 percent, but they were 
still in agreement. The high DP score seems to be consistent with perceptions provided 
on leadership in Chapter 6, whereby it was indicated that frequent changes in ministry 
leadership impeded the SWAp process.  
 
  
165 
 
 
 
 
7.3 A Funding Mechanism vs. Funding to the Sector  
 
The shift towards the SWAp was based on the understanding that it would be a suitable 
modality for funding sectors in developing countries after the traditional project 
approach had failed to meet expectations; the project funding mechanism being 
associated with time-consuming and costly parallel management structures (Foster, 
2007). The approach was also viewed as bias towards responding to the needs and 
interests of donors at the expense of critical sector priorities. Therefore, it was 
anticipated that a SWAp would provide a better modality with improved funding and 
financial mechanisms.  
 
It was against such a background that government officials in this study tended to show 
consistent optimism towards SWAp funding and financial mechanisms. Table 7.7 
shows how partners viewed financial mechanisms in terms of improving funding to 
sector programmes, while Table 7.8 focuses on how funding mechanisms improved 
overall sector budgeting.  
 
Table 7.7 Perceptions of the degree to which financial mechanisms in the Malawian 
education SWAp improve the funding of sector programmes 
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
18 94.7% 13 81.3% 4 80.0% 
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 3 18.8% 1 20.0% 
To no 
extent  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
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Table 7.8 Perceptions of the degree to which funding mechanisms in the Malawian 
education SWAp improve overall sector budgeting  
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
17 89.5% 10 62.5% 5 100.0% 
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 5 31.3% 0 0 
To no 
extent  
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 0 0 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
 
A high proportion of all groups agreed that financial mechanisms improved funding to 
sector programmes, 94.7 percent of government officials, 81.3 percent of DPs, and 80 
percent of CSOs/NGOs indicating that such mechanisms improved programme funding 
to a large extent. Again, government officials returned a score of 89.5 percent on 
funding mechanisms for the overall sector budget, thus indicating a very positive trend 
in terms of both financial and funding mechanisms, which are related. On the other 
hand, CSOs/NGOs showed a more positive bias towards funding mechanisms for the 
sector budget, with a 100 percent score.  
 
In general, all partners show a strong trend towards the perception that these two factors 
influenced funding to the sector. This finding indicates that a move towards a SWAp 
that supported a pooled funding mechanism (as was the case with the “embryonic” 
SWAp for the implementation of the PCAR programme) enhanced funding to the 
sector. However, this contention is only partially corroborated by the qualitative data, 
which acknowledges that, according to government officials, there was an improvement 
in funding to the PCAR programme in spite of some intrinsic inconsistency. Indeed, 
both the trend and the results of qualitative data analysis demonstrate that there were 
inconsistencies in funding that tended to affect sector programmes negatively.  
 
One reason for such negativity is that at the time of data collection, the JFA document 
had not yet been signed by those DPs who had indicated a willingness to contribute to 
the pool fund. There was uncertainty around JFA funding mechanisms at this time, as 
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some DPs wanted the government to meet the condition of a minimum government 
allocation to the primary education subsector before releasing funds to the pool. 
Another aspect of the JFA funding mechanism was that some DPs who were not part of 
the pool were concerned that the two categories of “pool fund DPs” and “non-pool fund 
DPs” might create unnecessary divisions within the DP group. An example of the 
attempt to address this division is the chair deciding to include all DPs in meetings 
originally intended for “pool fund DPs” only. 
 
The findings of the survey (see Appendix D) show that there was a perceived moderate 
shift in DP funding patterns, with a score of 52 percent for government officials, 56 
percent for DPs, and 40 percent for CSOs/NGOs – each indicating such a perception to 
a large extent. This finding is again consistent with „trend analysis‟, Table 7.1 and 
qualitative analysis data that show that DPs maintained their project approach for the 
lengthy period up to the initiation of the NESP.  
 
7.4 Funding vs. Other Aspects of the SWAp Partnership  
 
The survey (see Appendix 4) provides information on a number of other aspects that 
affected funding and partnership interaction in this education SWAp process. One 
prominent area of these data is the financial factor, which determines the amount of 
power, influence and participation a DP enjoyed in the partnership. Table 7.9 shows 
how the principal donor to the education sector exercised power.  
 
Table 7.9 Perceptions of the degree to which the principal donor to the education sector 
exercises power over the SWAp process 
 
Response Government Officials DPs CSOs/NGOs 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
To a large 
extent 
15 78.9% 11 68.8% 2 40.0% 
To some 
extent 
2 10.5% 3 18.8% 2 40.0% 
To no 
extent  
2 10.5% 2 12.5% 1 20.0% 
 
Source: The author‟s compilation from frequency tables generated by SPSS 
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The trend in respect of all groups of partners is that the principal donor exercised power 
in the education SWAp partnership to a large extent, although the CSO/NGO score is 
comparatively low (40 percent). Conversely, the government officials‟ score (78.9 
percent) is high, while that for the DPs (68.8 percent) represents the median score. 
While confirming the qualitative data discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 8, this finding also 
indicates a concern on the part of the two main stakeholders (the government and DPs) 
around the way power was exercised in that it had a negative effect on a partnership that 
was formed to work in close cooperation in the interests of enhancing sector 
performance. Given that the overall purpose of the SWAp was to enhance funding and 
improve general sector performance and aid effectiveness, this area requires addressing 
if the power around funding that adversely affects actors‟ performance is to be 
minimized. 
 
Survey data (see Appendix D) also reveal the extent to which the amount of funds 
donated to the sector by a DP influenced the manner in which it participated in the 
SWAp process. A sizeable proportion of DPs (87.5 percent) indicated that the amount 
of funds donated to the sector by any stakeholder influenced its participation in the 
education SWAp process to a large extent; the second highest score of 84.2 percent was 
that of the government officials; and the CSOs/NGOs were in broad agreement with a 
score of 60 per cent. This evidence accords with observations of the qualitative data 
whereby actors‟ perspectives clearly indicate that the amount of financial assistance to 
the government influenced the manner in which the donor participated in the SWAp 
process.  
 
Another dimension for which the survey provides data concerns efforts made in the 
SWAp partnership to accommodate priority areas identified by the government when 
funding the sector. All three groups of partners acknowledged that stakeholders 
considered priority areas identified by the government when funding the sector. The 
DPs and CSOs/NGOs scored highly (80 percent) in indicating that stakeholders in the 
SWAp process considered to a large extent priority areas identified by the government 
when funding the sector, and the government officials‟ equivalent score was only a little 
lower at 73.7 percent.  
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Qualitative data presented in Chapter 6 and 8 highlight the problems encountered when 
DPs attempted to influence the process in order to have their interests incorporated into 
SWAp documents. Therefore, it is not clear whether all priorities reflected in the NESP 
as the main SWAp document were those of the government alone.  However, evidence 
from qualitative data indicates that although an effort was made to accommodate 
government priorities in this SWAp process, other factors militated against their full 
incorporation.  
 
Evidence from the survey that is consistent with the trend analysis relates to the extent 
to which DPs‟ funding to the sector concentrated on their old projects and areas of 
interest (see Appendix D). Government officials (68.4 percent) indicated that this 
occurred to a large extent, while the equivalent DP score was 62.5 percent. However, 
the CSO/NGO score was 40 percent, with a majority of 60 percent indicating a more or 
less neutral position and thereby differing from the stance of both government and DPs.  
 
Therefore, it is evident that both government officials and DPs perceived funding to the 
sector from the latter to be concentrated on their old projects and areas of interests, 
although the percentage is not high, an aspect that indicates that attempts were probably 
being made to adjust to the requirements of the new SWAp modality. This evidence is 
also consistent with the qualitative data finding that DPs continued with the project 
approach throughout the PIF period up to the initiation of the NESP, the latter to some 
extent representing projects that DPs had been funding all along.  
 
This part has provided information that has revealed that there were additional aspects 
of the education SWAp partnership that affected the process in terms of participation 
and funding to the sector. These include the amount of money DPs donated to the 
government; DPs‟ ambition to have their priorities included in policy and planning 
documents; and the perpetuation of old projects and areas of interest regardless of the 
shift to a SWAp. All these factors have been found to impact negatively on the SWAp 
process in terms of its partnership living up to the conceptual understanding of the 
modality and the prescriptions of the Paris Declaration framework.  
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7.5 Conclusion   
 
Through the examination of qualitative data collected in a survey and quantitative data 
generated by means of a trend analysis of DP funding over seven years (i.e. from the 
initiation of the NESP), this chapter has shown that there were a number of factors in 
the Malawian education SWAp process that affected the way in which funding to the 
sector was influenced. Evidence has shown that partnership relations negatively affected 
education funding, thereby posing potential threats to both aid effectiveness and 
enhanced support to the sector. Both trend and qualitative data analyses identified 
inconsistencies in funding that affected sector programmes negatively. This practice led 
to a failure to meet the expectations of education partners whereby coherence of funding 
should have been maintained and aid delivery consistent if the government were to be 
afforded greater flexibility and control over the planning and implementation of sector 
programmes. 
 
This section has also found that the coordination of the education SWAp process 
affected funding to the sector. It has pointed out that such management was affected by 
issues linked to ownership and leadership, both of which demanded the requisite 
capacity. The chapter has provided evidence that financial mechanisms employed by 
DPs improved funding to the sector, attributing this to the pool fund created around the 
implementation of PCAR, in spite of the fact that DPs continued to operate in their old 
project mode and did not utilize government systems for disbursement. The failure by 
DPs to adopt government systems is an area that requires further investigation in the 
light of the findings of evaluation reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration 
(Wood et al., 2008). This section has also confirmed government optimism that a 
SWAp modality could improve funding to the sector.  
 
This chapter has also highlighted the finding that the amount of money DPs donated 
could negatively affect interaction in this SWAp process as it perpetrated skewed 
participation. Moreover, it has been shown that funding to the sector was perceived to 
concentrate on DPs‟ old projects and areas of interest. Generally, the findings presented 
in this chapter are consistent with those of the qualitative data, as provided in chapters 
5, 6 and 8. Finally, there is clear evidence that funding to the sector was affected by 
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several other factors. Therefore, a concerted effort to address these areas is called for if 
the realization of the anticipated enhanced funding to the sector is to be realized in 
accordance with the concept of a SWAp. 
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Chapter 8 
Power Relations 
 
8.0 Introduction  
     
According to Foucault (Denegri-Knott, 2004; Deacon, 2002), power relations are social 
relations; they operate through discourse and hence it may be assumed that they are 
likely to exist in a SWAp partnership. Therefore, an examination of such relations 
among actors in the Malawian education SWAp partnership was useful not only to 
understand how power was exercised in the process, but also to ascertain how these 
dynamics affected this partnership, particularly in terms of conflicts of resources and 
interests among the actors (Wright, 1996).  
 
Although power relations constitute a thread that runs through three chapters of this 
thesis (chapters five to seven), it is the present chapter that is dedicated to specifically 
investigating the various perceptions of power relations in the Malawian education 
SWAp partnership. The fact that actors constantly referred to aspects of power relations 
when considering other issues in the partnership indicates that this topic was of central 
concern to them and that they believed the distribution of power required redress.  
 
The first part of this chapter consists of eight sections: 
 
1. Money/Resources 
2. Expertise/Knowledge 
3. Agency Style or Modus Operandi 
4. Individual Personality 
5. Government/Agency Policy 
6. Historical Perspective – The Period of DP Involvement 
7. Degree of Participation – Commitment of Time and Human Resources 
8. Time Management in the Disbursement of Funds  
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These sections examine actors‟ perspectives on power relations in the education SWAp 
process, views that cover several identified themes according to which power was 
deployed. The last section draws some conclusions based on the preceding discussion of 
the eight sources of power, declaring the position of this thesis, which has been 
established from the various perceptions of the tangled web of power relations in the 
education SWAp partnership.     
  
8.1 Money/Resources 
 
As an aspect of international development cooperation, DPs provide aid in the form of 
money and resources to recipient governments; and, comparatively recently, changes to 
this convention have adopted new modalities that have witnessed a shift to the SWAp as 
one commonly used method of assisting developing countries (Forster, 1999). As a new 
aid modality, the SWAp is not only very much associated with aid effectiveness but also 
provides a way for donors to collaborate closely in supporting the meeting of 
international targets such as the MDGs (King and Rose, 2005). Consequently, when 
DPs in the education SWAp partnership under study donated money and resources to 
the Malawian government, this was viewed as one of their expected duties according to 
international aid relations.  
 
As was seen in both chapters five and six, actors consistently identified the role of DPs 
with the provision of the necessary financial support to meet MDGs and EFA targets. 
Actors broadly agreed that the money/resources DPs donated to the government 
constituted a contributory factor to power relations in the partnership, although 
dissenting views from some DPs on this issue were not unexpected due to their role as 
donors. Generally, the main concern was over the ways in which DPs who provided 
more money than others wielded power in the education SWAp partnership.  
 
Several DPs identified money/resources as a source of the power that was exercised in 
the partnership: „Power relations can be described at two levels of influence; big DPs 
who put more money in education want to have their voices heard more than others 
within the SWAp partnership‟ (DP1, Jan. 09). Similarly, „Partners with more resources 
have more say in the partnership; for example, when it comes to focusing on priority 
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areas, a partner with more resources influences more policy in that area‟ (DPM3, Jan. 
09). Emphasizing the point that those who gave more support seemed to enjoy „more 
say‟, another DP indicated that, „Partners who contribute more resources to the sector 
have tended to have more voice… Power relations exist because they reflect [the] size 
of contribution …‟ (DPM4, June 09). 
 
There was a similar perception from yet another DP: 
 
There are some development partners that contribute a big share to the 
education budget, either through bilateral contribution or multilateral, so for 
those development partners, they tend to want to exercise more power 
commensurate with the contribution that they are making to government 
(DPM5, May 09). 
 
The views of the majority of DPs further identified how power was deployed in the 
education SWAp in line with the money/resources that DPs provided, particularly those 
that provided more than others. One DP expressed the common assumption that 
donating more money was a licence to assume control: „I think we take it very positively 
that if you put in more money, we give you also the reference to see we are controlling 
as well. We cannot say simply you are putting in more money into it, then you are going 
to drive the boat to work, no‟ (DPM2, May 09).  
 
Another DP highlighted the influence that those DPs who donated money/resources 
exerted on SWAp policy decisions: 
  
When it comes to focusing on priority areas, a partner with more resources 
influences more policy in that area, for example, Agency DP4 and AgencyDPM5 
on youth and girls‟ education. [The] Ministry of Education would give more 
attention and prominence to a partner with more resources… My general 
comment is that everybody, and I as an individual, appreciate the SWAp 
process, but the problem emanates from being donor dependent. (DPM3, Jan. 
09).   
 
Conversely, another DP revealed an area of concern over the negative effects the issue 
of money/resources had on DPs who donated less: 
 
Of course, it has to some extent [a] negative impact in the sense that other 
smaller development partners feel that their contribution is not appreciated. And 
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also there are times when they think that their contribution is related to the 
amount of resources that they have contributed, and not maybe in the issues that 
they bring on board (DPM5, May 09). 
 
Elaborating further on the negative effects this had on the participation of actors, this 
DP said:  
 
There is a typical example where one donor – I will not mention the name – was 
so influential to the extent that other partners were absenting themselves from 
coordination meetings, because it was very apparent that that development 
partner was pushing their own agenda through the rest of the members, so that 
their agenda should be seen as something that has been agreed in a development 
partners‟ meeting (DPM5, May 09). 
 
Apart from revealing the manner in which participation was affected due to power 
relations, the above comment also suggests another way DPs could exercise power. 
Voicing a concern about the influence and power that those who donated more 
money/resources tended to have, one DP remarked: 
 
In the partnership, level of influence is noticed when one voices…an opinion. It 
is carried out, but I‟m not sure whether this is influenced by the personality or 
organization where one works, or power associated with resources – more 
resources equals more power – or their approach or way of doing things 
(DPM3, Jan. 09). 
 
These viewpoints – the example given by DP5M in particular – underline the negative 
effects such practices might have on other actors in the partnership, the assumption 
being that all actors would want to be treated and allowed to participate on equal terms. 
Comparatively, more views on money/resources as a source of power came from 
multilateral than bilateral DPs. This could be related to the desire to act according to 
political self-interest that tends to be prevalent among the latter (Minch, 2010) such that 
they might consequently be prone to attempting to wield more power than other DPs.  
 
From these observations, it is evident that the exercising of power in this partnership did 
not conform to the conventional expectations of actors in a SWAp set up. DPs who 
wielded more power seemed to make use of their money and resources to acquire a 
position of influence, a contention corroborated by Collins (1992, p.61): 
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The successful power wielder is not just pressing buttons; he or she is engaging 
in some quite complex social manipulation. Individuals who manage to be 
powerful and get their own way must do so by going along with the laws of 
social organisation, not by contradicting them.   
 
The evidence from DPs shows that power was not equally shared in this SWAp 
partnership. This could have constrained the government‟s leadership role in the 
process, particularly in determining national policy priorities and needs, which was 
contrary to the Paris Declaration framework under which these partners operated (King 
and Rose, 2005; Hyden, 2008). Traditional social organization dictates that the DPs 
with the most money have the most influence over policy and practice – a power 
experience expressed as „power over‟. However, the SWAp process is supposed to be 
more democratic and egalitarian – power expressed as „power with‟ (Hyden, 2008).  
 
According to the following remarks, the observations of government officials were 
consistent with those of the DPs discussed above in the way power was exercised based 
on the quantity of money/resources DPs donated to the government. The evidence 
presented below shows that the majority of government officials also acknowledged that 
the amount of money/resources tended to be proportional to the extent of an actor‟s 
“voice” and ability to wield power over others. Nevertheless, according to interviewees‟ 
accounts, paradoxically, it was the government that accorded DPs who donated more a 
greater say in influencing interactions, one official stating: 
 
The resource package makes them more powerful – the more money one partner 
has, the more areas of impact, and therefore the power balance comes in. Power 
balance comes in the sense that those who have more will also talk more and be 
listened to. Although in a SWAp, we would want to approach things from an 
equality point of view…in reality, that‟s what happens (GOE1, May 09).  
 
 Expressing a similar view, another government official stated, „I already alluded to the 
fact of power relations that those who pour in more money into the SWAp feel they have 
all the right to lead the SWAp and exercise more power than every other development 
partner (GOE3, May 09). Parallel views were expressed by another government official, 
who said „…the money level is a factor for a partner exercising more power over 
others‟ (GOE5, May 09); and a third, who stated, „Those who put in more resources are 
identified with power because they fully believe in their putting in money because you 
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show power by the money you put it… The money aspect [be]comes very prominent in 
power relations‟ (GOF1, May 09). 
 
One government official acknowledged two sources of power relations: „Some powers 
are coming from the legislation; others are coming as a result of ability to contribute 
financially… So, naturally, you would expect powerhouses to come from there (GOC1, 
May 09). 
 
Underscoring the weight of money/resources as a power factor that affected 
partnerships, a government official remarked, „Even if you talk of bilateral relations in 
government, one is more powerful than the other. What makes them more powerful is 
pertaining to resources‟ (GOC1, May 09). 
 
In view of the perspectives of government officials on power relations in this education 
SWAp partnership, which equated more money with more power, there seems to be 
compelling evidence of the significance of the role played by funding. A critical 
examination of these statements also suggests that although the government was seen to 
respond in accordance with the amount of money received from DPs by giving them a 
platform in interactions, and influence over policy and practice, the former did not seem 
to be entirely happy in surrendering its role of determining priorities and needs. The 
government complied in the interests of getting more money out of the DPs, but the 
question is at what cost was it prepared to continue with this state of affairs. In the 
meantime, the DPs seem to have had the power to make the government bow to their 
demands at will in order that it might get its funding.  
 
Such is the problem of aid dependency, with its consequent top-down approach that can 
negatively affect partnerships (Aerni, n.d.). Therefore, if the recipient country‟s 
expectations are to be met, all actors in the partnership must adhere to the concept of a 
SWAp, and give the government the opportunity to assume leadership and ownership. It 
also calls for discipline and substantial change in respect of modus operandi on the part 
of the DPs.  
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While the majority of government officials‟ comments focused on money/resources as a 
source of power, they also highlighted the effects that such power had on the 
engagement of actors in the partnership; particularly in terms of DPs that donated less 
money compared to others, as indicated by one official: 
 
There are some negative energies that are exerted in terms of power relations in 
the education SWAp process. If I am [were] a partner, I wouldn‟t want to be 
demeaned by a bigger partner to [than] the ministry. I would like to be treated 
as an equal because whatever I am doing forms part of the integral part of the 
whole… Donors chain [harness] a lot of negative energies towards each 
other…[but] we are working towards one thing (GOE3, May 09). 
  
The government official continued to comment on the effects of power relations on the 
participation of actors emphasizing skewed participation created due to money: 
 
In meetings, there are donors who shrink as an issue is being discussed or being 
tabled. Some donors don‟t say anything because they are afraid of a bigger 
donor… There are donors who want to really get areas where others are 
supporting, forgetting that no matter how small a contribution is, it still makes a 
change in the education system (GOE3, May 09).  
 
Again, this government official‟s viewpoint – which was shared by one DP – shows 
how, if left uncontrolled, power relations can have a negative effect on the participation 
of actors in a partnership. 
 
Contrary to the SWAp rationale, the perceptions of the majority of government officials 
in this study revealed that power relations obtained in the education SWAp partnership. 
In the main, these were manifested in the form of DP influence over the decision-
making process and tended to affect the implementation of programmes. Accordingly, 
as observed earlier, this SWAp process does not seem to have afforded the government 
the opportunity to determine its own national priorities or needs. Such a situation is in 
danger of jeopardizing the level of aid effectiveness that the Paris Declaration 
framework seeks to accomplish and could subsequently lead to the failure to achieve 
international targets, as cautioned by Colclough (2005).  
 
As is evident from the perceptions of government officials, money/resources constituted 
the main source of the power DPs tended to use to influence the policy process. 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the education policies and programmes realized in this 
SWAp process might not have truly reflected national priorities. This contention 
underscores the concerns of the government official highlighted in Chapter 6 who cited 
the example of the life skills programme and support for teacher training, both of which 
reflected DP priorities rather than those of the government.  
 
Contrary to the prescriptions of the Paris Declaration, empirical findings reveal that DPs 
tended to hold the power to influence priority areas based on their own interests. This 
poses a dilemma in policy-making in developing countries, in which tension seems to 
arise due to dialectical conflict between macro and micro policy, and macro and micro 
politics in the interaction between DPs and the recipient government. Equally, the 
perceptions of government officials provide evidence that the participation of many 
actors in this SWAp process was adversely affected.   
 
The observed pattern in the way government officials perceived issues in this 
partnership is consistent, their main area of interest being unswervingly around the 
funding of education programmes. In Chapter 5, it was noted that such concern meant 
that the government relied on international development aid to implement these 
programmes. Making such assistance critical to the implementation of government 
policy had a bearing not only on progress towards EFA and the MDGs, but also on the 
performance of individual directors in their respective departments. Incidentally, this 
could also provide some explanation of the behaviour of government officials in the 
education SWAp process who tended to be attracted to and moved by money, 
permitting DPs steal the show by influencing policy and practice.  
 
As indicated below, the perceptions of CSOs/NGOs were also generally in agreement 
with those of others actors, but with some slight variations. It is worthwhile noting here 
that CSOs are a critical partner in the development agenda, as outlined in the Paris 
Declaration framework and emphasized thus in the Accra Agenda for Action: 
 
We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors 
in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the 
private sector. We share an interest in ensuring that SCO contributions to 
development reach their full potential (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, pp.18–
19). 
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In view of this observation, the participation of CSOs in this SWAp process should have 
been crucial.  
 
The perceptions of civil society also identified the amount of money/resources a DP 
donated as a major force that affected interactions amongst actors through the 
manifestation of power relations in the SWAp partnership. One CSO member 
commented, „The major reason for a stakeholder to exercise more power is the level of 
financing to projects‟ (CS1, June 09). Another expressed a similar view: „…some [feel 
that] because they…are the ones putting in a lot of money…[they] should take greater 
control of the resources‟ (CS3, May 09). There was yet another comparable viewpoint 
from a CSO member who said, „…Issues of resources…would influence one partner to 
exercise more power than others‟ (CS2, May 09).  
 
While emphasizing money/resources as a source of power, one CSO member went a 
step further to apportion it: 
 
First of all, power is with the development partners who have the money and the 
monetary institutions. Secondly, at local level, power is with the Ministry of 
Finance; they have the money wallet, they are the people who determine the 
ceilings (CS2, May 09). 
 
As with the earlier perceptions of DPs and government officials, based on evidence 
from civil society, power had its foundations in money and resources, a circumstance 
that allowed DPs who donated more money to behave differently from others and 
exercise control in the SWAp process. This contributed to an environment of unequal 
participation that made it difficult for civil society to fulfil its role and responsibilities in 
the SWAp partnership as articulated in the Paris Declaration framework, and reinforced 
in the Accra Agenda for Action. Again, when examined from a government perspective, 
the manner in which power operated in this SWAp process tended to constrain civil 
society in its ability to shape and play a global governance role (Sending and Neumann, 
2006) on account of its skewed participation. 
 
Actors in all three main categories pointed out that the money/resources DPs donated to 
the government tended to create an imbalance of power in the education SWAp 
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partnership, with some DPs wielding more power than others, influencing policy and 
practice, and creating unequal participation. All these factors contributed to 
undermining the role of civil society as a watchdog in the process. 
 
8.2 Expertise/Knowledge 
 
Aside from money and resources, expertise/knowledge is another area that is generally 
believed to be a contribution of DPs in international aid relations. DPs are associated 
with expertise/knowledge and therefore perceived to be better informed than recipient 
governments – although, by implication, this perception would seem to automatically 
place government officials participating in a SWAp process at a lower level than DPs in 
terms of expertise/knowledge.  
 
Some DPs‟ highlighted expertise/knowledge as source of power relations in this 
education SWAp partnership, one of their number stating that, „A combination of size of 
resource contribution and expertise make some exercise more power over others‟ 
(DPM4, June 09). Another DP shared a similar view: „…Because of the resources and 
the expertise they are able to mobilize, [DPs] have had a lot more say in the process‟ 
(DPM1, June 09). 
 
In commenting on this issue, one DP argued that participation could be realized through 
expertise/knowledge without one necessarily contributing more in terms of financial 
input:  
 
…you have to provide the technical expertise, and that means you have to be 
very eloquent and clear on what you are presenting, showing that you 
understand the issues. If you don‟t, then your participation will naturally be 
downgraded… So, there is a lot of emphasis within the development partners to 
recruit sector specialists who know the ideals and can effectively participate‟ 
(DPM2, May 09). 
 
This view provides evidence of the significant role expertise/knowledge plays in a 
SWAp process. As seen in Chapter 6, the technical proficiency DPs brought to this 
education SWAp partnership was acknowledged by several actors when describing the 
role of the former in the process. Therefore, it could be argued that the greater the 
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expertise/knowledge, the higher the participation level. However, the perception of 
expertise/knowledge whereby DPs are regarded as being more knowledgeable than 
others poses a question about the degree of participation of both the government and 
civil society. This situation is further compounded by the expectation that a SWAp is a 
process that seeks to develop the capacity of the recipient government – how much 
capacity development can be achieved by a process in which participation is 
constrained?  
 
Government officials also cited expertise/knowledge as another factor in power 
relations in the SWAp partnership that could have adverse effects if applied wrongly. 
Underlining the implications for programme implementation that the power of 
expertise/knowledge could have, one government official explained: 
 
[A crucial factor is] the amount of knowledge and expertise…they bring into a 
particular programme. … Agency DPM1 would do some research perhaps 
elsewhere. …they draw their evidence, and they will come to you and say, „We 
have tried this and that, and this is now the agenda. If you want to move forward 
with your programmes, yes, we have money, but if you want to get this money we 
recommend that you also look at this particular programme.‟ A case in point is 
the current School Health and Nutrition Programme (GOE2, May 09). 
 
GOE2 described in some detail the unfortunate outcome of this intervention, which 
seems to have been imposed on the Ministry of Education due to the power over its 
programmes that the DP exercised with disregard to government opinion:  
 
When we were discussing under ESSP
8
 1, some of us felt strongly that the best 
placed people to implement the School Health and Nutrition Programme were 
our colleagues in the Ministry of Health. Like the issue of deworming, the 
treatment of malaria, bilharzia, we strongly believe that our colleagues in the 
Ministry of Health are best placed to deliver that aspect of School Health and 
Nutrition. But then, Agency DP1M would say, „No, you ought to do this…‟ We 
are implementing; we have problems and we really don‟t know what would 
happen in future to that programme (GOE2, May 09).  
 
This example serves as a caution about the unwarranted influence human capital theory 
can inflict on an education policy agenda and its programmes in the name of neo-liberal 
economic policy (Rose, 2003; Samoff, 2004).   
                                                 
8
 Education Sector Support Project. 
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Another government official also linked expertise to power relations: „… some powers 
are coming from…an ability to contribute…expertise‟ (GOC1, May 09). 
 
CSO members also provided their perspectives on this issue, likewise identifying 
expertise/knowledge as another source of power; one of their number remarking, „The 
major reason for a stakeholder to exercise more power is…and also the political clout 
they have and information/expertise‟ (CS1, May 09).  
 
Another CSO member discussed power relations in terms of policy-making for the 
SWAp process:  
 
The real power is with those who are initiating ideas. So, when we meet as civil 
society, development partners and the government…[the] government and 
development partners still have the power  (CS2, May 09). 
 
These perspectives provide evidence that expertise/knowledge was a factor in the power 
relations experienced in this SWAp. The views of all actors also reveal that DPs tended 
to wield power derived from their expertise/knowledge in order to influence 
programmes; and, in some cases, this source of power seemed to affect programmes 
negatively.  
 
The notion that expertise/knowledge is a resource that lies with and is brought to the 
development agenda predominantly by DPs therefore requires revisiting. Before 
utilizing expertise/knowledge, there is a need to consider seriously the context-specific 
basis on which programmes are built and implemented; and no one should ignore the 
fact that what works in one country might not necessarily work in another.  
 
In a SWAp partnership that presupposes an element of capacity development for the 
recipient government, the assumption that DPs are more knowledgeable puts 
government officials at a disadvantage in terms of participation in the SWAp process. 
Indeed, this study found that those with more expertise/knowledge had a greater chance 
to participate more influentially in the partnership.  
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One possible factor that could have militated against the building of government 
capacity in this SWAp process was its failure to accord government officials the 
opportunity to participate effectively. What is evident is that money/resources and 
expertise/knowledge as sources of power tended to be exploited by DPs in order to help 
themselves gain control over the entire process, including the decision-making process 
and policy dialogue.  
 
Although some views of civil society indicated that the government could realize power 
through the fostering of ideas, the evidence shows that government officials‟ opinions 
were unlikely to be considered as DPs tended to have the final say. The example cited 
by one government official of the programme that was imposed on the ministry in spite 
of its resistance serves as evidence to this effect.  
 
8.3 Agency Style or Modus Operandi 
 
It is broadly understood that any organization exists for a particular purpose; therefore, 
it is this purpose that guides the organization‟s operations, including the approach it 
adopts. In terms of a SWAp, with the government, various aid agencies, and CSOs 
working together, some actors might be primarily motivated by their modus operandi to 
behave in a certain way. Accordingly, another dimension DPs identified with power 
relations was agency style or modus operandi. DPs revealed this as a factor that tended 
to cause some individuals to assume that they deserved a bigger share than others in the 
SWAp partnership simply on account of the power and attitude of the organizations 
they represented: 
 
There are DPs who are powerful; I think they are just powerful maybe because 
of the organizational set-up. I gave an example of Agency DPM1; it‟s not a 
personality issue, it‟s just the way the organization is… So, even if you may want 
to choose another partner to work on a project that is funded by Agency DPM1, 
you don‟t succeed going [in getting] away from the Agency DPM1… [Some 
activities] will still be feasible, like in the monitoring of [the] implementation of 
FTI…  You can still see consistency in the organizations and the way employees 
or representatives behave (DP2, June 10).  
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While acknowledging the challenges of leading DPs in the education SWAp 
partnership, DP3 indicated that an element of agency modus operandi clearly lay behind 
the fact that representatives of certain organizations demonstrated their power by 
acquiring more roles than others: 
 
It is not good being in this position and you get pushed where others are trying 
to exercise more power… Like, we had a problem a few weeks ago trying to 
allocate or nominate people to various technical working groups…  And 
suddenly, we saw Agency DP2 was trying to get to be co-chair of as many 
groups… I suspected that if that would happen, they were just going to assign 
some of their consultants to sit in technical working groups; but that is not 
acceptable (DP3, Oct. 10). 
 
Thus, agency modus operandi empowered individuals working for that organization to 
behave in a particular way in order to fulfil its goals. While such an attitude should be 
differentiated from that of individual organization members, the evidence of this study 
suggests that elements of individual personality might thrive on agency style.   
 
A CSO member also pointed to an aspect of agency style as a factor in power relations: 
„…the issue of the structure, the configuration, would influence one partner to exercise 
more power than others‟ (CS2, May 09).  
 
Another CSO member also cited agency modus operandi as the origin of the tendency 
for some DPs to acquire a high level of influence in interactions amongst actors in the 
partnership: 
  
Some of them [DPs] feel or see themselves as too big… I don‟t want to mention 
institutions here, but…my observation is that there are some donor agencies that 
really feel that they should be in the driver‟s seat. Maybe now the ministry is 
taking control, but sometimes they even reach the point of controlling the 
agenda (CS3, May 09). 
 
Another CSO member had a slightly different take in emphasizing the extent to which 
power exerted by multilateral financial institutions that focused on economic 
development generally could affect funding to specific programmes: 
 
Power is with the Agency DPM1 and the Agency DPM6. That is why, 
irrespective of what we say about few teachers, few classrooms, Agency DPM1 
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will determine how much should be given to the Ministry of Education (CS2, 
May 09).   
 
The above views on modus operandi provide evidence that DPs tended to wield power 
not only in the interests of driving the SWAp agenda, but also of assuming control over 
programme decision making. This in turn suggests a disparity between the principles 
and practice of a SWAp partnership, a notion that Buchert (2002) identifies as a major 
concern about the new aid modality. However, in the context of a neo-liberal 
international agenda, recipient governments are likely to continue to be pressurized by 
multilateral organizations and the World Bank in particular; as was the experience of 
Malawi in the 1980s in its obligation to raise primary school fees (Rose, 2003). 
 
Compared with those from multilateral organizations, the perceptions of power relations 
of individuals with bilateral aid agencies seem to have focused more on power exerted 
from the perspective of modus operandi than that of money and resources donated to the 
government. As alluded to earlier, this bias could have been founded on the political 
self-interest they normally pursued. Furthermore, the power resulting from agency 
modus operandi – which has an inclination towards multilateral aid agencies – could 
pose a challenge to bilateral DPs.  
 
8.4 Individual Personality   
 
A process such as the Malawian education SWAp partnership presupposes the 
involvement of various people from different backgrounds interacting in the interests of 
a common goal. As has been suggested earlier, the aspect of individual personality is 
likely to surface in these interactions, especially given individual differences and the 
fact that no two human beings behave in quite the same way. Thus, actors highlighted 
individual personality and the manner in which the exercise of power affected others as 
a source of power relations in the education SWAp partnership.  
 
One DP expressed the opinion that, views on the agency‟s style in relation to 
personality notwithstanding, individual qualities based on evidence remained important 
in the SWAp partnership. The DP provided an example of how things changed after a 
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new person had joined one DP: „…but now Zeena [pseudonym] came in, and despite 
Zeena‟s young age, Zeena is a very nice, interesting person to work with, who has 
managed to make…Agency DPM1 a credible partner and not a bulldozer, as we 
saw…with Agency DPM1 in the past in many countries‟ (DP3, Oct. 10).  
 
While some DPs linked personality to their organizations, other perceptions on 
personality revealed details of the way individual actors interacted with others in the 
education SWAp partnership.  
 
Government officials acknowledged that whilst the exercising of power over others was 
directly related to the amount donated, the manifestation of power itself was linked to 
the individual personalities of those representing DP organizations:  
 
The money level is a factor for a partner exercising more power over others, but 
I have also noted that personalities in these issues also matter. We have seen 
people come and go and the way they deal with issues has not been constant 
[consistent] (GOE5, May 09).  
 
A similar view from another government official also associated power with personality 
in addition to other factors, in indicating that it could „…either be a question of 
personalities amongst the partners and also…it is dependent upon personalities‟ 
(GOE2, May 09). 
 
These views were corroborated by a CSO member who stated, Some [DPs] are just 
egocentric, if I am to use that word, they just want to feel to be in power (CS3, May 09). 
 
It may be observed from these perspectives that individual personality was a factor that 
tended to influence the flow of power from DPs in this SWAp partnership regardless of 
whether their actions were reinforced by other sources of power or not. Indeed, 
individual personality seemed to play a bigger role compared to the other sources of 
power because of its ability to thrive on them. In order to gain a better understanding of 
this phenomenon, it would be of interest to investigate the individuals wielding more 
power than others, that is, those displaying individual personality traits, where they 
come from, and what agencies they represent.  
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8.5 Government/Agency Policy  
 
Minch (2010) notes a difference between aid provided by bilateral donors and aid 
provided by multilateral donors, which in the case of the present study underpins the 
reason why government/agency policy might be a power factor in an aid partnership 
such as the Malawian education SWAp process. Only one DP representative highlighted 
government/agency policy as a dimension of the power relations experienced in this 
partnership. This was with regard to the stance held by some DPs on the improvement 
of education in Malawi, which stemmed from their own governments‟ policies. In 
pursuing such policies, DPs had a tendency to exercise power over others in the attempt 
to achieve their goals, one of their number stating: 
 
Personalities come and go, but we still see that there are certain positions that 
various development partners have about how they can improve education in 
Malawi. And those positions are held very strongly to the extent that they don‟t 
want to move from their positions; but these positions are a manifestation of the 
policies of their governments that is translated into the power that is played 
[out] within the development partners (DPM5, May 09). 
 
Government officials also argued that government/agency policy had a role, one of 
them asserting that it could „…be a question of personalities…and also the agenda from 
the host government‟ (GOE2, May 09). Another said: „I have a feeling that power 
relations exist because of hidden agendas, interests and the political motives that could 
be attached to the assistance that we receive, so you find that in terms of consultancy, 
there are a lot of rules and regulations attached to that‟ (GOE6, May 09). This 
government official went on to explain that DPs tended to insist on recruiting technical 
advisors from countries that provided aid disregarding the availability of expertise in the 
recipient state, concluding that, „it looks like if you accept that assistance, it becomes 
the easy way of getting the funding‟ (GOE6, May 09). 
 
Another government official underlined the problem of programme implementation that 
tended to be constantly affected by DP decisions based on their home government 
policies: 
 
We know as government that partners have pressures from their country offices 
and sometimes, this is evident in the way they play their cards. If a partner is 
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having pressure from their country office, they will make sure that they will 
sound that alarm to us in such a way that they will misdirect us. Instead of us 
focusing on our priorities, they will be directing us in a way that we should 
spend their money, that it should be seen [to be] working (GOE3, May 09).   
 
Government officials thus drew attention to an area of concern whereby ministry 
programmes tended to be driven by the preferences and policies of DP governments. It 
is evident that DPs had the upper hand in decision making in this partnership, leaving 
both the government and civil society powerless. This seems to reverse the normal 
societal convention that being in a position of power, the government should be held 
accountable for its policy decisions. Yet, the government only showed signs of 
weakness by succumbing to such influence just to get the funding – which is contrary to 
the rationale of a SWAp and the expectations of the Paris Declaration framework 
(Buchert, 2002; Brown et al., 2001; Hamblin, 2006; Hyden, 2008).  
 
However, the manner in which power operated in this education SWAp partnership 
tends to reflect the observation made by Samoff (2004) on the difficulty of achieving 
country-led development due to the aid dependency of the recipient government. Yet, he 
also cautions against placing importance on recipient government leadership and 
interests at the expense of the interests of DPs in a SWAp. The latter contention could 
be problematic not only with regard to the prescriptions of the Paris Declaration 
framework, but also in terms of how a SWAp should formulate its policies and 
strategies.  
 
A CSO member revealed the tendency for programmes to be affected by DP decisions: 
„Probably…[it] can be a limiting factor to say that the development partners are 
coming here with already designed programmes and we have to fit in there, but I think 
that is the style of the game‟ (CS2, May 2009). 
 
Whilst the views of CSO members on power relations as they affected funding to the 
education sector covered various areas of concern, in the course of showing 
appreciation for the new modality of the SWAp, one of them was also quick to identify 
the maintenance of donor conditionality to aid in line with their government/agency 
policies: 
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Power relations can either strengthen or weaken some processes of [the] SWAp, 
for instance, the specific conditions attached to their aid, which make it difficult 
for government to freely utilize the resources. For example, the MGDS Review 
for 2007 noted that some donors were still insisting on using their own financial 
and reporting systems (CS1, June 09). 
 
Another related area that this CSO member highlighted in connection with the 2007 
MGDS Review concerned decisions made on funding subsectors: „Some donors 
oversubscribed to a particular subsector at the expense of others; areas such as early 
childhood development, adult literacy, [and] science and technology have been 
underfunded because of such oversubscription‟ (CS1, June 09).  
 
A similar view from another CSO member focused on funding to the higher education 
subsector: 
 
In [the] recent past, they…always emphasized on primary – primary and 
secondary – and therefore, not much goes to [the] higher education subsector. 
So, you still see that managers of the higher education subsector have a big 
problem in managing this sector, which is not given enough resources (CS3, 
May 09).   
 
Another CSO member voiced a similar opinion in respect of subsector programmes: 
 
Decisions can either strengthen or weaken the partnerships and sector 
performance. Another example is that although the SWAp NESP recognizes 
ECD
9
 [and] adult education as components of education, the decision to have 
these implemented outside [the] MoE without [a] proper financing mechanism 
is making it difficult for such subsectors to get funding (CS1, June 09). 
 
These perceptions support the notion that civil society was restricted in its efficacy, 
regarding itself to be virtually powerless owing to an inability to change the condition 
of this SWAp, as confirmed by the Malawi Education Country Status Report (2009), 
which stated that both early childhood development and adult education continued to 
attract very low funding.  
 
A close look at the above views reveals that they are inconsistent with a watchdog role, 
which was to highlight gaps in or the unequal distribution of funds to subsectors. This 
                                                 
9
 Early childhood development. 
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could serve as a caution that perhaps it is necessary to seriously reconsider the 
participation of civil society, not only with regard to its critical role in the SWAp 
partnership, but also in the interests of aid effectiveness, as stipulated in the Paris 
Declaration framework.  
 
There was only one multilateral DP in this SWAp partnership, which nevertheless cited 
government/agency policy as a factor in power relations. On the other hand, no views 
could be obtained from the bilateral DPs, the majority of comments being from civil 
society. This could be attributed to the observation made earlier that it is bilateral 
agencies that tend to foster and adhere to their own government/agency policies in their 
operations. However, it is evident that there was a power imbalance that tended to 
favour DPs and their priorities over the government, which, again, contravened SWAp 
conventions and the Paris Declaration framework.   
 
8.6 Historical Perspective – The Period of DP Involvement 
 
In the international aid arena, there are both bilateral and multilateral agencies and 
conventional practice dictates that bilateral agencies provide assistance to former 
colonies due to existing ties between the two countries, which they normally implement 
on a large scale. Accordingly, as a former British colony, Malawi continues to receive 
aid from the UK. It is therefore not surprising that one DP in the present study cited 
these historical ties and the lengthy period it had been involved in Malawi as another 
source of power that a DP could exercise in the education SWAp process. This assertion 
was made based on the belief held by some DPs that lengthy historical and political ties 
with the Government of Malawi earned them the right to guide the development 
process: 
 
Others – because of the history – others are partners that have been in Malawi 
for a long time. They have been supporting [the] government education sector 
right from independence, so they feel justified that they need to take a leading 
role because they have seen the education process evolving in Malawi and 
would like to take quite a strong position in terms of how they would want it to 
go (DPM5, May 09). 
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A similar perception from a government official explicitly linked power to the political 
relations that emanated from the historical, colonial affiliation between the Government 
of Malawi and the British government: 
 
I think we should be realistic here. History speaks; Malawi was a colony of the 
British and because it was a colony of the British, even the Canadians, 
Americans and others, they will still feel the British have got an upper hand 
because of the political power relation… Even now, over history, Britain is still 
the largest donor to the education sector. They exercise more power over others 
(GOE1, May 09). 
 
Another government official, who attempted to offer a solution to the power imbalance 
in the SWAp partnership, also cited the historical dimension as a factor: 
 
One of the guiding principles to the partnership has to do with checking that 
power relations are not negatively affecting the partnerships; and also some of 
these may be historical. Other partners might say we have been assisting this 
country since it became independent (GOE2, May 09).   
 
The evidence thus shows that DPs made use of historical ties in order to exercise power 
over others in this SWAp partnership. These perceptions could be associated with the 
main arguments of dependency theory, which addresses underlying relations between 
Western countries and developing countries (the so-called centre–periphery dynamics), 
and the failure of developing countries to gain total independence as a result of their 
economic difficulties (Easterly, 2009); hence the problematic power relations due to 
dependency, as cautioned by Samoff (2004).  
 
8.7 Degree of Participation – Commitment of Time and Human 
Resources  
 
In the traditional project approach, the government was never expected to contribute 
funds towards the implementation of projects initially funded by DPs. Consequently, the 
DPs had overall control in decision making around projects. However, the dynamics are 
different in a SWAp process in which the partners are supposed to operate on an equal 
footing – in a more democratic way. Accordingly, the government is called upon to 
demonstrate more accountability and responsibility in a SWAp.  
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However, the evidence under analysis in this section shows that in terms of programme 
servicing, the government tended to continue operating according to the old approach 
and did not allocate a budget for initiatives that DPs were funding. On the other hand, 
the financial constraints it faced could have contributed to its failure to commit funds to 
such programmes.  
 
Government officials identified state failure to allocate funds to certain programmes as a 
contributory factor in the DP policy of limiting government participation in the 
decision-making process, and an aspect of power relations in the SWAp partnership. 
The non-recognition of government contribution in the form of human resources or time 
devoted to programme implementation further compounded the government‟s sense of 
disgruntlement. As a result, it seems that government participation in the SWAp process 
was compromised by underrepresentation when the partnership made decisions on 
programme issues.  
 
Moreover, government officials also provided evidence of inconsistency in DP decision 
making on programme funding, one of their number citing the example of how the 
implementation of the PCAR programme was affected by this exercise of power: 
 
One of the biggest challenges we have had as a ministry has been…the Primary 
Curriculum Assessment and Review… It has been like a tug of war where one is 
put this side and the other side [is] trying to push you, and say[ing], „This is the 
way you should be moving.‟ But simultaneously, one would also understand that 
you cannot simply be talking without you committing yourself in one way or 
another, whether by funding or whatever (GOE4, May 09). 
 
Another official commented on the same issue, elaborating on the need for the 
government to allocate funds to programmes in order to maintain control over them: 
 
…otherwise, you have to live by the saying which says, „Put your money where 
your mouth is.‟ What I have noted in the past in terms of programming, the 
ministry has tended not to put the money where its mouth is. It has tended to say 
that [this] programme is currently being supported by development partner a, b 
and c; therefore, we will put our money in a different programme… The best 
way to go…about implementing particular programmes…[is to] also show our 
commitment by putting in some resources…some partners will say, „What is 
your contribution?‟ The government contributes a lot through its human 
resources… (GOE2, May 09). 
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Commenting on the degree of participation as a power factor, another government 
official stated: 
 
From PIF to NESP, the partners are saying, „We want government 
contribution,‟ but it is an issue of equal status. So, they say that if you want us to 
give you a 100 million [US$], you should tell us what you are going to provide; 
forgetting that government already has resources that are provided in that 
particular subsector. So, what is coming up now is that government is being 
forced to cost the office accommodation, human resources, vehicles, the time 
(GOE1, May 09).  
 
Sharing related views on the government contribution that tended to go unnoticed by 
DPs, another official said, „Whilst our partners can say, „This year, we will give you 
US$11,000,‟ we have already a lot on the ground; we have human resources on the 
ground; we have already erected infrastructure on the ground‟ (GOE3, May 09). 
 
From the foregoing statements, it is evident that the degree of government participation 
tended to be adversely affected by its failure to commit funds to some programmes, 
meaning that decisions seemed to be made unilaterally by DPs. This was a growing 
issue in this SWAp partnership, which increasingly involved DPs asking for 
government contribution to programmes implemented with their support. Yet clearly, 
the government did not have as much money as the DPs; therefore, even with the 
modest amount the former might be able to commit, the question of whether this would 
represent a balancing of power in the SWAp partnership remains highly doubtful. 
 
However, another dimension this evidence brings to light is the non-recognition of 
human resources and infrastructure that the government had already committed to 
programmes. This demonstrates the prevailing belief that money was the major 
recognized resource in this SWAp partnership. In response to this attitude, the 
government started costing and translating human resources, hours of labour, and 
infrastructure into monetary value in order that its contribution might attain credibility 
in the eyes of the DPs.  
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8.8 Time Management in the Disbursement of Funds   
 
Timely implementation of education programmes can be crucial, particularly where 
they include components such as teacher training and procurement of education supplies 
that have to be aligned to the school calendar. The majority of government officials 
identified time management in the allocation of funds to programmes by DPs as another 
area of power relations that tended to emphasize the government‟s dependency on its 
donors. The views of government officials on this aspect of the process reflected how 
education programmes were affected by tight DP control over funding. In this case, 
power tended to be used in the form of decision making on the volume and timing of the 
release of funds, including when original programme funding agreements with the 
government were to be adjusted or terminated. Lamenting the situation, one official 
gave two examples:   
 
Sometimes, we have situations, for example, at the beginning of the year, 
partners are stringent with their funds, but at the end of the year they are lavish 
and say we have so much to spend: „How can you spend this money so that it 
doesn‟t go back to our capital?‟ But we didn‟t plan for that; what we planned 
for, we did it in a manner that was not planned because they were stringent with 
their money. But at the end, they realized they kept so much with them…and we 
have already done things in a manner that we did not want to do (GOE1, May 
09). 
 
Another way, they come midway and say that our programme is ending on such 
dates, so can you make sure you programme yourself towards this. And when we 
reach the end, previously they said, „When we reach here, we will have another 
programme,‟ but once you reach the end, they tell you that this programme is 
pending, so we will not fund you for five months. And when you ask why you are 
not funding us for five months, they say that we do not have resources to bridge 
the gap… But yet, you are supposed to start the next phase immediately; and this 
is a challenge to the ministry because the programmes are continuous. While 
you are trying to sort that, they come back and say, „We have given you the 
bridging resources, but we have shifted the next programme to such a date.‟ So 
you become a draft organization; you are not what you want to be and this is a 
negative part about the partnership (GOE1, May 09). 
 
Another government official speculated on the timing of funding and the implications 
this had for programme implementation: 
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There are development partners who seem not to care much, but to respond to 
their home governments… The area that a particular donor is supporting, you 
suddenly find that the flow of aid stops and yet the project or programme is 
yielding good results. They exist, such development partners, so we shouldn‟t 
hide this from anybody. There are certain development partners who 
seem…stubborn and would want to do it their own way (GOE5, May 09).  
 
Another government official also expressed concern about funding and the time factor: 
 
The differences in what I would call the strengths of the partners can have some 
negative impact. For example, we have been unable to benefit from certain 
financial resources which had a conditionality of a JFA
10
 [] as a prerequisite for 
accessing those funds…. You have some of the heavy weights still saying, „We 
are still consulting;‟ contacting their…[home] governments on issues like the 
joint financing arrangement and also other issues pertaining to this…. So the 
end result is you don‟t get as much as you would have, and that affects 
programme implementation (GOE2, May 09). 
   
The commonly held view on the power of DPs to revise their financial commitments to 
programmes at will was also shared by another government official, who revealed the 
burden of unfulfilled financial pledges that the Ministry of Finance had to shoulder in 
attempting to procure alternative means of funding: 
 
This does impact negatively on the sector because there are some partners who 
want to religiously follow the principles of [the] SWAp…so they may not release 
much money. …At the end of the day, it becomes a problem on the part of the 
Ministry of Finance on financing those particular problems (GOF1, May 09). 
  
As has been established, the timing of education programmes must be tied to the school 
calendar if they are to be effective. However, according to the findings of this study, 
centrally, DPs tended to work to different timescales from those originally agreed upon 
with the government, which accentuated the government‟s dependency on them. 
Moreover, any inconsistency in funding could have adverse effects on programme 
outcomes. Government officials emphasized concerns around the unpredictability of the 
receipt of funds, a situation that led to the failure to accord the government control over 
budget implementation. Therefore, again, the manner in which such power was 
exercised in this partnership shows that it was not in keeping with the accepted notion 
of a SWAp or the Paris Declaration framework (Hyden, 2008).  
                                                 
10
 Joint financing arrangement. 
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8.9 Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has systematically examined power relations in the education SWAp 
partnership. It has revealed that DPs held power, the source of which emanated from the 
eight identified ways in which they were able to control the process and dominate a 
partnership highly susceptible to power relations, thus revealing a wide range of factors 
that affected the partnership negatively. 
 
From the perspectives of all actors, it is evident that money and resources constituted 
the main source of power relations in this SWAp process. Accordingly, DPs that 
donated more money to the government created an imbalance of power and influenced 
the interactions of other actors, which adversely affected the decision-making process, 
including policy design and implementation. Not only was the participation of 
government officials affected but also that of DPs that donated less money. The 
engagement of this group was constrained and their status diminished as the situation 
tended to create some sense of inferiority and frustration. Finally, the participation of 
civil society was also restricted, thereby affecting its ability to fulfil its function as 
stipulated in the Paris Declaration and reiterated in the Accra Agenda for Action.  
 
Evidence from all actors has shown that expertise and knowledge represented another 
element of power relations and played a significant role in this SWAp partnership. 
Through their expertise and knowledge, DPs were able to impose and influence the 
implementation of programmes without due regard for their relevance or effectiveness. 
This kind of power was also linked to level of participation – the more 
expertise/knowledge an actor had, the greater the engagement in this SWAp process. 
Since expertise/knowledge was associated with DPs and the ability to participate 
effectively in the SWAp process, the engagement of government officials in this very 
important development agenda was constrained, and, consequently, the capacity that the 
state was intended to develop through the SWAp process was curtailed.  
 
Another aspect of DP expertise was that it tended to be taken for granted, hence the 
government overreliance on DP proficiency. This was observed to perpetuate the 
dominance of DPs over the education development agenda as – on the understanding 
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that they had the necessary knowledge/expertise – their decisions were implemented 
even when the government attempted to point out what it thought needed to be done. 
Again, knowledge/expertise as practiced in this SWAp reflected the influence of neo-
liberal economic policies propagated through human capital theory in the provision of 
international development aid to education (Rose, 2003; Samoff, 2004), in which the 
World Bank manifested itself as a source of knowledge.  
 
Actors also provided evidence that DPs controlled the SWAp agenda and decisions on 
education programme implementation through agency modus operandi as a source of 
power. This phenomenon was associated more with multilateral aid agencies than 
bilateral ones. Although individual personality as a source of power did not feature 
highly, it was noted that this could affect the image of the individual as well as that of 
the organization he or she represented. It has been noted that this source of power 
thrives on other factors such as the provision of money and resources, and agency 
modus operandi.  
 
It has been found that government/agency policy as a source of power relations created 
conflicts of interest in policies and priorities in the SWAp process, which led to 
decisions being made in favour of DPs; the conditionality of aid was found to be 
associated with this source of power too. DPs also wielded power due to historical 
involvement. The period of DP engagement as another source of power is based on the 
assumption that they were sufficiently knowledgeable about sector issues to make 
informed decisions due to many years of experience supporting the country. This is 
associated with the economic dependence on Western nations of Malawi and other 
developing countries (Easterly, 2009; Samoff, 2004) that hinders them when they 
attempt to make independent decisions on issues of national importance. This practice is 
seen to contradict the principles of the SWAp and the Paris Declaration, as DPs 
continue to interfere in the determination of recipient government priorities, a strategy 
that could adversely affect aid effectiveness.  
 
Government officials identified the degree of participation, and commitment of human 
resources and time as a source of power experienced in this SWAp process that 
restricted them in education programme decision making. DPs exercised control over 
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policy for those programmes to which they donated money based on their interests and 
withheld funds at will, which had a negative effect on the quality of implementation.  
 
Evidence has also shown that DPs challenged the government to demonstrate greater 
accountability for the SWAp by allocating funds to various programmes supported by 
the former. However, given its limited resources, it is questionable whether the 
government will ever be able to operate on an equal footing with its DPs. Another 
dimension to this source of power was that government contribution through human 
resources and time devoted to the implementation of programmes was undermined due 
to DP non-recognition. However, the fact that the government resorted to costing and 
translating all human resources, hours of labour, and infrastructure into monetary value 
can only be viewed as a futile act of desperation. 
 
Time management in the disbursement of funds has been found to be a unique source of 
the power DPs wielded in this SWAp process and one that also affected education 
policy negatively, DPs exercising tight control over programme funding, which led to 
inconsistency in the release of the money. The study found that DPs worked to different 
timescales to those originally agreed upon with the government, which accentuated state 
dependency on the DPs, left the government doubly indebted when funds did not arrive 
as expected, and meant that it had no choice but to beg for money from elsewhere. Such 
inconsistencies had a negative effect on programme outcomes, highlighting concerns 
around the unpredictability of funding, and which did not allow the government the 
control and flexibility that a SWAp was intended to provide.  
 
Thus, in general, education policies and programmes implemented in this SWAp 
process, according to evidence in this Chapter, did not truly reflect national priorities 
because DPs manipulated the partnership through eight sources of power in order that 
their own priorities should be met. Evidence has demonstrated that DPs had the upper 
hand in decision making, rendering both government and civil society impotent. Indeed, 
the government‟s tendency to succumb to the influence of its DPs purely to obtain 
funding reveals not only considerable desperation due to overdependence, but also the 
extent of its powerlessness.  
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Therefore, the conduct of DPs in this partnership was also contrary to the rationale of a 
SWAp and the partnership prescriptions of the Paris Declaration (Buchert, 2002; Brown 
et al., 2001; Hamblin, 2006; Hyden, 2008). Such a situation warrants serious 
contemplation of the whole notion of a SWAp and the goals that the Paris Declaration 
framework strives to achieve, especially in light of Samoff‟s (2004) caution against 
placing greater importance on recipient government leadership and interests at the 
expense of DP interests in a SWAp. This poses key questions on whether the shift from 
the project approach to a SWAp modality has been genuine or merely a different way of 
doing things while DPs still maintain a strong grip on the aid agenda. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion: A Tangled Web of Power Relations  
 
9.0 Introduction    
  
The narratives in chapters 5, 6 and 8 reveal how interactions in this education SWAp 
partnership were dominated by unequal power relations, demonstrating that each group 
of actors was in some way caught up in the discourse. For example, the DPs were busy 
trying to pursue the interests of their own governments. Malawian government officials 
were also implicated in the discourse in part owing to the fact that they represented the 
state, but as career politicians, more importantly because the securing of funding would 
reveal them as significant players. At a higher national political level, obtaining sectoral 
funding was also noted as a sign of dynamism.  
 
At the international level, as evidenced by the impetus for the Paris Declaration and the 
Accra Agenda for Action, proponents were also caught up in the mainstream discourse. 
They were perceived to operate on behalf of developing countries, but remained part of 
the discourse on good governance and therefore did not necessarily represent the 
interests of recipient governments. Therefore, although the SWAp put the recipient 
government in the driving seat, it remained uncomfortable due to the multitude of 
backseat drivers. Finally, the road on which the recipient government travelled was 
constructed by the international community that had initiated the SWAp and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.    
 
The first section of this chapter provides a contextual analysis of power from an 
international development aid perspective, addressing the implications for actors in the 
SWAp under study. The second section examines the policy dialogue in the education 
SWAp partnership, and how it was affected by micro politics and the macro-policy 
environment. The third section discusses how power operated in this partnership. The 
fourth section presents a conceptual framework developed based on the theories of 
power examined in Chapter 3.3 and the experiences of Malawi in order to utilize in the 
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analysis and explanation of the implications of power for the education SWAp process. 
Lastly, the final section draws some conclusions based on the key arguments.  
 
9.1 Power Shift – A Failed Attempt at International Development  
 
Chapter 5 argued that the emergence of the Malawian education SWAp partnership was 
directly linked to international aid and its targets, and internal reform processes such as 
the PIF, PCAR and NESP; initiatives that were all implemented under the influence of 
global trends requiring developing countries to adopt the SWAp as a new aid modality 
to replace the project approach. As noted in Chapter 3, the latter was a mechanism 
employed by donors for delivering aid to post-independence developing countries in 
which they had economic interests or potential markets (Minch, 2010). Donors had the 
power to decide which projects were put into operation and how they were managed, 
which included setting up project implementation units from which they had full control 
of the execution and funding of their interventions (Foster, 2007).  
 
As indicated by actors interviewed for this study, in the Malawian context, the process 
of adjustment to the demands of the global community tied aid to targets such as 
poverty reduction, EFA and the MDGs. This led to the creation of a partnership that 
brought together the government, DPs and CSOs/NGOs to collaborate on the 
formulation of an education SWAp document – thus, the NESP came into being.  
 
This reveals that it was an act of power at the highest international community level (at 
which fundamental decisions are made in respect of aid to developing countries) that 
dictated this change of modality from the project approach to the SWAp. Aid recipient 
governments – including that of Malawi – had no choice but to comply by introducing 
appropriate reforms that aligned them to such a modality, as highlighted by participants 
in the present study. In this case, there was no resistance to change, actors indicating 
that they viewed the education SWAp partnership as a positive strategy for achieving 
enhanced funding to the sector, as pointed out in chapters 2 and 5. 
 
Government officials were particularly enthusiastic about the education partnership as a 
significant innovation in the delivery of international aid that reinforced the SWAp and 
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such an alliance model as more utilitarian and egalitarian, as prescribed in the Paris 
Declaration of 2005, which was set to become a definitive pronouncement in the history 
of international development assistance. Indeed, the Paris Declaration framework is 
characterized by a major paradigm shift that affects not only the way international aid 
business is transacted, but also the roles and responsibilities of each group of aid actors 
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005; Hyden, 2008). The effects of this 
innovation are evident in the Malawian education SWAp.  
 
Thus, the SWAp became a power mechanism that brought together DPs, government 
officials and civil society (each group with its distinct roles and responsibilities) as 
expounded in the Paris Declaration framework. Such a mechanism was vital as it 
dictated the nature of relations between these actors. Therefore, a change in aid 
modality threatened to undo the power of those who wielded it. Consequently, the shift 
from project approach to SWAp was characterized as a change in the mechanism that 
seemed to threaten the power of actors – that of DPs in particular – in the aid 
relationship whereby there was a clear shift from donors to the recipient government 
taking the lead in the development agenda (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
2005).  
 
As discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 8, there was an ongoing power struggle between 
actors in the education SWAp partnership as they attempted to adjust to the 
requirements of democratic collaboration. The government was expected to take the 
lead and assume ownership over the development of policies and strategies as well as 
the coordination of the development process. However, although in principle, DPs fully 
subscribed to the SWAp modality and Paris Declaration framework, they were seen to 
continue operating according to the project approach and clinging to a sense of 
supremacy by wielding the eight sources of power identified by actors. These naturally 
placed DPs in a position of advantage over other actors and therefore influenced 
conduct that was contrary to the expectations of a SWAp and Paris Declaration 
partnership model.  
 
According to actors, this major change threatened the power donors had over the way 
aid was delivered and utilized in the project approach. DP resistance was thus reflected 
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through efforts to perpetuate the old modality beyond the initiation of the SWAp on the 
pretext that given a lack of trust in government accountability and systems, it was a safe 
mechanism for delivering funds. However, in many ways, this change seems to have 
affected all groups of actors when it came to education SWAp partnership relations. The 
prescribed partnership model removed the power of DPs, for example, in taking the lead 
over policy priorities and programmes, and placed it with the government. This is one 
reason why government officials seemed to be positive about the SWAp from a 
conceptual point of view but became more frustrated when the reality on the ground did 
not allow them to assume their expected leadership role.  
 
The new partnership model also empowered civil society to play a critical role in this 
education SWAp process in ensuring the implementation of policies that would benefit 
people on the ground (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). However, this study found that 
although acknowledged by all actors as having been accorded the role of watchdog, 
civil society was severely constrained in its ability to carry out such a function due to 
the power dynamics that obtained in this SWAp process. In spite of the requirement that 
all partners should operate as equals while playing distinct prescribed roles in the 
interests of achieving a common goal (Eyben, 2008; Hyden, 2008; Paris Declaration for 
Aid Effectiveness, 2005), this did not seem to be the case, as pointed out by various 
actors. Chapter 8 highlighted the power relations that emanated from eight identified 
sources, that is, money/resources; expertise/knowledge; agency/modus operandi; 
individual personality; DP government/agency policy; period of historical DP 
involvement; degree of participation/commitment of human resources; and time 
management in the disbursement of funds. Such a paradigm tended to accord a few DPs 
– those who donated the most money in particular – more power, influence and control 
over others in this SWAp partnership. This situation underscores the issue of power as it 
relates to international aid relations in general, a point that is highlighted by Shutt 
(2009) in her study of Cambodian NGOs and their international funders.  
 
Actors also provided evidence that innovations implemented with the aim of meeting 
the expectations of the new modality were slow in being realized. This reveals many 
challenges due to a conflict of interests that was fuelled by power relations generated by 
those DPs who donated the most money, in terms of policies and priorities at the micro 
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level of the SWAp process where implementation of international aid innovations and 
declarations were supposed to be practised. Therefore, it is vital to address the question 
of whether there can be meaningful adjustment to the concept of a SWAp if DPs 
continue to exercise power based on the amount of money they donate, given the extent 
of Malawi‟s aid dependency – which represents a commonality with many other 
developing countries. The resultant inquiry must then be how to design a SWAp that is 
capable of more effectively reducing the power asymmetry experienced in this process.  
 
9.2 Policy Discourse in the Education SWAp – Who Determines Policy 
Priorities? 
 
9.2.1 Macro Level  
 
Policy at country level cannot be completely divorced from global perspectives, for 
example, the developments in international aid that ushered in the Paris Declaration. 
This view was clearly articulated by actors discussed in Chapter 5 who stated that the 
government had to strive to achieve international targets. This study also found that 
actors interviewed concurred in that at the global level, all the international social 
progress from the end of World War Two – the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the 
MDGs, EFA and the FTI (Colclough, 2005) – that led to the coupling of neo-liberal 
economic policies with a new aid modality influenced policy at country/macro level. It 
is therefore not surprising to note that in Malawi, all key policy and development 
planning documents (PIF, NESP and MGDS) have embraced and reflected these aspects 
(Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2001; Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology, 2008; Ministry of Economic Development, 2006). As pointed out in 
the preceding section, it was at global level that decisions were taken to switch from the 
project approach to a SWAp, and it is global level prescriptions that determine who 
qualifies for aid and for what purposes it is intended.  
 
Analysis of the emergence of the SWAp in Chapter 5 traced the modality to trends in 
international development assistance, and the corresponding linkage to targets such as 
the MDGs and EFA. Consequently, the education SWAp was adopted in Malawi as a 
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direct response to global level decisions, with several DP governments agreeing to 
provide aid to the country through a SWAp modality in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration determined at the same level to which they were signatories. 
 
Another macro-level aspect – not explicitly highlighted in chapters 5, 6 and 8, but 
which was still reflected in the influence of one multilateral agency on education 
programmes – that was discussed in Chapter 3 is the effect neo-liberal economic theory 
has on the formulation of education policy and practice. Under the “New Policy 
Agenda”, neo-liberalism, the market and private enterprise are given prominence as 
efficient strategies for the provision of services and the achievement of economic 
growth (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Accordingly, neo-liberal economics has embraced 
human capital as being just as important as physical capital to economic growth, with 
the World Bank assuming a major role in promoting and influencing this agenda 
(Rutkowski, 2007; Rose, 2003).  
 
The participation of civil society in the SWAp is recommended in the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). As pointed out by 
CSO members, a shift in emphasis to governance precipitated the participation of civil 
society in this SWAp. It was considered the preferred actor as being better placed to 
facilitate the effective provision of services to communities and the implementation of 
the neo-liberal economic policies DPs promoted than was the state (Hulme and 
Edwards, 1997). Thus, CSO members in the present study referred to their role as 
ensuring that the interests of the community were represented through their participation 
in the education SWAp.  
 
Nevertheless, the participation of civil society in this SWAp tended to be constrained by 
power relations emanating from macro-level influences, as DPs seemed to exercise 
power over the partnership in order that their governments‟ priorities should be reflected 
in SWAp programmes. Although civil society was empowered at a global level to play a 
significant watchdog role in the development agenda, due to these power dynamics, it 
seemed unable to fulfil this function. For example, it could not act to address the issues 
reflected in Section 8.5. In this instance, there seems to have been a breakdown in terms 
of the expectation that civil society should raise sufficient concern to correct an aid 
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donation anomaly that it failed to meet. Indeed, there was an observed spirit of 
helplessness amongst CSO members with regard to an inability to perform their role due 
to lack of effective communication with DPs and government officials. Yet, better 
relations might have more effectively facilitated their watchdog function: „Those of us 
from civil society are invited to contribute to the process, but we haven‟t yet reached the 
level where we can go there and turn tables upside down on the programme – no way‟ 
(CS2, May 09). This study found that the role of civil society in the SWAp process was 
generally suppressed and thus it could not provide the appropriate checks and balances.     
 
At a broader level, another feature to the policy discourse is the nature and background 
of the people involved in the policy-making process: Who are these DPs? Whose 
policies and interests do they represent? What knowledge do they bring to the policy 
discourse? All these questions imply a power dimension that is reflected in the SWAp. 
As has been observed, policy dialogue and practice are influenced by a group of actors 
trying to promote certain global ideologies who are assumed to promote the neo-liberal 
agenda (Rutkowski, 2007).  
 
This aspect was manifested by both bilateral and multilateral DPs, who tended to 
perpetuate such practice in the policy discourse of this education SWAp, as highlighted 
in chapters 5, 6 and 8. These DPs acted as conduits of power that flowed through the 
partnership and facilitated the incorporation of their governments and agencies‟ policy 
priorities in SWAp documents. The urgency with which they wished to fulfil this role 
was evident in the way DPs conducted themselves, as exemplified in Section 8.5.  
 
A good deal of the power relations experienced in this SWAp partnership resulted from 
the conflict of interests between DPs and the government where policy and priorities 
were concerned. This raised some doubts as to whether DP agencies and/or their 
governments fully subscribed to the requirements of international development aid 
demanded by a SWAp modality.  
 
At a national level, as part of the global agenda, recipient governments are required to 
formulate relevant policies that reflect their efforts to fulfil the global agenda such as 
EFA and the MDGs. In order to achieve effective utilization of aid, recipient 
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governments have been accorded responsibility by the Paris Declaration framework to 
set their own priorities so that aid addresses real issues on the ground in registering 
progress towards achievement of international targets.  
 
However, as pointed out earlier, the major challenge to the government under study was 
that it could not effectively articulate its national priorities in the policy process without 
being overtaken by DP influence. Heavy dependency on international aid hindered the 
realization of that: „When it comes to focusing on priority areas, a partner with more 
resources influences more policy in that area‟ (DPM3, Jan. 09). This study found that 
power in the SWAp partnership was wielded by DPs‟ control over the decision-making 
process and, consequently, the accommodation of their policy priorities. Accordingly, 
based on the evidence discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 8, it may be concluded that 
government priorities had not yet been fully reflected in policy or strategy documents. 
 
9.2.2 Micro Level 
 
As observed in Chapter 8, interaction at the micro level seems to have been adversely 
affected by a wide array of factors that revealed a conflict between principles and 
practice; how the SWAp was conceived at global level and the reality on the ground 
where it was put into practice at the grassroots level. The distinct roles ascribed to DPs, 
such as providing aid and technical expertise to the government, tended to create a clear 
division between who was important in the policy-making process and those who were 
not.  
 
Several issues around funding as a source of power (see Chapter 8.1) – as well as other 
sources of power – arose in the discourse that influenced this education SWAp at micro 
level. The government‟s position seems to have been compromised by those DPs who 
tended to compete with the government to get their policy interests and priorities 
reflected in the NESP. This created tension in the interactions and an imbalance in the 
participation of actors. This also appears to have introduced notions of superiority and 
inferiority amongst those DPs who donated more money and those who donated less 
respectively.  
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Such a situation ran contrary to the principles of the SWAp partnership whereby all 
partners were supposed to be equal. Yet, this study found that each actor endeavoured to 
protect his or her own country or agency interests, and that those with the strongest 
economic muscle prevailed over others. Thus, neo-liberal economic policies tended to 
take priority over those of the Government of Malawi. It is at this level that the macro-
political and policy environment met with the micro-political environment. 
 
The emphasis in the SWAp partnership, as defined in the Paris Declaration and 
reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action, is on government leadership and ownership 
in determining sector priorities. Therefore, the SWAp is viewed as a dramatic reform, 
exemplified in the partnership model, from one that reflects “power over” – as evinced 
by unequal utilitarian experience and charisma – to “power with” – as manifested in a 
democratic model such as the SWAp partnership in which everyone is intended to act as 
an equal (Hyden, 2008; Eyben, 2008). Consequently, evidence on the practice of this 
SWAp process raises doubts as to whether the original power holders really wanted 
change to occur in the prescribed way or whether they expected it to be different.  
 
Incidentally, if such an innovative modality fails to achieve aid effectiveness, there is a 
danger that the original power holders (the DPs) might openly put the blame for any 
failure on the recipient country and revert to their old ways of implementing assistance, 
as observed by Easterly (2007). Indeed, as observed in the present study, the shift to the 
SWAp, which was meant to realize a more effective aid modality, seems to have 
generated some strong waves amongst the principal actors in the policy discourse, a 
development that could have a negative impact and leave the aspiration of aid 
effectiveness difficult to achieve. 
 
9.3 Conceptual Framework – The Exercise of Power in the SWAp    
 
Based on the theories and approaches to power on one hand, and narratives on power 
relations (as discussed in Chapter 8) on the other, this section presents a model of power 
as it was conceived and exercised in the Malawian education SWAp partnership. A 
conceptual framework developed for this purpose is thus utilized to explain the exercise 
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and implications of power, as drawn from practical examples of this partnership 
process. 
 
 
  
211 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Conceptual Framework 
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9.4 The Flow of Power  
 
According to actors in this SWAp partnership, power was perceived in possessive terms 
based on eight identified sources of power that DPs held and used to and get the 
government to comply with what they wanted. These eight sources of power were 
money/resources; expertise/knowledge; agency style/modus operandi; individual 
personality; DP government/agency policy; period of historical DP involvement; degree 
of participation/commitment of human resources; and management of time for 
disbursement of funds. Money was identified as being the most dominant. Chapter 8 
enumerated how each was perceived as a source of power that DPs wielded in this 
partnership. In such a conception, the eight sources of power combined to form a 
mechanism that DPs used to get the government, and/or other DPs and civil society to 
accept what they wanted done, as reflected in the conceptual framework (Figure 9.1). 
Therefore, this subsection builds on this model to elaborate the conception and exercise 
of power in this partnership, and explore its implications for this SWAp process and the 
education sector as a whole. 
 
Although this basic conception of power in possessive terms does not strictly agree with 
Foucault (1991) – who avoids viewing power primarily as an entity to be possessed by 
any particular individual or group – the principle of its transmission is not completely in 
contradiction with the Foucauldian analysis of the flow of power from all points 
(Denegri-Knott, 2004; Foucault, 1991). What DPs in the present study had at their 
disposal through the eight sources of power that they could call upon whenever 
appropriate could be interpreted further as an ability when viewed from Lukes‟ 
expanded concept of power as a capacity to be held and used whenever necessary 
(Lukes, 2006).  
 
9.4.1 Determining Programmes and Programme Strategies vs. 
Expertise/Knowledge 
 
Chapter 8 discussed how DPs were perceived to wield power in order to achieve their 
objectives in this SWAp process. For example, the expertise/knowledge that DPs were 
expected to provide as part of their role in the partnership constituted one of the sources 
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of power they wielded to persuade the government to accept and implement the School 
Health and Nutrition Programme. In this particular case, the DP initially used such 
power to get its way by pointing out that the programme had been successful elsewhere. 
The DP later backed this up with money/resources as another source of power in order 
to sway the government‟s decision to accept the programme.  
 
Thus, a combination of two mechanisms (M1 and M3 in the conceptual framework in 
Figure 9.1) was used to get the government‟s acceptance. Although the government 
seemed to have its own views and preferences in respect of this programme, they were 
superseded by those of the DP when the financial element was brought into play. The 
DP made it plain to the government that the money would be readily available if it 
agreed to implement the programme according to the preferences of the donor. 
Motivated by money, government officials thus allowed the DP to influence the 
decision-making process that led to the implementation of the programme according to 
the donor‟s prescription.  
 
As demonstrated in the conceptual framework, government views on this programme 
were suppressed, which in turn precluded the articulation of grievances and shaped its 
perceptions into acceptance due to its attraction to funding. Therefore, the government‟s 
interests were excluded, which precipitated an “observable conflict” according of 
Lukes‟ (2006) three-dimensional view of power (first dimension). The DP used both 
expertise/knowledge and money as mechanisms to gain control over the policy dialogue 
and persuade government officials to comply with its wishes, as exemplified by the 
following quotation:  
 
Agency DPM1 would do some research, perhaps elsewhere, whether within sub-
Saharan Africa, or Asia or wherever. They draw their evidence and they will 
come to you and say, „We have tried this and that, and this is now the agenda… 
If you want to move forward with your programmes, yes, we have money, but if 
you want to get this money we recommend that you also look at this particular 
programme.‟ A case in point is the current School Health and Nutrition 
Programme (GOE2, May 09). 
 
The study found that the programme had encountered some difficulties in effective 
implementation due to a lack of expertise in the field of health on the part of the 
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Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. When one takes into consideration the 
roles and responsibilities of actors in a SWAp, the two sources of power utilized in this 
case represent the main obligations of DPs in such a modality; therefore, they should 
not have been used to block government views. Yet, programmes and implementation 
strategies seem to have been imposed on the government, thus reflecting DP policy 
interests and priorities rather than responding to local circumstances on the ground. It is 
therefore questionable whether the implementation of this programme could contribute 
towards aid effectiveness and the achievement of international targets.  
 
9.4.2 Policies that Reflect DP Priorities – the Ills of Financial Power 
 
DPs also exercised their financial power in other instances. The study found that DPs 
used financial mechanism M1 to persuade the government to cancel a two-year pre-
service training programme for primary school teachers in favour of a one-year in-
service programme so that they could use the funds saved for the rehabilitation of 
teacher training colleges. The government in turn expressed its views, revealing 
dissatisfaction with such a DP policy. In this case, the government seems to have 
reached an internal consensus and expressed its views on the teacher training 
programme, but DPs used M6 to continue to exclude government views and 
preferences.  
 
Therefore, according to the conceptual framework, the prevention of the formation of 
grievances or possibility of withdrawal did not apply because even though such 
protestation was expressed and maintained, there was ultimate acquiescence because the 
desire to get money into the sector proved to be stronger than any objections to the 
practicability of the programme. This situation does not exactly represent latent conflict, 
M5, as there was an overt clash between the two different policy preferences (Lukes, 
2006) and the government made its opposing views clear, although they were excluded 
in the final decision and the DPs preference prevailed, as noted in the following 
quotation:    
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In some cases where government would have liked to have a teacher training 
programme which would run for two years, donors would say, „no, run a 
training programme for one year, and we will put the rest of the money towards 
rehabilitation of TTCs [teacher training colleges],‟ instead of training our 
teachers.  So, in terms of priorities, we wanted more teachers and not more 
structures in teacher training colleges; that is not what we wanted (GOE3, May 
09). 
 
Another example of DPs exercising power in the partnership to set sector priorities 
instead of allowing the government to do so can be seen in the following example, 
whereby life skills education was added to the primary curriculum as a non-examinable 
subject against the express wishes of the government, which again bowed to the DPs‟ 
will in order to get money into the sector: 
 
In terms of what to include in the curriculum, you see that they would push a lot 
on life skills education and then, at the same time, they would dictate [that] this 
shouldn‟t be examined. Our context is different; [if] you don‟t examine a 
subject, that subject is not given any weight at all. But because it is a donor 
dictating, our priorities took second place (GOE3, May 09).   
 
 
Again, there was an open conflict of interests between the DPs and the government: 
based on the evidence, the government‟s views were spelt out but excluded when the 
final decision was made. According to interviewed government officials, the 
unfortunate reality was that although important, the subject was not receiving due 
attention from either teachers or students because it was not examinable, and the risk of 
students failing to acquire the intended life skills was consequently high.  
 
In the above two cases, the government seems to have been dissatisfied with the 
decision-making process, having expressed its views, which in both instances were 
excluded. Thus, money was a major factor that tended to dictate government acceptance 
of DP domination in decision making.  
 
Evidence from this study shows that DPs had the greater say in the SWAp partnership; 
controlled the direction of interaction and allocation of resources; influenced the policy 
dialogue and agenda; dominated the decision-making process; influenced programmes; 
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and tied the release of funds to government acceptance of their choice of programmes. It 
was found that DPs were able to achieve this largely because of the hard cash they 
brought to the SWAp process. Such exercise of power through two sources 
(money/resources and expertise/knowledge) seems to have led to the implementation of 
programmes that did not reflect government priorities but those of the DPs.  
 
This may be interpreted as having weakened the government‟s decision-making 
position in this SWAp partnership, which contradicted the Paris Declaration framework 
in its promotion of the consideration of recipient government priorities if aid were to be 
effective. It is evident from the present study that programmes imposed on the 
Government of Malawi did not respond to local needs. Indeed, the whole notion of DPs 
having technical expertise to bring to the government seems to have been exaggerated 
and taken for granted, as is evident in the examples of programmes that, from the 
government‟s point of view, did not seem to address the needs of the sector.     
 
From evidence on the way power was conceived and wielded in this education SWAp, 
it is clear that there were other cases in which DPs utilized their agency style or modus 
operandi as a source of power (M1). Accordingly, DPs seem to have exercised power 
that placed them in a prominent position that was widely recognized, for example, the 
DP as a knowledge bank. Evidence shows that this allowed DPs to assume a monitoring 
role in the implementation of FTI funds as indicated in 8.3. 
 
Thus, DPs with certain agencies accorded themselves power due to their agency style or 
modus operandi, which was associated with expertise/knowledge in the conduct of their 
business and seems to have made them more powerful than others. DPs from one 
agency had power over actors from other agencies that expressed interest in monitoring 
the implementation of the FTI. Evidence indicates that the first DP manipulated the 
situation to its advantage to exclude its rivals from the competition and gained the 
position.  
 
Actors in the present study confirmed that that agency style or modus operandi (M1) 
was used by DPs to wield power over policy and programme priorities in the education 
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sector. Actors also argued that this source of power tended to favour DP interests over 
those of the government. Based on the conceptual framework, according to Lukes‟ 
(2006) three-dimensional view of power, such manoeuvring represents latent conflict 
(M5). 
 
9.4.3 Skewed Participation and Unequal Status  
 
The study found that power exercised in this partnership adversely affected the 
participation and status of actors, and that some DPs seem to have used their financial 
muscle to acquire positions of influence (M1). The following example reveals the 
control over the decision-making process exerted by one DP, which frustrated other 
actors due to the consequent skewed participation and seems to have kept some DPs 
away from SWAp coordination meetings because they found the overbearing influence 
of the DP in question intolerable as indicated in 8.1. 
   
Thus, participation in this SWAp partnership seems to have been affected by an 
imbalance of power created by one DP who donated more money to the government 
than others did. The influence of a single person over the decision-making process 
frustrated other DPs whose views seem to have been excluded from final decisions. The 
study found that these actors protested against such domination by not attending 
meetings and consequently failing to express their views.  
 
However, in a similar situation, there was a different reaction by another group of DPs, 
who seem to have resorted to withdrawal from meetings for fear of a dominant DP.  
 
In both cases, DPs exercised power by wielding financial muscle as a mechanism (M1 
in the conceptual framework) to persuade the government to acquiesce to their polices, a 
ploy that also affected other DPs. This may not necessarily be conceived as latent 
conflict, since these actors seemed to avoid making decisions to which they were 
adverse; thus utilizing the strategy of non-decision making as means of blocking 
alternative views or values (M4) due to the domination of one actor in the SWAp 
process (Lukes, 2006).  
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Another situation emphasized the unequal status of DPs due to the exercise of the power 
of funding, which made those who donated less feel that their contribution was not 
appreciated: 
   
There are some negative energies that are exerted in terms of power relations in 
the education SWAp process. If I am a partner, I wouldn‟t want to be demeaned 
by a bigger partner to the ministry. I would like to be treated as an equal 
because whatever I am doing forms part of the integral part of the whole 
(GOE3, May 09). 
 
As indicated by the evidence provided above, the exercise of power by DPs who used 
money as a mechanism (M1in the conceptual framework) seems to have created a sense 
of superiority amongst those who donated more money and one of inferiority with 
regard to those who gave less. This in turn also seems to have affected the participation 
of others in the decision-making process, and constrained the formation of opinions  and 
grievances (M5) in terms of those who gave less, a situation that was expressed as latent 
conflict. In short, DPs who donated the most money seem to have acquired more say in 
the SWAp partnership; controlled interactions between the actors in it; and dominated 
policy to the extent that engagement was skewed.  
 
Interviewees also contended that agency style or modus operandi as a source of power 
in this partnership tended to confer a sense of superiority. Some DPs seem to have 
influenced the policy dialogue, and allowed their political interests to determine how aid 
was disbursed and programmes or subsectors funded – behaving to some extent as if 
they were both principals and agents when such conduct is analyzed from a principal–
agent theory perspective. The principal-agent theory deals with a relationship or a 
contract between two parties that come together in order to achieve a common 
endeavour or goal. What becomes critical in a principal-agent problem is how to deal 
with the asymmetric information between the agent and the principal and its subsequent 
dilemma of getting the agent to behave in the way the principal wants where the agent 
has an informational advantage over the principal, and yet may have different interests 
from the principal (Takahashi, 2007). The DPs in question tended not only to assume 
ownership of the process through which they donated money, but also controlled and 
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managed it in terms of access to knowledge and the setting of agendas on programme 
implementation; thus, behaving as if they had all the information necessary to put 
interventions into practice (Vaubel et al., 2005). 
 
In addition to the various ways in which power can be realized based on the conceptual 
framework, there are multiple permutations that represent different reactions to power 
relations that do not necessarily fit into this framework. One example of such exercise 
of power is where DPs challenged the government to commit funds to programmes that 
were initially supported by donors, a mechanism that could also constrain local 
participation.  
 
The study found that DPs exploited their degree of participation, and commitment of 
human resources and time as a source of power (M1). This was identified as a different 
type of power as it tended to directly address how the government might attain 
legitimacy and control over sector programmes – in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration framework – by participating effectively or on an equal basis with DPs, 
which should have been achieved through the allocation and commitment of financial, 
human and time resources. However, the government‟s position in terms of decision 
making on the implementation of, for example, the PCAR was highly compromised by 
its failure to commit funds to the programme. According to evidence, this seems to have 
occurred through the exclusion of government views on the manner in which the PCAR 
was implemented, which confirms that financial aid played a key role in influencing the 
participation of actors in this partnership.  
 
While DPs challenged the government to commit funds to programmes, they did not 
necessarily recognize these contributions through the provision of material assistance 
such as the physical infrastructure, human resources and staff time involved in 
programme implementation. Such a phenomenon seems to have forced the government 
to transfer these elements into monetary cost.  Thus, although this DP exercise of power 
triggered a reflexive action from the government, it also challenged the latter to begin 
allocating funds.  
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Interestingly, just as it was found that DPs donating the most money had the most 
influence, evidence also shows that greater equality in the allocation of money to 
programmes led to enhanced participation. This further underscores the role money 
played in SWAp power relations. However, financial power could also continue to limit 
government participation, given the financial resources that the country had and was 
able to make available to its development programmes when compared to those of the 
DPs. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the imbalance of power in this partnership is 
bound to be experienced for a long time yet unless donors address the issue of power 
relations that comes along with their money. 
 
Another source of the power DPs wielded in this partnership involved time management 
in the disbursement of funds to programmes (M1). The study found that the exercise of 
such power seems to have resulted in DPs withholding funds, which had implications 
for the timely implementation of programmes as well as its quality. As opposed to 
situations in which power was exercised through financial aid, in this case, power was 
wielded by failing to allocate funding that had been agreed for programme 
implementation:  
 
Sometimes, we have situations, for example, at the beginning of the year, 
partners are stringent with their funds, but at the end of the year, they are lavish 
and say, „We have so much to spend – how can you spend this money so that it 
doesn‟t go back to our capital?‟ But, we didn‟t plan for that; what we planned 
for, we did it in a manner that was not planned because they were stringent with 
their money. But at [in] the end they realized they kept so much with them… And 
we have already done things in a manner that we did not want to do (GOE1, 
May 09). 
 
In relation to the exercise of power by withholding or failing to deploy funds as planned 
(M1), the study found that this seems to have compromised the quality of programme 
implementation, which had repercussions for the outcome. Evidence provided by actors 
indicates that the DP who agreed to fund teacher training did not keep its promise and 
withheld the money. This programme thus seems to have been highly compromised due 
to the consequent shortfall in the budget. The funding decision does not seem to have 
taken into account the importance of adequate teacher training to the learning process 
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and the resultant negative outcomes for students. The following quotation details what 
happened to the implementation of the PCAR: 
 
A very good example of a big let-down by the donors is the PCAR experience.  
When we [had] conceptualized it and developed it, and finally took it to the 
classroom for implementation, the plans were that after every two weeks since it 
is a new curriculum, teachers would be exposed to continuous professional 
development [CPD] at zonal level. And at [the] planning stage, the donor 
committed that they are going to support CPD through and through until we roll 
out all the eight classes. But to our shock, the very first class we introduced it to, 
in Standard 1, we trained teachers for four weeks; after those four weeks money 
stopped coming for CPD.  That was a big let-down, yet teachers were exposed to 
a new outcome-based curriculum. They had orientation for just three days; an 
orientation that [was] supposed to take five full days took only three days and, 
in some cases, only two and a half days, and they called it three days.  You know 
what, that compromised a lot in terms of content, pedagogy, principles and 
values (GOE3, May 09). 
 
In another programme, the government and its DPs planned to implement an early 
childhood development (ECD) initiative for five-year-old children as a primary 
reception facility that was known as P Class (P for preparatory) in order to introduce 
them to school routine. However, the government failed to implement P Class in spite 
of having developed a curriculum because the DPs seemingly exercised power by not 
releasing the agreed funds. As a compromise, part of the P Class curriculum was taken 
and compressed in order to have it taught in the first term of Standard 1 of primary 
education. In the event, a whole term of the Standard 1 curriculum was consumed to 
pave the way for an Early Childhood Development component that was originally 
planned to take a year. One government official commented: 
 
It was a new phenomenon; therefore, the donor felt that it was better to start 
with Standard 1 rather than the P Class. Donors were not sure of our capacity… 
I wouldn‟t [couldn‟t] pinpoint [it] – the ministry did not want to take the risk 
when implementing, and the other issue was resources (GOE1, May 09). 
 
The exercise of power whereby DPs withheld agreed funds for the implementation of 
programmes tended to lead to the unpredictability of aid, thereby making it difficult for 
the government to exercise control over sector initiatives. This not only compromised 
the quality of implementation, but also hindered the initiation of essential new 
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programmes, both of which affected the degree of aid effectiveness that the Paris 
Declaration sought to achieve. These shortcomings could also adversely affect sector 
performance, as programmes failed to address issues adequately on the ground. 
Moreover, this type of power tended to put the government in a very weak position with 
little control over sector programmes or funds. Central to the notion of a SWAp is the 
commitment of funds to the sector in order to make aid predictable, and that the 
government should have greater control over sector programmes in accordance with the 
Paris Declaration framework. Yet, this study found that the exercise of power in this 
SWAp was not consistent with such a notion.  
 
9.4.4 Headhunting Civil Servants – Jeopardizing the SWAp Leadership  
 
This study also found that power exercised in the partnership negatively affected the 
progress of the SWAp process when DPs drew upon their deep pockets to recruit some 
of the most brilliant government officers to work for the NGOs sponsored by the 
former. Such headhunting of civil servants also contributed to the frequent high-level 
reshuffles in the Ministry of Education Science and Technology, which, in turn, 
perpetrated government dependency on DP expertise and leadership. The following 
statements not only illustrate the extent of this negative influence on the SWAp 
partnership, but also the frustration shared amongst the actors:  
 
We have seen a number of people, some of the best people of the ministry for the 
last one, two years, being poached by, particularly, Agency DP2 and Agency 
DP2‟s country firms hired by Agency DP2, or funded by Agency DP2, to do 
different consultancies in [the] education sector.  They hire the people from the 
ministry…and they offer them ten times as much as they get in the civil service at 
the moment. And the last [latest] one to be poached is the Director of Planning, 
Dr Dambo [pseudonym] (DP3, Oct. 10).  
 
One problem is that there is [a] high turnover of PSs in the Ministry of 
Education. This limits them and they depend on DPs, who have more knowledge 
and information. Likewise, there is [a] high turnover of directors, for example, 
Dr Jamu [pseudonym] replaced by Dr Dambo [pseudonym] (DPM3, Jan. 09). 
 
The lack of leadership on the part of government can be attributed to an extent 
to the frequent changes in the leadership of the ministry, particularly at the 
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minister and PS levels. This has obviously slowed down the process, with the 
result that this process, which started as far back as years ago, is not [has not 
been] completed (DPM1, March 09). 
 
Government officials recruited by this DP agency were offered handsome salaries, 
which obviously constituted an incentive. However, this exercise of power through the 
headhunting of civil servants negatively affected the progress of the education SWAp 
process. It also seems to have contributed to the problem of the high turnover of top 
ministry staff – personnel who were exceptional not only in terms of providing SWAp 
leadership at ministry level, but also with regard to capacity building in order to avoid 
overreliance on DP expertise.  
 
Arguably, this kind of conduct could be construed as a means of weakening the 
leadership role of the government and its ownership of the whole education SWAp 
process merely through a DP desire to maintain dominance over the development 
agenda. In this situation, the government would remain dependent on its DPs in terms of 
knowledge, expertise and leadership, especially so when donors are also able to flex 
considerable financial muscle, as noted in chapters 5, 6 and 8. Regrettably, such a 
scenario might lead to a reversion to the project approach. 
 
9.5 Conclusion  
 
The evidence in this chapter on how power was conceptualized and exercised in this 
education SWAp partnership poses a big challenge to the realization of the model as 
defined by the Paris Declaration owing to Malawi‟s heavy dependence on financial aid. 
Indeed, government influence in this SWAp process was heavily compromised by 
power relations in the partnership; given that DPs wielded power by means of 
mechanisms M1 to M6 (including the eight sources examined in Chapter 8) in the 
conceptual framework, which led to the exclusion of state interests in important policy 
decisions. Moreover, in their exercise of power, DPs were able to coerce the 
government into accepting decisions or acting in a way it did not wish to because of the 
pressure it was under to secure funding. The policy dialogue was driven by a few DPs 
who donated more money to the government than others did, a strategy that left many 
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others frustrated. This model of power was observed and captured by an independent 
journalist in the following cartoon, which illustrates the way in which the Malawian 
education SWAp ultimately played out. 
 
Figure 9.2: Donor Express Bus 
 
 
 
Source: exact source unknown, but was taken from a newspaper  
 
Figure 9.2 illustrates that the way in which power is exercised in a SWAp – as 
evidenced by the Malawian experience – is inconsistent with the modality as it was 
redefined in the Paris Declaration framework. Rather, the recipient government, which 
is supposed to be in the driving seat, tends to be put in an impossible position due to all 
the backseat DP drivers in the SWAp process (the bus in the cartoon), who try to wield 
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power and exert pressure in order to reflect their home governments‟ interests and 
agendas in development policies and strategies.  
 
This depiction shows that DPs tend to cling to the power model that characterized the 
project approach. Conversely, the road on which the government drives is determined 
by the international community – which was a common criticism of the management of 
development aid under the project approach because it denied the recipient government 
access to the centre of control (Hamblin, 2006); and DPs try to ensure that their policies 
take precedence over recipient government priorities and needs, which are often 
excluded, by employing different mechanisms that incorporate the eight sources of 
power.  
 
Consequently, due to power relations; the types of programmes promoted by some DPs; 
the quality of implementation that continued to be eroded by DP control of funding; and 
a failure to uphold principles aimed at aligning aid with national priorities, it is 
questionable whether the interventions under study could contribute meaningfully to the 
realization of international targets. 
 
When considered in terms of power relations in this SWAp, civil society was left with 
no real identity in the development agenda, a position that ran contrary to the 
expectations of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008). A better understanding is therefore required in respect of macro-level 
political decisions that have implications for practical application at the micro level. The 
Malawian experience also serves as a reminder that care must be taken not to set 
unrealistic goals or standards given the reality on the ground.   
 
The manner in which power was wielded in this education SWAp process – which was 
proportionate to the amount of money donated – not only ran contrary to the principles 
of the SWAp as a more democratic, egalitarian type of alliance in which all actors were 
intended to operate as equals, but, more importantly, it was not conducive to the 
conduct of a partnership that could be expected to enhance funding to the sector. These 
findings are corroborated by Samoff‟s (1996) observation that there has been little 
change in SWAp relationships. These conclusions inevitably pose the question of 
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whether the SWAp is just another tool for powerful developed countries and erstwhile 
colonial masters to set and control the development agenda of weak developing 
countries; a continuation of the process claimed by Escobar (1995), who provides 
evidence of how development policies have proved to be instruments of control 
equivalent to those of the colonial era. Therefore, it is highly contestable as to whether a 
move to address these challenges at a higher level than that of the donor government 
would bring about a positive change in the SWAp partnership, given that such a policy 
could merely entail the same people meeting to decide on the issues. 
 
Although the SWAp differs fundamentally and conceptually from the project approach, 
the reality has shown that nothing much has changed. Nevertheless, it is hoped that 
through a process of continuous refinement the modality will prove to be more effective 
in the long term. However, given the current situation as evidenced by this study, the 
big question is whether such an aspiration can ever be realized. Indeed, while the 
process remains subject to power relation challenges that might affect the achievement 
of aid effectiveness and the meeting of international targets based on the principles of 
the modality, it has been noted that the SWAp partnership still represents a reasonable 
collaboration mechanism for all aid actors to work together towards a common goal.  
 
As observed in Chapter 5, based on a conceptual understanding of the modality, this 
was a unanimous desire amongst all the actors in the education SWAp under study. 
Thus, in terms of its principles, the SWAp is still regarded as a promising collaboration 
mechanism that all aid actors can employ in order to work together towards the 
common goal of achieving aid effectiveness. Therefore, perhaps it is time to 
reconceptualize the whole notion of the SWAp through a process of critical reflection 
on all the factors that come into play. 
 
Finally, according to mechanism M7 in the conceptual framework, all actors in the 
SWAp under study seemed committed to continue operating in a partnership in which 
they were bound by global and macro-level requirements – e.g. those stipulated by the 
Paris Declaration framework – as an act of power at a structural level to which their 
governments and agencies subscribed. Thus, the SWAp becomes self-sustaining and 
actors‟ reactions to power relations are largely regulated by this certainty.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion  
 
10.0 Introduction  
 
This study, which aimed to critically analyse partnerships in the Malawian education 
SWAp process and determine how they influenced it, has examined the nature and 
structure of partnership collaboration amongst various DPs, government officials, and 
CSOs/NGOs from the development of the PIF to the initiation of the NESP. This 
chapter thus presents a summary of the main findings of the study, the contribution of 
the thesis, and the implications of the findings for SWAps in Malawi and beyond. It also 
provides areas for future research based on the findings of the study. 
 
10.1 Summary of Research Findings and Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The SWAp partnership was central to this study. Therefore, efforts to gain an insight 
into the origin of the SWAp in the interests of a better understanding of relationships 
around this new aid modality in relation to the Malawian context as well as others 
featured prominently. This thesis links the SWAp to changes in international 
development cooperation, in respect of education in particular, which took place in the 
1990s. It also identifies the failure of the project approach as being largely responsible 
for such changes. Accordingly, the SWAp is a critical partnership strategy for funding 
sectors in developing countries based on the conceptual understanding that it will prove 
to be a more effective aid modality. The education SWAp in Malawi provided the focus 
of this study, being a typical basis for partnership collaboration in the wake of the 2005 
Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness.  
 
Chapter 2 identified the context of the Malawian education reform. It highlighted the 
changes in international development assistance and their link to the initiation of 
internal education reform in the country. The chapter also identified challenges in the 
Malawian public education system in terms of funding, access, quality, equity, and 
228 
 
 
 
 
internal efficiency. It discussed the reasons for adopting the new modality in 
expectation that a SWAp partnership would address these challenges. The funds 
released through this partnership were ultimately intended to assist the government to 
achieve the international targets of EFA and MDGs.  
 
Chapter 3 narrated the historical circumstances that led to a shift from the project-based 
approach, as characterized by a totalitarian style whereby donors had full control over 
funds and implementation, to the SWAp as a more egalitarian and democratic modality 
for funding developing countries. While acknowledging the necessity of a SWAp, this 
chapter also highlighted the challenges that many other countries have experienced due 
to deviation from the conceptual understanding of a SWAp. The chapter thus cautioned 
the need to be mindful of the frequent disparity between theory and practice where the 
SWAp is concerned. It described a modality conceived in the rarefied atmosphere of the 
Paris Declaration, with its academic global prescriptions, which bore little relevance to 
the reality on the ground or the accompanying implications for macro-level policy 
formulation and micro-level implementation.  
 
This chapter also revealed evidence of the influence of neo-liberal economic policies in 
terms of international development assistance. It highlighted the role of the World Bank 
in promoting these policies in the education development agenda through human capital 
theory. This is based on the notion that in acquiring knowledge and skills, individuals 
are regarded as capital in the process of production and such acquisition as an 
investment. It associates the incorporation of civil society in the international 
development agenda with the influence of the same neo-liberal economic policies, 
which promote the transfer of the economy from public to private ownership based on 
the belief that this increases government efficiency and contributes to the improved 
well-being of the nation.  
 
Finally, the chapter highlighted various power theories, given that the SWAp 
partnership is not only a social entity that is prone to power relations, but also the fact 
that the very introduction of the modality was an act of power in the realm of 
international development aid. 
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Chapter 4 discussed the methodology used for the investigation, which facilitated an 
understanding of the actors‟ perspectives on how partnership interactions affected the 
education SWAp. It described the social constructivist philosophical framework used to 
explore the views of DPs, government officials, and CSOs and NGOs as actors in the 
education SWAp process. 
 
Chapter 5 highlighted the experiences of the Malawian education SWAp process from 
the perspectives of actors on the emergence of its partnership. The thesis argues that the 
emergence of this SWAp partnership can be directly linked to international aid targets 
such as poverty reduction, EFA and the MDGs, as well as internal reform processes 
such as the PIF and PCAR, which were initiated under the influence of international aid 
trends that required developing countries to adopt the SWAp as a new aid modality to 
replace the project approach.  
 
The thesis further contends that the partnership for the education SWAp process – 
which brought together the government, DPs, NGOs and CSOs to collaborate in the 
development of a SWAp document, the NESP – emerged from the process of adjusting 
to the demands of a global community that tied aid to international development targets. 
It was from the small thematic groupings initiated during the development of the PIF 
that this partnership evolved into a single large education SWAp alliance, with the 
inclusion of civil society as one of the main actors assuming a watchdog role. 
 
A key finding of this study was that minimum capacity – a “capacity base” – is required 
if the government is to engage meaningfully in a SWAp even though such a modality 
intrinsically includes state capacity building. The study found that capacity was an area 
of great concern, particularly in terms of the ability of government officials to engage in 
a SWAp process according to the principles of ownership and leadership – as a certain 
amount of capacity was required to lead the SWAp process by bringing together DPs 
and civil society, and clearly advancing government priorities. This means that the 
government should have had a minimum level of capacity in order to engage 
meaningfully in a SWAp process that itself involved the further development of state 
capacity. However, evidence shows that government capacity was found to be wanting 
right from the start. This finding calls for a redefinition of the minimum necessary 
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capacity level for a government to engage in or implement a SWAp. This finding 
further evidences how lack of capacity is structurally determined. The dependency of 
the government on its DPs is such that even when it has been engaged from the 
initiation of the SWAp process, as observed in the experiences of many countries, 
capacity is still identified as a problem at the implementation stage (Brown et al., 2001; 
Smith, 2005; Samoff, 2004). 
 
Subsequent to the capacity issue per se, is concern around trust as it relates to the 
capacity of the government, given that lack of trust deters DPs from releasing funds 
through certain modalities that they perceive as risky. DPs have consistently claimed 
that government systems and procedures are weak even after engaging in a SWAp 
process. Consequently, this thesis raises another key question with regard to what 
should come first in order to address obvious concerns around capacity: capacity 
building or the initiation of the SWAp process – or simply at what stage of the SWAp 
should capacity building commence.  
 
The shortfalls in partnership interaction to which it was susceptible notwithstanding, the 
Malawian SWAp was found to be a popular aid modality amongst actors, particularly 
given that most DPs still operated in the project mode. The purpose of initiating such an 
education policy was to implement the following qualities: improved planning, 
harmonization, alignment, coordination, ownership, government leadership, enhanced 
funding, and capacity building,  the three main areas of most concern to all actors being 
planning, funding and harmonization. 
 
However, the thesis suggests that there had been no significant improvement in terms of 
realizing these qualities, as the partnership continued to experience negative power 
relations in spite of the fact that there was a common understanding of the concepts of a 
SWAp and that the process was to be guided by the principles of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration. For example, DPs used financial power to implement their own priorities 
for the development of policies and strategies, which adversely affected the SWAp 
process and frustrated the government as well as other actors; particularly endangering 
the comprehensive, coherent policy implementation and deployment of resources that 
the SWAp was intended to facilitate. 
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Chapter 6 identified several other important issues pertaining to relations and roles 
amongst the different actors in this SWAp partnership. DP unity in the provision of 
effective support to the government was hampered by elements of mistrust and an 
aspect of covert competition that seemed to exist amongst them due to a quest to fulfil 
their own government‟s agendas, which created a spirit of competitiveness. This further 
negatively affected partnership aims whereby DPs were expected to become less 
responsible for the SWAp as the government assumed the lead role in a context of 
closer interagency collaboration (Riddell et al., 2000). Therefore, this thesis questions 
DP integrity in the Malawian context in terms of their willingness to modify their 
actions and conform to the Paris Declaration to which they were signatories.  
 
All actors in this SWAp partnership recognized the importance of avoiding duplication 
of efforts, hence the need for a clear definition of the role to be played by each based on 
its area of expertise or comparative advantage. This was critical if gaps in programme 
implementation were to be identified and all areas of the sector in need of support 
covered. Consequently, the DPs were identified with two main roles: funding provision 
and technical support to the government, although the former tended to cause problems 
around power relations. 
 
This thesis acknowledges that pressure from the global governance and international 
development agenda in the context of neo-liberal economic policies obliges the 
incorporation of civil society in a SWAp process and that it should be identified with a 
watchdog role. However, the present study found that such a role was constrained. The 
thesis argues that although it was expected to constitute one of the main actors in the 
SWAp process, civil society was rarely viewed as part of the main partnership, which 
seemed to exist between the DPs and the government only.  
 
The thesis contends that in the absence of effective relations that might have facilitated 
a meaningful system of checks and balances, civil society was restricted in its ability to 
function appropriately in the SWAp process, which consequently becomes an area of 
concern, especially given its critical role in monitoring and supervision. Moreover, 
when considered in terms of power relations in this SWAp, the situation of civil society 
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tended to leave it with no real identity in the development agenda, which calls for a 
better understanding of macro-level political decisions that have implications during 
practical application at the micro level.  
 
This study found that role of civil society in the SWAp partnership was prescriptive to a 
certain extent, which left little room for it to act effectively. Thus, the thesis contends 
that the role of civil society in this process does not appear to have been fully 
assimilated or acknowledged. On the other hand, the role of the government was clear – 
to provide financial support and set the agenda, the latter including the identification of 
priority areas. However, the evidence suggests that these duties were impeded due to 
pressure from DPs that provided financial support – in spite of the fact that the Paris 
Declaration clearly assigns these roles to the recipient government.  
 
This issue is not only critical in terms of the leadership and ownership of the education 
SWAp process, but also with regard to the aid effectiveness that the Paris Declaration 
framework emphasizes (Hyden, 2008). Therefore, this element stresses the challenges 
of the SWAp modality, and underscores a disparity between the SWAp rhetoric and the 
reality on the ground, an area also highlighted by Buchert and Epskamp (2000).   
  
Accordingly, the thesis suggests that key issues around the role of civil society in the 
SWAp process require further investigation and theorization; given the Malawian 
context – or that of any other developing country – in which CSOs are funded by DPs 
and tend to be in constant competition with the government where funding is concerned. 
Therefore, they can easily become vulnerable to changes in state policy if they do not 
toe the line of the government of the day. In this regard, the crucial questions to pose are 
what impact does civil society have on the SWAp process; whose interests are they 
protecting – those of the government or the DPs who fund them – and how effective is 
their watchdog role.  
 
Chapter 7 highlighted a number of factors in the education SWAp process that affected 
the manner in which its partnership influenced the improvement of funding to the 
sector. The first finding was that partnership relations negatively affected education 
funding, thereby posing a potential threat to both aid effectiveness and enhanced 
233 
 
 
 
 
support to the sector. This practice ran contrary to the expectations of education partners 
whereby coherence of funding should have been maintained and aid delivery consistent 
in order to allow the government more flexibility and control over plans and the 
implementation of sector programmes. The second finding was that the coordination of 
the education SWAp process also affected funding to the sector. The chapter provided 
evidence that financial mechanisms employed by DPs improved education funding, but 
this was attributed to the pool fund created around the implementation of PCAR.  
 
The failure by DPs to adopt government systems is an area that requires further 
investigation in the light of the findings of evaluation reports on the implementation of 
the Paris Declaration (Wood et al., 2008). This chapter confirmed government optimism 
that a SWAp modality could improve funding to the sector, but it also found that the 
amount of money DPs donated negatively affected interaction in this SWAp process as 
it perpetrated skewed participation.  
 
A third finding was that funding to the sector was perceived to concentrate on DPs‟ old 
projects and areas of interest. Generally, the findings in this chapter were consistent 
with those of the qualitative data presented in chapters 5, 6 and 8. Finally, there was 
clear evidence that funding to the sector was affected by several other factors.  
 
Chapter 8 highlighted evidence in support of the contention that funding constituted the 
main source of power relations in this SWAp process. Accordingly, DPs that donated 
more money to the government created an imbalance of power and influenced the 
interactions of other actors, which adversely influenced the decision-making process, 
including policy design and implementation. This affected the participation of 
government officials as well that of DPs that donated less money. The engagement of 
the latter group was constrained and their status diminished, as the situation tended to 
create a sense of inferiority and frustration. However, the thesis argues that as long as 
those who donate the most fail to use their influence positively to minimize power 
relations and facilitate adherence to the principles of the Paris Declaration, the SWAp 
process is bound to continue to be adversely affected.  
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The thesis also identifies time management in the disbursement of funds as a significant 
source of DP power that also affected Malawian education policy negatively. DPs 
exercised tight control over programme funding, which led to inconsistency in the 
release of the money. They were also found to work to different timescales from those 
originally agreed upon, which accentuated government dependency on its DPs and left 
the former doubly indebted when funds did not arrive as expected, as it was obliged to 
beg for money from elsewhere. Such inconsistencies had an adverse effect on 
programme outcomes, highlighting concerns around the unpredictability of funding, a 
situation that did not allow the government the control or flexibility that a SWAp was 
intended to provide. 
 
The thesis argues that DPs‟ own government mandates and internal systems restricted 
their operations in the SWAp process, which, in a sense, created conflict with their role 
as DPs. It was also found that even though DPs seemed to embrace the innovations a 
SWAp necessitated, their internal systems were too slow to change and adapt to the 
requirements of the modality. DP mandates and internal systems were found to cause 
conflict around the setting of national priorities in the SWAp process, as DPs were 
regarded as attempting to influence the NESP agenda to bring it in line with their 
respective government policies. These revelations pose the fundamental question of 
whether DP governments are genuinely subscribing to the Paris Declaration.  
 
Another aspect that the thesis identifies is the difficult situation in which some DPs 
found themselves due to their government mandates and internal systems, which could 
have a negative impact on the general performance of individuals, agencies, and the 
entire SWAp process. Individual development workers representing DP governments 
found the resultant situation restraining and frustrating, particularly when operating in a 
competitive environment in which those who were sufficiently flexible to respond to the 
demands of the sector stood a better chance of being well recognized. 
 
Chapter 9 provided evidence of the way in which power was conceptualized in this 
SWAp partnership, and reviewed the fashion in which it was exercised. The latter was 
found to be in a manner that posed a substantial challenge to the realization of the 
modality as defined by the Paris Declaration, which was due to the heavy dependence of 
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Malawi on financial aid. Indeed, the government‟s decision-making position in this 
SWAp was found to be severely compromised by power relations in the partnership that 
largely resulted in the exclusion of government interests from important policy 
decisions.  
 
Evidence shows that the policy dialogue was driven by a few DPs who donated the most 
money to the government, a situation that left many other DPs frustrated. The 
implementation of programmes was also affected by the control DPs exercised over 
their money, which showed scant regard for upholding principles aimed at the 
alignment of aid with national priorities. The thesis argues that given such power 
relations in this SWAp process, it is doubtful whether the education policies and 
programmes executed through its partnership could contribute meaningfully to the 
realization of international goals and aid effectiveness. Such a contention brings into 
question the integrity of the SWAp, and whether it is just another tool with which 
powerful developed countries set and control the agenda of weak developing countries, 
as claimed by Escobar (1995).  
 
This study found that the way power operated in this partnership was exercised 
proportionate to the amount of money donated. This runs contrary to the principles of 
the SWAp, which was conceived as a more democratic, egalitarian type of alliance in 
which all actors were intended to operate as equal partners. Yet, more importantly, a 
SWAp partnership is expected to enhance funding to the sector; therefore, financial aid 
provided by DPs should not create a power conflict. The thesis thus suggests that there 
is a need to address this situation through policy reform at a higher level than that of the 
DP. 
 
In spite of the finding that this partnership was subject to the adverse consequences of 
“power to” – DPs holding sway over others by wielding the eight sources of power 
money/resources; expertise/knowledge; agency/modus operandi; individual personality; 
DP government/agency policy; period of historical DP involvement; degree of 
participation/commitment of human resources; and management of time for 
disbursement of funds, identified in Chapter 8 – that jeopardized aid effectiveness and 
global targets, the thesis still contends that a SWAp partnership based on internationally 
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recognized principles represents a reasonable collaboration mechanism through which 
all aid actors may work towards a common goal. As observed in Chapter 5, this was a 
common belief amongst all actors in this education SWAp process. However, given the 
evidence of this study, it is questionable whether the aspiration for such an ideal SWAp 
can ever be realized.  
 
Furthermore, this study found that actors seemed committed to continuing to operate in 
this SWAp as they were bound by macro level requirements, for example, those of the 
Paris Declaration framework to which their governments and agencies subscribed. 
Therefore, the thesis argues that a SWAp becomes a self-sustaining modality, which, in 
so doing, largely regulates power relations.  
 
Finally, the thesis argues that the manner in which power was conceptualized and 
exercised in the SWAp partnership under study highlights a design flaw. Although the 
principles of the modality were well intentioned, they failed to take into account the fact 
that power relations between partners in the process were not necessarily restrained 
merely through a commitment to use the SWAp in place of the project approach. DPs 
were still anxious to pursue their own government or agency interests and, given 
asymmetric power relations, they were always likely to prevail. Thus, the resultant 
question is how a SWAp can be designed that is capable of more effectively reducing 
the power asymmetry experienced in this process. With this in mind, even current 
power theories are not able to adequately address the question. Rather, there is a need to 
develop a new hypothesis that accommodates multiple approaches as well as the diverse 
reactions to power relations that are manifested in any SWAp.   
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10.2 Policy Implications for the SWAp Process in Malawi and 
Elsewhere  
 
The thesis highlights several policy implications through a detailed analysis of 
collaboration in this education SWAp process and the challenges it faced due to power 
relations emanating from the donation of financial aid in particular. In view of the 
critical nature of civil society‟s role in the development agenda and the negative 
experiences that this SWAp partnership experienced with continued DP control of the 
process, the Ministry of Education should take a policy decision to initiate appropriate 
legislation that protects and empowers it. This would also assist civil society to perform 
its watchdog role more effectively; call for the greater accountability of all actors; and 
enhance sector performance, ultimately leading to the achievement of the international 
targets envisioned in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.  
 
This study found that there was a policy gap at DPs‟ own country/agency level in terms 
of their conduct in this SWAp process, which indicates a conflict of interests in 
determining policy priorities in the partnership. Therefore, there is a need to address this 
through policy reform that aligns global, macro-level and micro-level operations in 
international development aid. This would help resolve the current situation whereby 
there is a clear conflict of interests between the government and its DPs that contradicts 
the expectations of the Paris Declaration to which both actors remain signatories. A 
second policy area that needs to be addressed is related to the finding that DP mandates 
and systems failed to change and adapt to expectations, for example, those of the Paris 
Declaration framework. This suggests that policy reform is also required to address 
these shortcomings. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the government fell short in terms of sector 
planning by not allocating funds to certain programmes. Lack of such planning created 
problems and compromised the quality of implementation, which was the case with the 
PCAR initiative to some extent. However, responsibility for programme funding was 
left to DPs alone. This also implies that there was no clear Ministry of Education policy 
for the allocation of funds to programmes. Given government centrality in the 
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identification of priority areas, there is a need for policy that guides the allocation of 
budget line items, including those that are supported by DP funding.  
 
The thesis argues that the Ministry of Education should take a positive stance to 
improve this situation. However, the willingness to adjust expressed by government 
officials in this study is insufficient and formal policy to regulate the practice in future 
is thus required. This would also reduce incidences whereby the government is held 
captive by DPs that agree to fund particular programmes, or is left doubly indebted 
when a DP fails to deliver agreed funding and it is therefore necessary to petition 
another DP to help remedy the situation, circumstances that if unchecked will weaken 
the government‟s position in the SWAp process. 
 
10.3 Directions for Further Research  
 
The thesis provides a few areas in which further research is required if the SWAp 
process is to be more meaningful and effective. This study identified a good deal of 
convolution with regard to the role of civil society in this SWAp partnership, in which 
CSOs were funded by DPs in much the same way as they donated financial assistance to 
the government. Therefore, CSOs not only tended to be in constant competition with the 
state where funding was concerned, but, also being subject to government authority, 
could easily become vulnerable to changes in public sector policy if they were not on 
good terms with the government of the day.  
 
This study found that although civil society was expected to constitute a vital member 
of the SWAp partnership, it was rarely viewed as one of the main actors in a 
relationship that was otherwise seemingly confined to the DPs and the government. 
There was therefore no adequate mechanism with which civil society could implement 
meaningful monitoring and supervision. Given that ensuring checks and balances in the 
SWAp process is a critical role, this becomes an area of concern. Furthermore, in the 
Malawian context, there was found to be some deviation from the contemporary widely 
held global notion that the role of the state as the primary development actor was 
increasingly being challenged by other major actors such as the market and civil society 
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(Malhotra, n.d.). Such engagement was found to be extremely limited in the case of 
Malawian civil society, hence its limited participation in the SWAp process.  
 
All these findings serve to indicate that this area requires further investigation and 
theorization if the position of civil society is to be strengthened in this SWAp 
partnership. It would be appropriate to undertake a study that investigates in detail the 
role and performance of civil society in the SWAp process in order to determine how 
broadly they are affected and to identify the key factors involved with a view to 
suggesting alternative solutions. Such a study could also serve to critically analyse civil 
society‟s priorities in this aspect of the development agenda; whether they represent the 
interests of the government, the DPs, or the community they are supposed to represent 
and serve (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Such a study would require multiple methods of 
data collection over a lengthy period in order to better understand the factors and 
dynamics behind the current situation that hinders the role of civil society in this SWAp.  
 
Another area that requires further research relates to the capacity gap within the 
government, particularly in terms of the ability of its officials to engage in a SWAp 
process according to the principles of ownership and leadership. These call for a certain 
amount of capacity to lead the SWAp process in bringing together DPs and civil 
society, and clearly advancing government priorities. However, this study found that in 
the Malawian SWAp experience, government capacity was identified as wanting right 
from the start in the sense that the government did not meet the minimum capacity level 
or “capacity base” to engage meaningfully in a SWAp process which itself involved 
further government capacity building.  
 
Previous studies have focused on concerns around government capacity, and those of 
SWAps in general and have mainly addressed the issue of capacity in terms of policy 
and programme implementation (Brown et al., 2001; Smith, 2005; Samoff, 2004). It is 
therefore recommended that a further study of the Malawian education SWAp be 
conducted to specifically examine capacity-related issues and determine the capacity 
base government officials require if they are to engage meaningfully in the process. 
Such a study should consider the capacity of individuals as well as those of systems, 
and must particularly take into account the facts that systems development takes some 
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time, and that capacity has been identified as an area of concern in other contexts 
(Brown et al., 2001).  
 
Finally, pre-SWAp capacity assessment should be considered in order to determine a 
chronological order for the implementation of its elements. Should capacity 
development precede any SWAp process or should it come at the beginning of the 
process? And what mechanisms should be put in place in a SWAp process to ensure that 
capacity development is achieved? Answering these questions is vital because not only 
does a SWAp involve the capacity development of government officials, but also, more 
importantly, it revolves around other factors such power relations that can all too easily 
militate against effective government participation in the first place. 
 
10.4 Conclusions 
 
The thesis has highlighted a number of findings related to this education SWAp 
partnership that require further research. The initial assertion that a SWAp was a more 
effective aid modality than the project approach was to say the least optimistic, and was 
probably made without due consideration for the practice on the ground – which 
emphasizes the disparity that all too often exists between the principles and practice. 
Neither did the conceptualization of the SWAp seem to take into account other factors 
such as the power relations created through the financial muscle of those who donate the 
most financial aid; the heavy reliance of developing countries on such assistance; or the 
influence of neo-liberal economic policies.  
 
As a new modality for funding the public sector in developing countries, the SWAp is 
experiencing more challenges around power relations on the ground than anticipated, as 
DPs seem to be either unwilling or unable to comply with the principles and partnership 
model prescribed by the Paris Declaration. Indeed, while the SWAp differs 
fundamentally and conceptually from the project approach, the reality has shown that 
nothing much has changed. Although in terms of its principles, the SWAp is still 
regarded as a promising collaboration mechanism that all aid actors can employ in order 
to work together towards the common goal of achieving aid effectiveness, it is 
questionable whether the power asymmetry pertaining to “giver” and “receiver” 
241 
 
 
 
 
dynamics can be minimised. Therefore, perhaps it is time to reconceptualize the whole 
notion of a SWAp through a process of critical reflection on all the factors that come 
into play; and, if DPs continue to exercise power based on the amount of money they 
donate, consideration of what might constitute a practicable adjustment to the concept 
of the modality. 
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire for DPs and CSO/NGOs 
 
 
The following questions addresses the nature of partnerships in the education SWAp 
process in Malawi, and how they influenced policy from the adoption of the PIF to the 
implementation of the NESP. 
 
Personal Information 
 
Instructions 
 
Please fill in the blank spaces: 
 
Name of organization: …………………………………………………………………. 
 
Number of years of employment in Malawi: …………………………………………. 
 
Number of years involved in the education SWAp process: …………………………. 
 
Sex: ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Please describe the type of support your organization has rendered to the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology in respect of the education SWAp process (from 
PIF to NESP): 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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General Questions 
 
The following items are designed to answer the main question, “How do partnerships in 
the education SWAp process influence funding to the sector?” 
 
Instructions 
 
Please circle the number on the scale that you consider most accurately indicates your 
response to the following questions: 
 
 
1. To what extent do the partnerships in the education SWAp process improve 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
2. To what extent do the partnership relations of different stakeholders affect 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
3. To what extent are relationships affected by aid coordination? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
4. To what extent are the roles of stakeholders affected by the amount of funds 
actors donate to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
5. To what extent does the amount of funds donated to the sector influence 
stakeholders‟ participation in the education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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6. To what extent does the government coordinate the education SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
7. To what extent do financing mechanisms in the education SWAp process 
improve funding of sector programmes? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
8. To what extent do power relations around financing affect partnerships in the 
education SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
9. To what extent has aid to the education sector improved due to the SWAp? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
10. To what extent are partnerships in the education SWAp process effective in 
mobilizing funding to the sector?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
11. To what extent does leadership in the education SWAp process influence 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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12. To what extent do financial mechanisms used in the education SWAp process 
improve funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
13. To what extent is aid through projects implementation accommodated in the 
education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
14. To what extent has the funding to the sector improved from the initiation of the 
PIF to the implementation of the NESP? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
15. To what extent does the biggest financial donor to the education sector exercise 
power in the SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
16. To what extent have stakeholders in the education SWAp process taken priority 
areas identified by the government into consideration when funding the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
17. To what extent has DP funding to the sector concentrated on old areas of interest 
or projects? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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18. To what extent has there been a shift in funding patterns of different 
stakeholders in the education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
19. To what extent have the partnership principles applied at various stages in the 
education SWAp process affected funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
20. To what extent has the pattern of the SWAp partnership influenced funding to 
the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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Appendix B 
 
Quesionnaire for Government Ministries 
 
The following questions addresses the nature of the partnerships in the education SWAp 
process in Malawi, and how they influenced policy from the adoption of the PIF to the 
implementation of the NESP. 
 
Personal Information 
 
Instructions 
 
Please fill in the blank spaces: 
 
Ministry and department: …………………………………………………………….. 
 
Number of years of employment: …………………………………………................ 
 
Number of years involved in the education SWAp process: ………………………… 
 
Sex: …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Please describe the type of support each development partner/donor has rendered to the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in respect of the education SWAp 
process (from PIF to NESP): 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
General Questions 
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The following items are designed to answer the main question, “How do partnerships in 
the education SWAp process influence funding to the sector?” 
 
Instructions 
 
Please circle the number on the scale that you consider most accurately indicates your 
response to the following questions: 
 
 
1. To what extent do the partnerships in the education SWAp process improve 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
2. To what extent do the partnership relations of different stakeholders affect 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
3. To what extent are relationships affected by aid coordination? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
4. To what extent are the roles of stakeholders affected by the amount of funds 
actors donate to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
5. To what extent does the amount of funds donated to the sector influence 
stakeholders‟ participation in the education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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6. To what extent does the government coordinate the education SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
7. To what extent do financing mechanisms in the education SWAp process 
improve funding of sector programmes? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
8. To what extent do power relations around financing affect partnerships in the 
education SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
9. To what extent has aid to the education sector improved due to the SWAp? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
10. To what extent are partnerships in the education SWAp process effective in 
mobilizing funding to the sector?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
11. To what extent does leadership in the education SWAp process influence 
funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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12. To what extent do financial mechanisms used in the education SWAp process 
improve funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
13. To what extent is aid through projects implementation accommodated in the 
education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
14. To what extent has the funding to the sector improved from the initiation of the 
PIF to the implementation of the NESP? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
15. To what extent does the biggest financial donor to the education sector exercise 
power in the SWAp process?  
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
16. To what extent have stakeholders in the education SWAp process taken priority 
areas identified by the government into consideration when funding the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
17. To what extent has DP funding to the sector concentrated on old areas of interest 
or projects? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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18. To what extent has there been a shift in funding patterns of different 
stakeholders in the education SWAp process? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
19. To what extent have the partnership principles applied at various stages in the 
education SWAp process affected funding to the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
 
 
20. To what extent has the pattern of the SWAp partnership influenced funding to 
the sector? 
 
1.  To a very large  
     Extent 
2.  To a large  
     Extent 
3.  To a fairly 
large  
     extent  
4.  To some extent 5.  To no extent 
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Appendix C 
 
Interview Guide for DPs, Government Officials and CSOs/NGOs 
 
1. The following questions pertain to motivation for the formation of 
partnerships in the education SWAp process: 
 
1. Can you describe the partnerships formed during the education SWAp process? 
2. What is the purpose of partnerships in the education SWAp process? 
3. Why are partnerships necessary to the education SWAp process? 
4. How were partnerships formed in the education SWAp process? 
5. What principles were applied at each stage of the process from PIF to NESP? 
6. How effective have the education SWAp partnerships been? 
7. What has changed for the better in the sector since the initiation of the education 
SWAp process? 
8. What influenced the shift from the term „donor‟ to that of „development partner‟ 
in the context of the SWAp process? 
 
2. The following questions address ways in which the roles of different   
      stakeholders affect the education SWAp process: 
 
1. What are the roles of different stakeholders in the education SWAp process? 
2. Why are different roles necessary in the education SWAp process? 
3. How are the roles of different stakeholders coordinated in the education SWAp 
process?   
4. How is the role of leadership played in the education SWAp partnerships?  
5. What contributions have different stakeholders brought to the education SWAp 
process? 
 
3. The following questions seek to clarify the nature of power relations among  
       stakeholders in the SWAp partnerships: 
 
1. What are the relationships between different stakeholders in the SWAp 
partnerships?  
2. What is each/your organization contributing to the SWAp partnerships?   
3. How is power exercised among stakeholders in the SWAp partnerships? 
4. How do power relations affect the partnerships in the SWAp process? 
5. How do decisions made in the SWAp partnerships affect your organization? 
6. What would make one stakeholder exercise more power over others in a SWAp 
partnership? 
7. Why are there power relations among stakeholders in the education SWAp 
partnerships?   
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Appendix D 
Frequency Table 
  Total 
  
Government 
Officials 
Development 
Partners  CSOs/NGOs  N  % 
  n  % N  % N %     
1. To what extent 
do partnerships in 
the education 
SWAp process 
improve funding to 
the sector? 
  
To a large 
extent 
16 84.2% 14 87.5% 5 100.0% 35 87.5% 
To some 
extent 
3 15.8% 2 12.5% 0 0 5 12.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2. To what extent 
do the partnership 
relations of 
different 
stakeholders affect 
funding to the 
sector? 
  
  
To a large 
extent 
18 94.7% 14 87.5% 4 80.0% 36 90.0% 
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 1 20.0% 3 7.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0 1 2.5% 
3. To what extent 
are relationships 
affected by aid 
coordination? 
  
To a large 
extent 
17 89.5% 12 75.0% 4 80.0% 33 82.5% 
To some 
extent 
2 10.5% 4 25.0% 1 20.0% 7 17.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. To what extent 
are the roles of 
stakeholders 
affected by the 
amount of funds 
actors donate to the 
sector? 
  
  
To a large 
extent 
16 84.2% 14 87.5% 5 100.0% 35 87.5% 
To some 
extent 
3 15.8% 1 6.3% 0 0 4 10.0% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0 1 2.5% 
5. To what extent 
does the amount of 
funds donated to 
the sector influence 
stakeholders‟ 
participation in the 
education SWAp 
process?  
To a large 
extent 
16 84.2% 14 87.5% 3 60.0% 33 82.5% 
To some 
extent 
3 15.8% 1 6.3% 1 20.0% 5 12.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 1 6.3% 1 20.0% 2 5.0% 
6. To what extent 
does the 
government 
coordinate the 
education SWAp 
process? 
  
  
To a large 
extent 
13 68.4% 12 75.0% 3 60.0% 28 70.0% 
To some 
extent 
6 31.6% 3 18.8% 2 40.0% 11 27.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0% 1 2.5% 
7. To what extent 
do financing 
To a large 
extent 
18 94.7% 13 81.3% 4 80.0% 35 87.5% 
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mechanisms in the 
education SWAp 
process improve 
funding of sector 
programmes? 
  
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 3 18.8% 1 20.0% 5 12.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8. To what extent 
do power relations 
around financing 
affect partnerships 
in the education 
SWAp process? 
  
  
To a large 
extent 
13 68.4% 14 87.5% 2 40.0% 29 72.5% 
To some 
extent 
5 26.3% 1 6.3% 3 60.0% 9 22.5% 
To no 
extent 
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 0 0 2 5.0% 
9. To what extent 
has aid to the 
education sector 
improved due to 
the SWAp? 
  
  
To a large 
extent 
14 73.7% 12 75.0% 2 40.0% 28 70.0% 
To some 
extent 
4 21.1% 4 25.0% 3 60.0% 11 27.5% 
To no 
extent 
1 5.3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2.5% 
10. To what extent 
are partnerships in 
the education 
SWAp process 
effective in 
mobilizing funding 
to the sector? 
To a large 
extent 
14 73.7% 12 75.0% 4 80.0% 30 75.0% 
  
To some 
extent 
5 26.3% 4 25.0% 1 20.0% 10 25.0% 
11. To what extent 
does leadership in 
the education 
SWAp process 
influence funding 
to the sector?  
  
To a large 
extent 
14 73.7% 15 93.8% 4 80.0% 33 82.5% 
To some 
extent 
4 21.1% 0 0 1 20.0% 5 12.5% 
To no 
extent 
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 0 0 2 5.0% 
12. To what extent 
do financial 
mechanisms used 
in the education 
SWAp process 
improve funding to 
the sector? 
  
To a large 
extent 
17 89.5% 10 62.5% 5 100.0% 32 80.0% 
To some 
extent 
1 5.3% 5 31.3% 0 0% 6 15.0% 
To no 
extent 
1 5.3% 1 6.3% 0 0% 2 5.0% 
13. To what extent 
is aid through 
projects 
implementation 
accommodated in 
the education 
SWAP process? 
  
To a large 
extent 
11 57.9% 9 56.3% 4 80.0% 24 60.0% 
To some 
extent 
8 42.1% 6 37.5% 1 20.0% 15 37.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0% 1 6.3% 0 0% 1 2.5% 
14. To what extent 
has funding to the 
sector improved 
from the initiation 
To a large 
extent 
16 84.2% 12 75.0% 4 80.0% 32 80.0% 
To some 
extent 
3 15.8% 4 25.0% 1 20.0% 8 20.0% 
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of the PIF to the 
implementation of 
the NESP?  
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. To what extent 
does the biggest 
financial donor to 
the education 
sector exercise 
power in the 
SWAP process? 
  
To a large 
extent 
15 78.9% 11 68.8% 2 40.0% 28 70.0% 
To some 
extent 
2 10.5% 3 18.8% 2 40.0% 7 17.5% 
To no 
extent 
2 10.5% 2 12.5% 1 20.0% 5 12.5% 
16. To what extent 
have stakeholders 
in the education 
SWAp process 
taken priority areas 
identified by the 
government into 
consideration when 
funding the sector?  
To a large 
extent 
14 73.7% 12 80.0% 4 80.0% 30 76.9% 
To some 
extent 
5 26.3% 3 20.0% 1 20.0% 9 23.1% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17. To what extent 
has DP funding to 
the sector 
concentrated on old 
areas of interest or 
projects?  
 
 
  
To a large 
extent 
13 68.4% 10 62.5% 2 40.0% 25 62.5% 
To some 
extent 
6 31.6% 5 31.3% 3 60.0% 14 35.0% 
To no 
extent 
0 0% 1 6.3% 0 0% 1 2.5% 
18. To what extent 
has there been a 
shift in the funding 
patterns of different 
stakeholders in the 
education SWAp 
process? 
  
To a large 
extent 
10 52.6% 9 56.3% 2 40.0% 21 52.5% 
To some 
extent 
9 47.4% 6 37.5% 3 60.0% 18 45.0% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 1 6.3% 0 0 1 2.5% 
19. To what extent 
have the 
partnership 
principles applied 
at various stages of 
the education 
SWAp process 
affected funding to 
the sector? 
  
To a large 
extent 
12 63.2% 13 81.3% 5 100.0% 30 75.0% 
To some 
extent 
6 31.6% 3 18.8% 0 0 9 22.5% 
To no 
extent 
1 5.3% 0 0 0 0 1 2.5% 
20. To what extent 
has the pattern of 
the SWAp 
partnership 
influenced funding 
to the sector? 
To a large 
extent 
17 89.5% 12 75.0% 2 40.0% 31 77.5% 
To some 
extent 
2 10.5% 4 25.0% 3 60.0% 9 22.5% 
To no 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix E   
Sussex Institute Ethical Guidelines 
University of Sussex 
Sussex Institute 
 
Standards and Guidelines on Research Ethics Annex: Checklist for proposed 
research 
Standards 1 & 3: Safeguard the interests and rights of those involved or affected 
by the research. Establish informed consent. 
1.1 Have you considered the well-being of those involved or affected?  
 Have measures been taken to protect their interests (e.g. by clarifying 
use to be made of outcomes) 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
1.2 Has written and signed consent been obtained without coercion? 
 Have participants been informed of their right to refuse or to withdraw 
at any time? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.3 Have the purposes and processes of the research been fully explained, 
using alternative forms of communication where necessary and 
making reference to any implications for participants of time, cost and 
the possible influence of the outcomes? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.4 Where covert research is proposed, has a case been made and brought 
to the attention of the School committee and approval sought from the 
relevant external professional ethical committee? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.5 Does the proposal include procedures to verify data with respondents 
and offer feedback on findings? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.6 Will the participants be involved in the design, data collection or 
reporting where feasible? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.7 Has conditional anonymity and confidentiality been offered?  Yes 
 
No 
 
1.8 Has the appropriate person (e.g. head teacher, manager of residential 
home, head of service) been identified to whom disclosures that 
involve danger to the participant or others, must be reported?  
Yes 
 
No 
 
Standard 2: Ensure legislative requirements on human rights and data protection have 
been met. 
2.1 Have the implications of at least, the four pieces of legislation listed in 
this document been considered?  
Yes 
 
No 
 
2.2 Where any particular implications arise from legislation or 
uncertainties exist, has contact been made with the named university 
person? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Standard 4: Develop the highest possible standards of research practices including in 
research design, data collection, storage, analysis, interpretation and reporting 
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4.1 Has existing literature and ongoing research been identified and 
considered? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
4.2 Have methods been selected to be fit for purpose? Yes 
 
No 
 
4.3 Where appropriate to the research design, will all data collection 
proposed be used to address the question? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
4.4 Have methods for verifying data (e.g. audit trails, triangulation, etc.) 
been built into the research design? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
4.5 Where research is externally funded, has agreement with sponsors 
been reached on reporting and intellectual property rights? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
4.6 Have plans been made that will enable the archiving of data (e.g. 
through consulting the guidance available from the UK Data 
Archive)? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Standard 5: Consider the consequences of your work or its misuse for those you study 
and other interested parties 
5.1 Have the short and long term consequences of the research been 
considered from the different perspectives of participants, researchers, 
policy-makers and where relevant, funders? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
5.2 Have the costs of the research to participants or their 
institutions/services and any possible compensation been considered?    
Yes 
 
No 
 
5.3 Has information about support services (e.g. mentoring, counselling) 
that might be needed as a consequence of any possible unsettling 
effects of the research itself been identified? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
5.4 Are the plans flexible enough to ensure that time can be spent 
discussing any issues that arise from the effects of the research on the 
individuals or institutions/services? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Standard 6: Ensure appropriate external professional ethical committee approval is 
granted where relevant 
6.1 Have colleagues/supervisors been invited to comment on your 
research proposal? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
6.2 Have any sensitive ethical issues been raised with the School 
Committee and comments sought? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
6.3 If relevant, which includes all health and social care research, has the 
external professional ethical committee been   identified? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
6.4 Have the guidelines from that professional committee been used to 
check the proposed research? 
Yes 
 
No 
 
6.5 Do plans include seeking clearance from this committee (e.g. time to 
obtain approval may need building into the proposal)? 
Yes 
 
No 
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Appendix F 
Fieldwork Schedule 
 
Timetable for 2008  
Quarter Activity 
1 Develop the research proposal  
2 Fine-tune the research proposal 
Develop the research instruments: interview guide and questionnaires 
Conduct document analysis 
3 Get finalized proposal approved 
Pilot the instruments for data collection* 
Revise/finalize instruments for data collection* 
4 Administer questionnaires* 
Conduct interviews*   
 
*This did not take place as approval came late in December 2008. 
 
Timetable for 2009  
Quarter Activity 
1 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews  
Data transcription 
2 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews  
Data transcription  
3 Conduct interviews 
4 Conduct interviews 
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Timetable for 2010  
Quarter Activity 
1 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews 
Data transcription  
 Data coding 
2 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews 
Data transcription 
Data coding 
3 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews 
Data transcription 
Data coding 
4 Administer questionnaires 
Conduct interviews 
Data transcription completed 
Data collection completed 
Data coding completed 
 
 
